

\*ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File\*

ETHNIC  
AREA

DEVELOPMENT CONCEPTS

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1 March 1963

FOREWORD:

Primitive minority groups exist in large enough number in areas important to the free world to merit continued study of the role of these groups in counterinsurgency programs.

This booklet attempts to highlight the potential of these tribal groups. But more specifically it is a brief analysis of the specialized developments required to organize primitive minorities to resist communist subversion and take an active role in supporting "free-world" governments under whose jurisdiction they fall.

The specific example to be cited is that of South Vietnam where certain principles may be observed from the development of minorities in that area. (Intent of this work is to stimulate thoughts on the basic principles, rather than attempt to fix these principles as firm facts for all areas.)

INTRODUCTION TO EXAMPLE AREA:


A. MAPS:

1 - South Vietnam's location with regards to:


Communist China and USSR


Communist North Vietnam


Other free nations of Southeast Asia.












# LAOS: Major Ethnic Groups



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INTRODUCTION TO EXAMPLE AREA:

B. FACT SHEET ON SOUTH VIETNAM PRIOR TO ETHNIC/AREA DEVELOPMENT; 1961.

- 1 - Economic development had only reached the ethnic minorities to a very limited degree.
- 2 - Social and educational programs were not extended to tribal groups by the national government except on a token scale.
- 3 - Political "incorporation" and alignment of minorities was "lagging." Tribesmen did not feel they were an active part of the national government.
- 4 - Security programs were difficult to establish or control in the large area of the remote and scattered tribal villages. Conventional forces of the government of South Vietnam were rendered ineffective because of their seeming inability to locate or destroy small units of communist guerrillas.
- 5 - Some 600,000 scattered tribal villagers provided an excellent source of food, manpower, and intelligence for the developing communist subversive effort. The area which they occupied was directly adjacent to the subversive home base in North Vietnam. Ethnic minorities in Laos also provided potentials for support, development, and expansion of the subversive base of operation.

B.

6. Selected members of the various ethnic groups received communist indoctrination in North Vietnam. Special cadre cultivated the Communist cause among the tribal groups. Regional and guerrilla forces were developed to promote the subversive effort. This was made possible by attaining support from local South Vietnamese ethnic groups.
- 7 - By 1960 it was clear that too little attention had been paid to the tribal minorities and that this lack of interest was partially responsible for allowing a strong communist guerrilla force to develop - a gross mistake that could cost South Vietnam its freedom!
- 8 - A program to regain control of the tribal groups and halt communist subversion started in 1960-61. (This development, with details of essential information that allowed it to take place, is outlined in the remainder of this paper.)

NOTE: Basic facts as related to the individual situation in South Vietnam may or may not relate to other areas; however, two points stand clear:

The importance of minority groups to a nation's security remains constant with the number and type of these groups and their potential for communist development.

B.

The relative security of many underdeveloped nations will depend on their understanding and efforts in directing the development of minority and/or ethnic groups existing within their national boundaries.



I. INTELL AND DEVELOPMENT SURVEY:

A. CHARACTER OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSION; 1960.

1. Regional forces are under developmental expansion by North Vietnamese cadre and ethnic locals of South Vietnam. Some of these local cadre have been trained in the North, but many have been trained in the South at secret training sites.
2. Objectives of the regional force development is support of Communist guerrilla activities. Support includes intelligence nets, food supplies, communications nets, warning systems, and recruitment of manpower for the regional system and the developing guerrilla force. (Without this support subversion could not long exist.)
3. A Regional Political and Military Committee is responsible for the alignment of the population with the Communist cause. Propaganda and/or terrorist control comes into play here.
4. Development and expansion of subversive guerrilla forces takes place in cooperation with the regional force support mechanisms.  
(These two forces are inter-related.)
5. Emphasis of the guerrilla forces include: disruption of the economy and national security; small unit actions against government forces to obtain weapons for the expansion of guerrilla forces; population control, to include tax extortion; recruitment and training of locals as guerrillas, and support of the activities of the Regional Forces.

6. End objectives of the guerrilla forces is armed description of all national government programs in the areas of economic, political, social, security and other developments until such time as the national government collapses; or the guerrilla forces can gain sufficient support to overthrow the government; or opportunity occurs to utilize regular forces routed from the subversive "home base" to end the national government and establish communist control.
7. Regular forces are developed within the national boundary of the subversive sponsoring Communist country for the protection of the home base, support of cadre training, assistance in running supplies to subversive guerrilla elements, expansion of the "base of support" (regarded as "safe base" areas acting as a support system between "home base" and the subversive activity) and eventually for large-scale operations when such are feasible.

I. INTELL AND DEVELOPMENT SURVEY:

B. INDICATORS WHICH "DENOTE" INSURGENCY:

1. Propaganda programs which promote "strife" between any segment of the population and their national government.
2. Development of a "cause" - a promise for better life once the present government is destroyed. (Anything the population is desirous of, promise them this and then show why the present government is at fault for not providing for their desires.)
3. Early indicators should be available by detecting the recruitment of locals from which a cadre system could develop. Even if initial cadre are imported locals must be recruited before the development of the regional or guerrilla systems. (Both forces depend on the support of the local population.)
4. Refined development of a cadre system as well as extensive regional force development could take place with little or no notice if the national government concerned has nothing more than passing interest and/or contact with the group of the population supporting the initial insurgency development. A government contact should then extend to all elements of its population with particular emphasis on measuring their actions and reactions to government's policies and programs. (Numerous support for this action is available in the Development of Counterinsurgency, Part II of this paper.)

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I. INTELL AND DEVELOPMENT SURVEY:

C. ETHNIC CHARACTER:

1. Minority groups have the common character of having different interests, desires, customs and cultures apart from other minorities and/or majorities.
2. Primitive ethnic groups are effected by religious rites, superstitions, tribal laws, land practices and other things which divide them from other populations. But most important this creates barriers which must be breached by national government programs.
3. General national programs may create 'strife' among ethnic groups because of their inability to adjust or 'cope' with certain developments. Governments must then be particularly responsible for providing programs that may be adjusted to fit the various elements of its population. Such populations cannot be easily re-molded or forced to adjust to government policies.

I. INTELL AND DEVELOPMENT SURVEY

D. MOUNTAIN-CONG SYSTEM

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VIET CONG. MOUNTAIN CONG SYSTEM

I. Objective of the Mountain Cong System is to establish a control method and base of operation in the P.M.S. or High Plateau region of South Vietnam. Tribal villages in the P.M.S. are remote and scattered, providing a perfect means of support for the communist guerrillas if tribesmen can be induced to cooperate.

Established cooperation with villages provides constant food supplies over a large area, plus intelligence and other factors vital to a guerrilla force.

Advanced development of the Mountain Cong System calls for agents in all villages and mountain guerrilla units effectively controlling all regions in the P.M.S. These Mountain Cong Units shall be led by hard core Viet Cong, but large numbers of mountaineers shall be trained to follow and assist in all guerrilla actions.

II. Methods for establishing the Mountain Cong System is to press the already existing desire of the tribesmen to preserve the old way of life which is forever fading. To build this desire the Viet Cong build on certain existing facts. The first fact is that a great deal of assistance goes toward the development of a Vietnamese Land Development Center, most of which are in tribal areas, on former tribal lands. Viet Cong point to these facts and tell the tribesmen that the government takes from them to give to the Vietnamese. They talk of the tractors, medical aid, seeds, and plants given to the Vietnamese asking the tribesmen if they receive any of these things from the government. In most all cases the answer is no.

Viet Cong continue with this line of reasoning and begin to help the mountaineer to draw conclusions about these obvious facts. They contend that there is little doubt that the Vietnamese government intends to suppress the tribes by destroying their natural scheme of living with forest, field, and stream.

It should therefore be obvious that an independent nation solely for and governed by tribesmen would surely be better if the old ways are to be preserved. Viet Cong point out that unless this can be accomplished the mountaineer will be molded into the Vietnamese way of life, which he does not like. They contend that the tribesmen will in effect be slaves of President Diem and his American partners in crime.

III. To instill faith of the tribesmen in the Viet Cong, propaganda meetings are held in each village by a well-trained Viet Cong who speaks the tribal language of the area. The purpose of these meetings is to explain to the tribesmen the purpose of the Viet Cong in helping the mountaineer. One line of reasoning here is that the present government is bad in that it divides and oppresses all people.

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The Viet Cong point out that they wish to correct this situation and bring a better life for their own families. In striving toward this goal, they need the help of the tribesmen.

In return for this help they, the Viet Cong, will help the mountaineer establish an independent nation. It is explained that life will be hard and some must die in the effort to establish a better life. However, if they must become slaves death is surely better.

The Viet Cong leaders of the Mountain Cong System explain what taxes must be paid by each family and the rules each village must live under for the advancement of the cause. They carefully explain that those people who break these rules do great harm to the cause for preserving the tribal way of life and developing a new nation of by and for mountaineers. For this reason it must be a part of the regulations that such persons who turn against the cause should be dealt with in the worst possible manner.

It is explained that in return for full cooperation, the Viet Cong will live up to certain rules themselves. They will first of all treat all those who live by the rules fairly and justly. Inasmuch as possible they will provide for the needy. Although they must levy taxes they will not steal or refuse payment for something that they have bought. Neither will they rob belongings from captives or force their attentions on women. Above all, Viet Cong will not allow self-interest to injure Viet Cong or group interest. After this portion of the lecture, the Viet Cong lecturer points out the evil purposes of the Vietnamese government and the Vietnamese Army. The list here is long. Key words in most cases are rape, steal, plunder, and enslave. Any instance that may be possibly twisted is used as an example. Rotating demonstration teams are used by the Viet Cong to support the propaganda effort. Such a team might have a doctor with supply of medicine. Two or three men might give small demonstrations in the use of explosives and trap building and talk of their confidence in the ultimate victory of the Viet Cong. In some cases transistor radios are carried for tuning in the tribal broadcast from Radio Hanoi. Here the old Viet Cong line is repeated time and again building up and twisting every incident to fit the propaganda line.

IV. Radio Hanoi has speakers who are tribesmen who have been taken to Hanoi for training. These tribesmen call their families and friends to support the cause. A number of them tell of their training to be doctors, teachers and government administrators for the new tribal nation.

Large propaganda conventions and demonstrations are used to show signs of strength and instill the line of doctrine into the mountaineer. In one demonstration near Buon Ho in June 1961 nine tribal languages were presented in a large mass meeting.

V. Recruitment and training is done under the leadership of hard core Viet Cong with the support of mountaineers who have proven themselves loyal. The method of draft is kidnapping. An explanation is later given to the villagers as to the reasons why this is necessary. Here the old line is again used about the need for sacrifice if the tribes achieve their freedom.

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A trainee usually receives training in a region of considerable distance from his home. Once he has proven himself he may return to assist on the effort in his home area. Training seems to consist of methods of movement and tactics. The old line of propaganda is stressed during the training period. Special efforts go toward tactic for ambush and means for dispersing and regrouping when being pursued. Trap building and making of simple weapons is method phase.

VI. Patterns of the Mountain Cong System include the placing of agents in each village. An effort is made to keep their identity secret in most cases until it is felt that a majority of the village is on the side of the Viet Cong. The system for moving on an objective is to pass the word for Mountain Cong from villages in the area to converge on an objective. Some units of the Mountain Cong are kept close contact most of the time unless they are in hiding or under pursuit.

For large objectives, large numbers of Mountain Cong may gather and travel considerable distance as a group. Most of this type of travel takes place at night. The group may form a simple camp during daylight hours.

A system for complete dispersion and hiding exists if large units of military move into the area. The method involves hiding of weapons near a village and entering that village as traveler or making contact with agents in the village. Another means is to remain in hiding near the area of the village without disclosing their presence even to the villagers. The dispersion pattern is for small bands of guerrillas to scatter in all directions so that no sizeable group approaches any single village for hiding.

If pressed hard, another tactic of the Mountain Cong is to enter a village as a group and use the villagers for protection under threat of their lives.

This information is based on extensive study of Viet Cong activities in the highland area. To the best of my knowledge the material closely parallels the actual system. However, none of the statements should be taken as exacting facts.



II. DEVELOPMENT CONCEPTS OF ETHNIC/AREA PROGRAMS:

A. INFORMATION ON THE FIRST EXPERIMENTAL PROJECT ON ETHNIC/AREA DEVELOPMENT.\*

PAPERS:

1. Development of Counterinsurgency
2. Manual for Village Defense
3. The Village Defense Program, by a Special Forces Captain

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\*NOTE: These papers contain a detailed account of the theory and development of counterinsurgency.

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DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

Based on Experiences in South Vietnam  
From December 1959 to December 1962

18 December 1962

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KEY

**PART I. THEORY OF COUNTERINSURGENCY**

- A. "Life" Index for Governments
- B. "Termination" Index for Governments
- C. Factors Altering "Life Span" for Governments or Political Systems
- D. Roles of a Successful Revolutionary Subversive Force
- E. Roles of a Successful Counterrevolutionary Subversive Force

**PART II. CURRENT PROGRAMS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY**

- A. Analysis - Past and Present Efforts to Curb Communist Expansion
- B. Recommended Changes
- C. Manual for Village Defense (Based on experience gained in the Buon Enao Area Development Program)

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**FOREWORD:**

The actual writing of this paper took place during the period of one week. As a result details that should have been covered to show a basis for some conclusions were omitted. It is hoped that a beginning for sound analysis of present problems does exist in this effort.

Persons more familiar with the theory of counterinsurgency may choose to move directly to Part II which deals with specifics. The author was desirous of first developing the theory, found in Part I, so that persons with lesser experience might better understand the principles of counterinsurgency development.

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PART I. THEORY OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

A. "LIFE" INDEX FOR GOVERNMENTS

1. The main "key" to the "life span" of any government or even systems of government is its own ability to provide for the basic essentials of its population or populations.

Basic essentials should be considered as food, clothing, shelter, and all those supplemental developments required to produce the above basic essentials in sufficient quantity to provide subsistence for the population in question.

Supplementary assistance may vary from development of agriculture, communications, or transportation systems. In the case of capitalism, free enterprise may develop many of the supplementary needs. The government's role in this case is to serve and facilitate the free enterprise system.

Disregarding the ratio of individual freedoms given or allowed the people by the government as compared with those they desire and those they obtain, the relative measure of respect for any government or system of government is directly proportionate to that government's or system's ability to facilitate the development of an economy which provides a means for every individual to obtain the basic essentials or more.

2. A secondary "key" which measures the "life span" of governments is their ability to provide both internal and

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external security sufficient to allow normal individual and national pursuits of the desired basic essentials plus any other additional or supplemental desires.

Governments incapable of developing systems to protect internal security within areas and by means desired by the population will be short lived.

External security involves a wide range of responsibilities that must be met by the national government. Foreign policies, treaties, agreements and the maintenance of national armies as well as mobilization in time of war are all matters of prime importance. If government policy in these areas is contrary to the interests of the people, little can be done to prevent the resulting effects which lead to the downfall of policies, systems, and/or governments.

**CONCLUSION:**

Disregarding desires and demands for individual freedom, propaganda and/or psychological control schemes, martial law or military control, the viability of governments or systems of government may be reasonably measured in A. 1 and 2.

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**B. "TERMINATION" INDEX FOR GOVERNMENTS**

1. Continuing failure to provide, facilitate or allow for the development of a basic subsistence economy within a national area will result in the eventual downfall of the national government involved.

Lack of basic subsistence provides:

- a. A basis for ill feeling against the existing national government by the population whether or not that government is directly or indirectly responsible for the substandard economy.
- b. A foundation from which to build a revolutionary force, which may act in any number of ways, both violent and non-violent, to assist the downfall of the existing government.

2. A failure to establish effective policies and systems that will provide for both internal and external security may spell the end for a government, nation, or governmental system either from within or without; for it has laid itself "open" to all of its enemies, large or small, from any camp.

**CONCLUSION:**

The final success or failure of any system of government rests with the desires of the people to support that government. Degrees of support for a government or

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system of government is usually directly proportionate to the ability of that government to act in accord with and meet the desires of the people.

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C. FACTORS ALTERING "LIFE SPAN" FOR GOVERNMENTS OR POLITICAL SYSTEMS

1. Internal government mechanisms may act to adjust or control the desires of the national population and thereby temporarily sustain the government's life period even though it does not represent the will or desires of the people.

Methods of artificial control include military and police states, regimentation, regulation, control of speech and press, as well as use of propaganda and indoctrination systems.

2. External assistance may temporarily sustain a government that does not or cannot meet or provide for the best interests of its population. This comes about in the form of aid, trade, treaties, and agreements.

CONCLUSION:

Governments or systems that can only exist by virtue of artificial supports such as those expressed in C. 1 and 2 may be considered as temporary governments or systems whose end will be an eventuality. The shock of last defeat for such systems will always be great because their entire foundation has been artificially constructed and supported. Often the final breath of defeat involves throwing the nation under the artificially sustained government into war (if revolution does not take place first) - this creates a greater enemy to the people than their own government was in the past.

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D. ROLES OF A SUCCESSFUL SUBVERSIVE REVOLUTIONARY FORCE

1. A "primary role" is to hinder and retard economic development with the objective of making the economy as far below subsistence as possible.

Such an objective once accomplished provides unrest in the population, lack of confidence in the government, and makes it extremely costly and difficult for internal or external artificial supports to uphold the existing government.

Means of retarding an economy vary from creating unrest in labor by infiltration into the ranks, to tampering with national currency, to guerrilla activities designed to hinder economic development in any means possible from cutting and harassing roads, to any number of different actions that would act in their own small way to create economic problems.

2. An additional "corollary" subversive role is to cause the complete collapse of existing internal security through the use and development of guerrilla forces or any other means available.

Such actions supplement the lack of confidence in the existing government as well as greatly hindering economic development programs. Funds that could normally be used to better the "lot" of the local peasant must now be used to re-establish internal security.

As the "unrest" increases, the subversive guerrilla force can increase its development potential by collecting taxes and food supplies, and bringing local populations under their control. The guerrilla force must avoid serious losses in its early stages.

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of development if the movement is to be successful. This, however, becomes a different question once the movement has obtained the active or at least passive support of the majority of the population. Various stages of action have been quite well expressed by various communist doctrines on "guerrilla warfare".

3. Artificial methods may be employed by the subversive force through propaganda leaflets, programs of local appeal, and terrorist control actions. The ultimate purpose here is to support objectives in D. 1 and 2 as well as acting to give additional assurance in the ultimate victory of the subversive force through gaining support of the population. Note that communist efforts to gain popular support may involve any number of a great variety of systems designed to convince the people that their cooperation in the "cause" will result in the fulfillment of a particular desire or group of desires.

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E. ROLES OF A SUCCESSFUL COUNTER-SUBVERSIVE-REVOLUTIONARY FORCE

1. Assure continued economic development as well as a minimum subsistence economy.

2. Develop methods of internal and external security that will provide for the safety of the national population by, first separation of the subversive guerrilla force from the population, and by secondly destroying the subversive force. (NOTE: Actions taken against the base of origin of the subversive effort greatly assists breakdown.)

3. Establishment of sound government policies that represent, in as much as possible, the will of the people as well as allowances for a reasonable degree of individual freedoms. A basis for mutual cooperation between government and populations must develop.

4. Internal artificial government controls to include regimented police state and indoctrination systems may act as an expedient against subversive forces. However, the danger always exists that the population might consider the police state a greater threat to their desires than the subversive force attempting to overthrow the government in question. Sound justification for all actions taken by the government in power thus becomes an active duty in counter-subversion.

5. External assistance in support of a counter-subversive effort on the part of a national government obligates the external supporter to the policies of the recipient government except where political interplay may effect a change.

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The external supporter is committed to see that the objectives E. 1 through 4 are carried out to a degree that will allow the recipient government to "route" the subversive effort.

Numerous situations may develop where large gaps occur between desirable policies, policies of the national government, and advocated policies of the external supporter. The result is that various degrees of political "interplay" comes into effect--the result of which may or may not provide for practical solutions to the problems that have been previously discussed.

6. The existing national government and the external supporter must recognize the divergent desires and capabilities of ethnic minorities in order to curb subversive inroads to any portion of the population that might provide the initial foothold for the development of revolutionary activities.

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PART II. CURRENT PROGRAMS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

A. ANALYSIS OF PAST AND PRESENT EFFORTS TO "CURB" COMMUNIST DEVELOPMENT

1. Comment - Analysis of past and present approach methods used to effect solutions to the fundamental problems, reflect the activities of numerous agencies within the U.S. Government as aligned with U.S. efforts in support of friendly governments coming under communist subversion as well as other pressures.

In an objective attempt to analyze problem areas confronting the U.S. effort, consideration will be given to the basis for successes or failures. The standard for credit or discredit will be derived from the author's actual observations of various attempts to meet the problems thus far outlined. These observations resulted from actual participation in the planning, development, and application of economic, political, social, and security programs designed to bolster the South Vietnamese effort against communist subversion. (Period of working observation was from December 1959 to December 1962.)

NOTE: The author's total purpose is to motivate constructive improvement.

2. Listing of Observed Weaknesses

a. General policy planning in all areas is conducted for the most part between the national government agencies and their U.S. counterparts on the capital-city level. As a result, the programs and policies formulated, although outwardly sound,

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failed to provide a means of adjusting the system to the greatly varied needs and desires of divergently interested ethnic complexes of the population. Serious problems developed when attempts were made to re-orient these ethnic groups.

b. Determination of actual problems, policy planning and program application became increasingly difficult as a result of the short periods of time advisors had available to them to analyze problem areas and then develop and apply solutions. The complexity of this problem was expanded by the increase in quantity of short-term advisors and experts.

c. Coordinated programs expressing the cooperative efforts of several agencies have been generally lacking. "Shock effect" programs that gain support of the population require that economic, political, social and security developments follow in rapid sequence in an order that will create the greatest effect. In the period before 1962, the various ministries and agencies generally chose to go their own way. A very limited amount of progress was made in 1962 in developing a spirit of cooperation between agencies in the development of the counterinsurgency program. However, due to the inability of most agencies to provide rapid supplies of moneys and materials for direct application to problem areas, difficulties still existed in obtaining all of the ingredients needed for effective counterinsurgency programs.

d. Development of programs in the field generally progressed with great difficulties resulting from varieties of

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delays, on the side of the U.S. agencies and the various Vietnamese ministries, in getting moneys and materials to the actual level of the project. Peasant populations lost complete hope in the government when promised assistance either failed to arrive or was very much delayed in doing so. Payment of personnel working for the government, on several projects the author was working with, was often delayed four to eight months by which time some of the families were near starvation.

e. Political interplay as related to working relationships and agreements between the national government and the various U.S. agencies adversely affected capabilities of moving effectively to cope with problems. Agreements generally limited U.S. influence to higher levels of government except in those cases where U.S. advisors were allowed to operate at local levels. In such cases, the advisors were generally stripped of any control on moneys or materials and could do no more than suggest that certain things be done. Numerous observations were made where moneys and materials existed in sufficient quantity but failed to move to the project level because of political, administrative, and other difficulties within the national government. Advisors were helpless to do anything but observe the failure taking place on their level.

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3. Observation of Principles that made the Buon Enao Project Succeed as an Experiment in Counterinsurgency

NOTE\*

- a. Ethnic area planning
- b. Determination of, planning of, and application of programs by area specialists
- c. Flexible, coordinated, and timely development in all areas important to counterinsurgency programs, i.e., economic, political, social, and security assistance
- d. Direct cooperative control of moneys and materials on the project level.
- e. Development and application of effective tools of political interplay.

NOTE: A short analysis follows on the advantages gained in the five areas listed as compared to old methods of approach.

\*Buon Enao project was directed in the field by the author.

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a. Ethnic Area Planning

Keeping in mind that programs generated on a national level often were not adjustable to all ethnic populations and in some cases created conflict, a new method of approach was attempted with the development of the Buon Enao project. This new method was simply to analyze and develop programs on the level of the ethnic groups concerned; taking into consideration interests of the country as a whole with particular emphasis on methods of countering Communist subversive activities.

A system of analysis actually preceded any planning. Methods of approach were as follows:

(1) Studies were made of overt Communist approaches to the population. An attempt was made to determine rate of progress, capability, and end objective of the subversive effort.

(2) Detailed information was gathered on ethnic customs, cultures, superstitions, desires, problems, and potential to directed development.

(3) An attempt was made to determine existing relationships between the national government - general population, and the ethnic target group.

(4) Determination of primary stimuli or the establishment of approach patterns to the ethnic group took place through analyzing desires by giving small groups of the population small samplings of medical assistance; simple training and development programs in agriculture, education, and home industries.

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(5) Considerations were given desirable and feasible security programs and then an attempt was made to determine which areas of the various proposals would be most adaptable and acceptable to the ethnic populations.

A period of joint planning, study, and discussion between government, target populations, and support groups followed the above period of analysis.

The most important factor to remember about the planning was that the greater portion of this was accomplished on the local level. After most of the parties concerned had a rough idea of the attempted approach desired, permission was obtained from higher levels to support the ethnic area development by giving a small number of local authorities and advisors relative freedom of action and development as long as this took place within the area of national interest.

Note that the period of ethnic area planning took one year. During this time the steps of analysis and experimentation outlined above took place. In addition to this the year proved valuable in gaining the confidence of the target group as well as the local officials. At the same time, talented leaders and potential cadre, etc., had to be sought out, cultivated, and trained to act as the initial foundation from which economic, political, social, and security programs advanced in the form of an area development.

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b. Determination of, Planning of, and Application of Programs by Area Specialists.

Past and most present efforts of the U.S. to assist friendly governments have centered around the recommendations of various U.S. personnel working on the capital-city level or by personnel working as field advisors for periods generally not longer than one year. (Note: This does not take into account changes of policy that result from desires, demands, or recommendations of the national government. These factors will be covered in the area of political interplay.)

The net result of benefits derived from short-term advisors seems to be very limited degrees of progress. By contrast, a great deal of progress was made by utilizing these same types of personnel under the guidance of a limited number of Americans who had gone through the processes of ethnic area study outlined in A; who then stayed on to direct the area project.

Progress obtained during the development of the Buon Enao experiment could not have occurred, or would have been difficult at best, if no groundwork had been laid by an individual or individuals who had remained in the area long enough to understand the full complement of problems as well as having the confidence of the target population and area officials.

Note that it is the author's opinion that present efforts to analyze and effect solutions by the introduction of large quantities of short-term advisors and experts develops

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confusion and mistrust of national government officials. It does not afford the same advantages occurring from utilization of long-term ethnic area specialists.

REFERENCE: Jungle Mission, by Rene Riesen. (The author believes this book gives a good account of some of the activities that may take place during effective attempts to influence tribal ethnic minorities.)

c. Flexible, coordinated, and timely development in all areas important to counterinsurgency programs, i.e. economic, political, social, and security.

The general approach to effecting solutions to national problems was, and generally still is, expressed by the individual programs of the various ministries of the national government with varying degrees of advisory and financial support from their U.S. counterparts. Monies and materials provided by the U.S. were placed, for the most part, under the direct control of the various ministries. It then became their responsibility to provide a means of applying this to the divergent problems existing on local levels. Modes of approach were usually expressed in the form of national ministry programs that developed from different degrees of recognition of the problems. A blending of degrees of idea-exchanges between U.S. advisors, ministries, and national leaders, formulated policies.

Machinery for the development of cooperative programs between the ministries is for the most part void. Both the U.S. agencies and those of the national government coordinate

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programs on the higher levels. But in actual fact great differences in the flexibility of most organizations prevented a coordinated and timely effort in any actual application to problems. This continues to be a real weakness of present efforts and as a result, effective development does not take place in all areas of counterinsurgency programs. A great danger exists in that "shock effect" programs needed to develop a strong bond between government and population generally call for some degree of progress in all of the areas of importance, i.e. economic, political, social, and security.

A difficult population was convinced to give its full support to the government under the Buon Enao project because a single U.S. organization with its national counterpart was willing to accept the total initiative in seeing that efforts were flexible, coordinated, and timely.

Primary stimuli for gaining support of the population was simultaneous development of medical, agricultural, educational and security programs as initiated by the single U.S. agency with counterpart. Numerous delays occurred in obtaining assistance from ministries or agencies that should have supported areas of the project to which they were related. However, immediate support had to be supplied by the single U.S. agency conducting the experiment.

Success would not have occurred if the counterinsurgency experiment at Buon Enao had been totally dependent

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upon the existing system of programming through the individual ministries with their U.S. counterparts.

Note that there has been some recognition of the above outlined problems and as a result minor changes have been made since the initial development of the Buon Enao project. However, the author feels that the difficulties outlined above still present a real danger to our efforts.

4. Direct cooperative control of moneys and materials on the project level.

Several different systems exist for U.S. support organizations to supply funds and materials to the national government economy. By far the greatest majority of this support is turned over to the national ministries. No concessions were obtained from the national government by the U.S. support agencies for any actual control measures that would stimulate the movement of assistance to the level of the population. The author witnessed numerous cases where attempted projects failed because large quantities of moneys and materials were frequently delayed or totally stopped within the ministries. U.S. advisors were for the most part helpless in bringing any real pressure against a ministry to provide support to a needed development on the local level.

NOTE: That a few changes are presently being attempted to assure U.S. agencies of greater control in seeing that moneys, etc., reach the project level.

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A major factor in the success of the Buon Enao project was that concessions were obtained from the national government to allow for the movement of funds and goods directly to the project level, totally by-passing the ministries. Taking the place of the former system was a single Vietnamese officer who actually assisted in directing the project. This officer was a representative of a national agency and reported to them as well as the Provincial Chief. The quantity of moneys and materials needed was determined by U.S. advisors working on the project level. U.S. project advisors informed the U.S. agency, handling the project, of present and expected needs. A U.S. project advisor then acted as a banker in passing support directly into the hands of the local national acting as director. Since moneys and materials were disbursed only as needed support passed at once into the hands of the population affected by the project. As a result it was virtually impossible for delays and/or misuse of funding to occur.

5. Development and application of effective tools of Political Inter-Play.

A tool, or tools, of Political Inter-Play should be considered as a devise, devises, or mechanisms which act to move, alter motion, or change the direction of movement of Political machinery generally referred to as governments.

Numerous machines (governments) of underdeveloped, as well as developed nations find that variously interested groups are concerned with altering their direction of motion. As a

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result barriers are established to prevent the entry or application of the different tools of Political Inter-Play. There are cases where the use of some tools might assist movements of the machinery--but it is extremely difficult for the machine to analyze the effect of the tool prior to its use. Thus, barriers become the answer since they prevent the approach of most of the tools of Political Inter-Play.

Our past efforts to assist the defective machinery of national government suffering from communist subversion and internal strife reflect our inexperience of utilization of the tools of Political Inter-Play. In most cases we have only been able to add oil in the form of monetary support since we had no knowledge of the needed tool to replace faulty working parts of the machine.

Previous discussion has indicated problems that develop as a result of initially poor working agreements between the national government machinery and the mechanics or the U.S. advisory groups. Changes away from the initial agreements are suspect and become extremely difficult to develop. It then behooves the U.S. to be very certain the working agreements will constitute a practical approach in resolving problems. Unless agreements are functional it becomes extremely difficult and expensive at best to resolve problems arising from communist subversion.

Several types of effective Political Inter-Play took place before the start of the Buon Enao project. First it was pointed out that funds could not and would not be supplied unless they were controlled directly at the project level. This was accepted by the national government because it was a clear

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point of fact the target population would only be antagonized if funds did not arrive when needed.

A second concession was gained by demanding that the project director in cooperation with local provincial officials create a system of immediate action which would avoid numerous delays of decision and action that destroyed some of the previous attempts.

These two examples serve to illustrate that the primary need for Inter-Play is to obtain functional working agreements that give relative assurance that an attempted project does not fail as a result of mechanical breakdown.\* (Political Inter-Play also serves to hold national government agencies in a closer bond with their U.S. counterparts until such time as responsible local leaders can be developed.)

\*Note: The author makes no attempt to list specific approaches that might be listed as a tool of Political Inter-Play since each situation is somewhat different. Further study might develop some generalities.

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G. RECOMMENDED CHANGES

It is the author's opinion that a system utilizing long-term area specialists for ethnic area or area analysis, program planning, and program direction, should be developed as a means of resolving the indicated problems.

Such personnel could direct effective programs by the system of area analysis and could also attain most of the advantages observed in the development of the Buon Enao project; such as more immediate, flexible, and coordinated application of moneys and materials directly to problem areas.

This type of approach most rapidly effects counterinsurgency programs among divergently interested populations. Note that such a system is also applicable to most areas of Africa, South America, and Asia where great differences of interest exist between various populations within any one nation.

A specific suggestion for the area of South Vietnam would encompass the development of 12 teams of area specialists. Each team would be composed of three men, one having a background in the various phases of economic development, one having a background in special warfare, and the third having some background in politics. (NOTE: Requirements for other countries will vary.)

The teams of area specialists would be each assigned areas of responsibility within the country. Each team would remain in their assigned area for at least two years and should remain longer if problems still exist within their area. Duties of the

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team would include analysis, planning, coordination, and direction of programs of counterinsurgency, or even singly interested programs within their various areas.

Area specialists would most likely be directed by a controlling committee representing all of the U.S. agencies concerned. Such a committee should have the authority to direct all agencies in such a manner that support needed in any aspect of the counterinsurgency program is forthcoming without delay.

Comments regarding systems of approach to local populations leads the author to recall that measures taken to obtain the support of the native population involved in the Buon Enao project presented a number of unusual happenings that should be briefly recalled so that others become aware of the fact that immediate success of area teams as well as any other system demands close contact with the target population.

The period of area analysis which preceeded the development of the Buon Enao project lasted about one year. During this time the author lived, hunted, slept, ate, and drank with the natives. By contrast, the author could have remained "aloof" from the people and the personal difficulties of close association by conducting an intellectual type study from existing information. The results of the more sophisticated approach would have resulted in a total failure to even start such a project as resulted from the Buon Enao experiment.

Considerations of ethnic area groups to be developed should form a complete pattern and purpose as oriented to national security and to projected programs of varying degrees of expansion.

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that might lap into bordering countries. An excellent example exists in the SE Asia area for the development of a strong blocking force consisting of tribal ethnic groups throughout five different countries of that area.

Tribal groups protecting their own home areas could block the infiltration of Chinese or North Vietnamese into most of the Indochina area. The author would suggest that numerous advantages could be obtained by an active expansion of initial interest to all ethnic groups within the SE Asia area, that will eventually have to be developed to prevent the communists from making "end runs" around the areas where we do establish effective blocks of organized ethnic groups.

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MANUAL FOR VILLAGE DEFENSE  
AND  
ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT

Based on experiences at Buon Enao,  
Ban Me Thuot, Vietnam.  
Darlao Province  
1 November 1961 - 1 July 1962

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MANUAL FOR VILLAGE DEFENSE  
AND ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT

- I. Statement of the Problem
- II. General Considerations for Population Control Systems in Vietnam
- III. Ground Rules for Village Defense Systems of Population Control
- IV. Approach Methods for Village Defense Development
  - A. Selection of a Model Village
  - B. Appeal and Indoctrination Period
  - C. Agreement for Experimentation
  - D. Development and Expansion of Interest
- V. Area Growth Systems for Village Defense
- VI. Problems of Associated Development
- VII. Cooperation and Development of Counterparts and Counterpart Roles

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*CONFIDENTIAL*

51

## I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

All of the areas of South Vietnam provide a natural development potential for the Vietnamese Communist (VC) guerrilla in the many remote and scattered villages. It is virtually impossible for a conventional force to provide static defenses for even some of these villages nor is it possible for this conventional force to prevent VC contact with these villages through various types of operations. The problem is to develop some effective means to protect these villages or, in other words, a system of population control.

Population control is needed to break the support line provided the VC guerrilla by his contact with the villagers. An understanding of the types of support provided the VC guerrilla makes the problem clearer.

In the beginning the VC developed a control system over the villagers by the mild technique of propaganda, then followed this by acts of terrorism including torture and murder, as demanded to gain control of the villagers.

After the VC have established control the law of the VC may then be imposed on the villagers. The regulations usually follow the same pattern of development, ranging from the rice tax imposed to assist the VC guerrilla in his stated noble cause to "liberate" the people, to advanced systems where villagers act as warning agents when government forces move into the area. Some of the more apt students of the VC cause may be recruited to act as scouts or intelligence agents for a VC unit while others may receive training to fight with the VC. Threats of murder and actual murders plus other acts of terrorism serve to keep non-conformers in line and to force their assistance.

Without support from the population the VC guerrilla could not exist nor could his elusive activity continue once the villagers broke their contact. It is the contact and support from the local population that make the VC band the effective functioning unit that it is. Population support provides freedom of movement and actions. Since the unprotected local people are afraid to report the activities of the VC, a wide choice exists in the pattern of activities. None of these VC systems or patterns will be discussed here since the major purpose of this paper is to discuss village defense development.

## II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR POPULATION CONTROL SYSTEMS IN VIETNAM

A. The desire of the people should be a primary consideration. Previous examples of resettlement programs which enforced movement of villagers ended with various adverse effects. Mountaineers forced, except for a few volunteers, to resettle in large villages during 1958-59 resented their flight because their tribal life and customs were virtually destroyed by the movement. Religious beliefs of the tribesmen were in some instances ignored. All of these problems plus a general lack of support and understanding from the Vietnamese caused most of the resettled tribesmen to filter back to the mountains. In two cases entire villages revolted and killed their Vietnamese guards so they could escape. These revolts were not caused by the VC nor were they VC inspired.

Part of the failure was that assistance promised the newly settled villagers failed to continue, even in cases where it did start; funds were lacking or the resettlement program was over-extended.

*CONFIDENTIAL*



-2-

Several cases occurred where tribesmen in the new villages were ordered to build a new life based on Vietnamese culture. In one resettlement village the tribesmen were ordered to build their houses on the ground in Vietnamese style. Instead they built their houses on poles off the ground in tribal style, but built false fronts to give the appearance that the houses had been built on the ground.

Great care should be taken that mishandling of tribal and other minor ethnic groups, which forced many to the VC, is not repeated in the endeavor to form population control centers under the name of strategic hamlets or other population control schemes.

Population control systems will necessarily have to be as varied as the attitudes of the people concerned as well as having consideration for customs and desires. Certain economic factors including village and field practices should be considered. Analysis of several separate examples indicates that it would be economically impossible to resettle everyone into large fortified villages, again indicating that more than one concept of population control will be required. Examples of cases other than tribal groups follow.

#### (1) Land Development Villages

The land development villages are generally in the area of the highlands or plateau regions around Ban Me Thuot, Pleiku, and Kontum. These villages began in 1955 as a part of the resettlement of refugees from North Vietnam and continued later as a system for settling Vietnamese from overcrowded coastal regions. Primary emphasis during the planning of these land development villages was on the spacing of family homes so that each family might have a portion or all of its field area around its own house. Thus, all of the villages were large in area while the population was relatively small.

During the race of provincial chiefs to produce strategic hamlets by the number, all land development centers were required to build fences around their villages. Some of these fences were more than 20 kilometers in length. Almost all of these villages had fewer than 30 armed men with generally a small population. During the months of March, April and May 1962 nearly half of these so-called strategic hamlets in Darlac Province were overrun and/or lost weapons in fights with the VC.

General attitudes noted by the land development villagers was that the so-called strategic hamlet defenses were artificial. Many commented that it was the ARVN's duty to protect the villages from the VC; this included some of the Self Defense Corps (SDC) and Civil Guard defenders who fled at the first sign of a VC attack.

Several of the resettlement villagers had poorer attitudes than many of the refugees. Many of the resettlers felt that since the government had asked them to leave their native coastal villages to resettle in the highlands the government forces should protect their villages. As often as not

CONFIDENTIAL

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resettlers with guard duties would refuse to stand their turn stating that it was their duty only to work in the fields to provide for their families. Low salaries, VC propaganda, and other factors helped to create this attitude.

Programs in villages where the population is unconcerned are programs in name only. Contact with the VC is not necessarily broken. It is economically unfeasible to spend several million dollars to reorganize again villages that have received extensive aid over the past several years under land development. Instead it would seem that some adjustment is needed in the present defensive efforts. Again it is a matter of applying more direct solutions to specific problems rather than attempting one general solution for all problems.

(2) Defense and population control programs for Vietnamese villages in the regions of the coastal belt and the southern delta will necessarily meet numerous distinctly different problems. Close ties will be found among paddy areas, fishing areas and the like. Forced movement away from economic ties will cause resentment in many cases. This would create a potentially explosive situation should economic redevelopment fail to occur in the new centers of concentrated population under strategic hamlets or other similar programs. Past efforts at resettlement often ended with assistance programs being inadequate to provide the needed development. Many of the effective programs remained only false fronts because the resources of the Vietnamese ministries had either been overextended or channeled elsewhere. All of these weaknesses were noted in towns of numerous centers familiar to the author in various areas in 1960 - 61.

Another serious problem is that population control is difficult even with the cooperation of the people. The problem is greatly complicated if a percentage of those persons involved must be forced into resettlement.

B. In the final analysis general considerations for population control should provide for a set of stimuli to induce people to become a part of defended villages, strategic hamlets or other population control systems. Careful planning should be a part of all population control projects so that available resources and monies are not overextended to the point where economic development and assistance programs become hindered, thereby creating a greater burden on the people than formerly existed in their native homes. These rules will apply in cases where villagers are required to resettle as well as in cases where villagers become a part of population control and self defense systems without moving.

In all cases where resettlement or types of regroupment are involved great care should be taken to avoid force when population groups are requested to move as a part of the program. A situation may be created in which it is more desirable for the populace to move and become a part of the program rather than to remain aloof and separate. These systems of motivation will be discussed in the next section.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

54

-4-

III. GROUND RULES FOR VILLAGE DEFENSE SYSTEMS OF POPULATION CONTROL.

A. Defensive systems shall be developed in existing villages without any attempt to resettle or regroup any or even a part of the existing population.

B. Village defense villages may be supplemented by:

(1) Cooperative defensive systems among groups of defense villages.

(2) Development of mobile strike forces whose job it will be to take positive aggressive actions against the VC as well as to maintain an alert force to aid defense villages under VC attack or in need of help for reasons of emergency.

(3) Radio communication, transportation, warning and alert systems shall be developed to supplement the general area of village defense villages.

C. A primary stimulus will be developed as a beginning for a proposed village defense area development. The primary stimulus shall be known as the model village or control center which shall have the following two objectives:

(1) To create a desire for other villages to volunteer for the village defense program.

(2) In addition, to become the controlling factor in the expansion of the area defense development and possibly to act as the training center for village defenders.

D. Village defense development shall consist of the following:

(1) Building of a double protective fence, to align the villagers on the side of the government as opposed to the VC. In actual protective value it will serve only as a delaying device in case of large scale attacks by the VC. This serves to keep the defenders alert to continue ambushes, patrols and guard systems to protect the village.

(2) Supplementary development assistance composed of:

a. Medical dispensary and medical training facilities at the control center. A medic will be trained and equipped to handle simple cases on the village level while the dispensary at the center will handle the more severe cases.

b. Educational development to consist of training teachers for the defense villages as well as building and supporting schools for these same villages.

c. Agriculture and home improvement advanced by the training of extension teams to service the defense villages by teaching practical improvement methods. New types of seeds, plants, and other assistance will be given as available.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-5-

d. Youth training, cultural programs, etc. developed as the later stages of the village defense development. Primary interest in this area is to stimulate the interest of all parties to take an active part in development programs for the village defense villages.

#### IV. APPROACH METHODS FOR VILLAGE DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT

A. Selection of a model village is the key factor in the attempt at village defense. Success or failure in the development of the model village will determine the general area attitude toward the village defense program. A short history of the development of Buon Enao follows. Since Buon Enao was the first pilot model village defense village, experiences here may be somewhat different than those encountered in other cases of defense development.

Factors leading to the choice of Buon Enao as the pilot model included the following:

(1) Relationship of the village to main roads, towns, airports, communications and other military units; security of the area; potential for development and expansion; water and food supply; and all other associated factors that might affect, hinder or assist the development of a village defense control center.

(2) General considerations for the specific village include size, manpower, strategic location, relationship with and to other villages, plus general attitudes and feelings of the villagers.

#### B. Appeal and Indoctrination Period

The villagers of Buon Enao were approached with regard to village defense about 1 November 1961. The first series of discussions were not an attempt to explain any of the theories of village defense. Instead meetings were held for a period of one week to explain the theory of VC development in the simplest possible terms. It was explained that during the later phases of the VC development all villagers would be forced to align themselves with the VC or the Government of Vietnam (GVN), the only other choice being that they could attempt to remain neutral and thus incur destruction and death from both sides as the conflict progressed.

This was followed by one week of objective discussion to analyze the merits of the VC system versus the democratic system practiced by the GVN. Basic principles of communism versus free democracy were included as a part of all meetings.

The following conclusions were drawn by the villagers during the meetings.

(1) Support going to the VC from the villagers had been a result of fear as well as the inability of ARVN to protect the villagers in the majority of cases.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-6-

(2) Tribesmen had previously aligned themselves with the GVN but promises of help from the GVN failed to materialize. A basic distrust existed.

(3) Grumblings had been created among small minorities of the tribesmen expressing discontent at the tribal association with the GVN. This led to minority movements for tribal independence and to support of the VC. Later the VC conducted a successful propaganda program that convinced many supporters of the independent state that the VC revolution would create such independent states when the VC crushed the GVN.

(4) The Rhade were generally opposed to the policies of the land development program which upset them first, because the resettlement programs took tracts of tribal lands and second, because they saw that the flow of aid from both American and Vietnamese sources was strictly oriented to land development centers and Vietnamese villages. In the minds of many this was an open effort to suppress and destroy the tribesmen. But still the great majority did not favor the VC movement.

NOTE: Numerous examples had occurred to give evidence of the fact that the Rhade as well as other tribesmen had no real desire to follow the VC even in cases where they felt they were being unfairly treated by the GVN. The most outstanding example of this is the case of Cu Piang village where in August of 1961 the VC had made a great show of strength within the village to trick ARVN bombers into making an attack. The VC had deserted Cu Piang prior to the expected attack but forced the villagers to remain inside the village hoping that it would be bombed. Thus it was, and after the bombing the VC returned to the village to assist the people and advise them on the evil ways of the GVN. The VC then offered the villagers a place in the jungle with the VC. All but two of the Cu Piang people fled from the VC as they desired to have no more to do with them than with the GVN.

These people were later to become the first volunteers for the aggressor units of the village defense program.

(5) Of the few assistance programs started for the Rhade in Darlac Province, medical aid stations and schools had progressed the farthest. However, these programs were stopped by VC actions against both programs. Medicines and medical aid men were taken from villages by the VC. In the case of schools, the VC would threaten a village that allowed children to attend a school organized by the GVN stating that such schools were only propaganda centers for corrupting the thoughts of the children. At the beginning of the Buon Enao project all programs, including the two mentioned above, had been stopped. This created resentment against both the VC and the GVN.

D. An agreement was finally reached with the Buon Enao villagers that certain steps could be taken to show their total support for the GVN and from this they were willing to agree that an effort would be made to see if the GVN was sincere in the expressed offer of assisting loyal tribesmen.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-7-

Some of the villagers doubted that anything would materialize, but they began to take the following steps to show their loyalty to the GVN.

(1) Construction of a double protective fence was begun to enclose the village so that the VC could be prevented from entering without detection. Several of the villagers commented that it would also serve to control thievery from other outsiders, scavenging ARVN soldiers being the main consideration.

(2) Shelters were dug in the ground within the village to provide protection for the women and children in case of an attack. In addition secret shelters and hiding places were built for quantities of rice and personal valuables.

(3) A guard system was established to control the movement of strangers into the village as well as to defend the village in case of attack; bamboo spears were in use until mid-December 1961 when the GVN gave official approval to train and arm the village defenders as a part of the village defense program. This was a supreme concession on the part of the GVN considering that just two short years before they had feared the tribesmen to the point that all crossbows were ordered destroyed.

(4) Construction of a medical dispensary and training center began to implement the promised medical program for Rhade villages. One Special Forces (SF) medic had given medical assistance to the villagers from the first contact with Buon Enao on 1 November 1961.

D. Development and expansion of interest could now take place since the control center or model village had undergone a successful development stage.

The first phase for expansion was training and arming of the Buon Enao villagers plus 50 volunteers (these 50 were from the earlier mentioned bombed village of Cu Piang) for the aggressor-strike force.

The second phase was to gain permission from the Darlac Province Chief and other officials for the grant of an experimental area which included 40 other Rhade villages within the immediate area of Buon Enao. Once this concession was obtained the 40 village chiefs and their sub-chiefs were taken to Buon Enao for training in the concepts of village defense and to see what had been accomplished in the model village.

The third phase called for the strike force to play an important role. It became their duty to patrol and ambush to protect additional villages volunteering for the village defense program. In addition they had to encourage the villagers in their efforts. A valuable asset in this early phase was ten regular army men from the 77th Observation Group (Vietnamese Special Forces). The ten men, who were either Rhade or Djarai, formed the base for the cadre training force which was later expanded by giving additional training to some of the better men in the aggressor force.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

58

-8-

Final development stages involved the training of village defenders at the control center in Suon Enao and expanding the aggressor force. As a part of this expansion, cooperative defensive systems were established among the defense villages. Intelligence nets were set up along with combination runner and radio nets for relaying information back to the control center. An alert group or strike force was established at the control center. Its purpose was to go to the immediate assistance of a village defense village under attack. This alert group was in addition to regular operating groups of strike force on patrol or ambush.

An important factor in the early part of the development and expansion phase was the cooperation given by the Province Chief and the area commander. We were fortunate in that the Province Chief felt rather skeptical about the entire experiment although he was very desirous of seeing the project succeed.

Part of the agreement with the Province Chief was that the experimental village defense project would be kept secret during the beginning phase. He was later to be responsible, at his own discretion, for informing all of the other organizations of the GVN to which he was responsible. His skepticism or perhaps something else caused him to withhold information concerning the project. This was later to cause 30 days delay in the development of the project, called by the President so that all of the interested parties could catch up with what was going on.

Later analysis of the situation indicated that the Province Chief had actually assisted the project more than he realized and entirely by accident when he failed to inform those who later felt that they should have had a part in the development as well as partial control of the project. If this had occurred, conflict between and among the various groups might have destroyed the project. The interested parties include a long list with varied reasons and desires for having an interest in the village defense project. In too many cases the primary reasons were political gain and self-interest once they saw the project was a success. The interested parties are:

23rd Division (includes the Area Commander)

45th Regiment

SDC and Civil Guard Units

Civic Action Group

District Chiefs

Surete

Province and Sector Officials

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-9-

A critical problem in trying to work with all the parties attempting to involve themselves in a project is that all too often they fail to keep each other informed. Efforts are duplicated time and again. To make matters worse no general policy seems to be followed, permitting several courses of conflicting actions to take place at the same time. Several cases occurred where the same village received one course of action from one group only to have it changed again by another group in a matter of days.

It is the opinion of the author that such actions destroy the confidence of the people and create an adverse situation. If all the interested parties had their way the present village defense project would be divided in so many portions that nothing would be left of any coordinated control. Present efforts at Buon Enao center around an attempt to maintain some semblance of control through the PSO officer there since the Province Chief is now in favor of dividing the entire project into portions so that each of the interested parties may have a share.

This type of political maneuvering can destroy the effectiveness of a project or even prevent its development if conflicts occur in the early stages. It is the general opinion of Vietnamese, Rhade and American parties at Buon Enao that one of the primary reasons for success has been the central control over the project villages. Policies are clear-cut and follow one line of approach. The bases for many of the village defense successes will deteriorate under a system of multiple control which would come about should different parties gain portions of control. Some type of central control group is essential. To date the PSO has been the agency. Perhaps some provincial organization might later be developed.

#### V. AREA GROWTH SYSTEMS FOR VILLAGE DEFENSE

A. In village defense development, as in any program where numbers of people involved are ever increasing, an opportunity exists for VC infiltration into the program. Certain control measures were developed during the experimental Buon Enao project.

At the time a village volunteers for village defense the village chief must certify that all members of the group are loyal to the GVN and to the cause of village defense, which is to fight against the VC should they attempt to enter the area of the village or obtain any type of support from the villagers. All of the volunteers must pledge that they will capture any and all who attempt to support the VC or those who have supported the VC. These captured, in some cases surrendered, VC undergo a correction and re-education program at the control center in Buon Enao. The village defenders are free to witness the treatment of these VC during the various phases of re-education. Fair treatment of prisoners under this program acts as added incentive to the turning in of additional VC and VC supporters. In addition village defenders are plainly told that all VC spies and traitors not declaring themselves will be shot when captured.

CONFIDENTIAL



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-10-

B. Regulations governing villages accepted for village defense state first that all members of the village must themselves volunteer to become a part of the program; the village is not accepted until this occurs. In addition there must be a sufficient number of people volunteering to receive training and carry weapons to provide adequate protection for the village. This number will depend on the size of the village, its strategic location, and strength of the VC in the area of the village.

Villagers are told that their acceptance into the program must be in accord with the consequent development of their area or in such cases where the village is not to be developed, that they must temporarily combine with another village defense village, using it as a center from which to patrol and ambush around their village area until such time as a sufficient number of villages in their area can be trained to provide enough area strength to allow the defenders to live in their own village.

C. Once trained and returned to their village, defenders must comply with regulations for regular reporting and passing of information regarding other than normal activities. Other regulations include areas of patrol and ambush and cooperative systems for combined defenses among defense villages. Plans are also made for area withdrawal or confinement to the village in cases where ARVN action is called for within the area.

D. Capabilities and potential of the defense villages include the ability to restrict VC movement into the defense areas. What seems to be more important is the fact the VC can no longer obtain food, intelligence, or recruits from the defended villages. Experiences with the Rhade villages under the Buon Enao project indicated that defense villages are capable of withstanding attacks by VC units up to company size. Even continued harassment from the VC had little or no effect except in two cases where the villagers lost motivation. This was regained through propaganda which informed the people of the real purposes of the VC in their attempt to gain the friendship of the villagers.

Several cases existed where families had one or more members living with the VC. These families were given rules by which they would conduct themselves should their VC relatives try to make contact with them. One of the most important regulations included removal from the village should they pass on intelligence information to the VC. The families were told that their VC relatives would be given fair treatment should they surrender and all policies of the re-education and liberation program were explained. Several of the VC surrendered as a result of these efforts.

E. Supplemental programs were developed to provide stimulus for VC to surrender as well as to provide good will for the villagers who had relatives with the VC. The primary program was the development of a special village where VC prisoners could live a free life so long as they complied with certain regulations of an honor system. The trustees were required to report all movements outside their village area and all strangers in their area;

CONFIDENTIAL

-11-

conversations with visitors are monitored by the elected group leader. Trustees build their own houses and are given an area of good land on which to plant crops. Supplemental rice rations are supplied during the beginning period.

Prior to the time the VC or ex-VC are allowed to become trustees they undergo interrogation by a team of Rhade. After interrogation prisoners are held in a compound area and given daily propaganda lectures as part of a re-education program. As the ex-VC show favorable changes in attitude they come before a board of examiners who determine whether they can become trustees or if they are to be held for further re-education. Additional action may also be recommended as the board sees fit.

A section of aggressors was given special training to qualify them as political and village defense instructors whose job it is to travel from village to village to instruct in both fields. Also the group gives skits, sings songs, and sets ambushes for the VC. To supplement this program a group of propaganda specialists study the new trends in VC attempts to appeal to the villagers and from this devise propaganda papers and lectures. Both of these groups were selected from regular aggressors with special abilities who were given advanced training in their fields.

#### VII. PROBLEMS OF ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT

An important factor of the village defense program is the corollary assistance program running from simple medical care to agriculture, education, etc. During the development of the Buon Enao project a considerable struggle was involved in starting all of the associated development programs. As a result most of the assistance projects had to be initiated by Combined Studies. Some of the cases merely involved getting in contact with the right people, whereas other cases had to be carried for some time before the responsible parties could be drawn into the project.

The problem in all cases is simple: programs of assistance are needed during the development stages of village defense as well as during the later and continued stages as proof to the villagers that the GVN is interested in their welfare and development. This helps especially to destroy the idea that the defense villages are only a barrier to protect high-livers and officials in the major cities.

Several things can be learned from the last year's experience in working with Vietnamese ministries, USOM, and other assistance organizations. The first lesson is that programming usually occurs year by year and consideration of emergency requests for assistance above the yearly program is available directly in proportion to the ability to make necessary contacts at the local and Saigon levels. One general comment is that since the acceptance of the village defense and strategic hamlet programs both the Vietnamese ministries and the various American organizations are becoming geared to meet emergency demands at the local level.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

62

-12-

Assistance available at the local level.

Medical - contact the province chief of medicine as well as the province or area hospital to get them interested in helping your program. USOM health officials will be glad to give you an assist on this if you make the request.

Agriculture - contacts in this area may vary from local extension or agricultural services to farmers' associations or one of a dozen different organizations depending on the needs and what is available within the province. Advice can be obtained from the province chief or upon request to USOM either direct or indirect. Some good contacts in your area might be International Voluntary Services or the area USOM malaria control advisor.

Education - consult the province head of education concerning questions on schools and teachers and their availability should you need one in any of your villages.

Miscellaneous - USIS, Vietnamese Information Services, Land Development or Land Offices, local missionaries, and priests usually have some materials or knowledge of the area that will provide assets to your project.

Assistance Available in Saigon.

Requests in all areas for assistance not available on the province level are best presented in written form to Combined Studies who in turn can pass them on to GVN, USOM or other agencies. Attempts to get things on your own are usually difficult and time-consuming.

As a closing note I would like again to point out that assistance programs are most important aids in gaining and keeping loyal villagers who are willing to resist the VC effort.

#### VIII. COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTERPARTS AND COUNTERPART ROLES

During the development of village defense and other similar projects an American advisor has a choice of two paths to take. The first path is that of working around his Vietnamese counterpart which at first glance seems like the quickest way to develop a project. This may be true in a very few cases but in most this early speed only spells eventual failure because when you leave nobody remains to carry on your ideas and unless you have developed some of these ideas as well as experiences in your counterpart the project may or may not be capable of sustaining itself under pressure. The percentages are then in favor of your work being destroyed if you have no counterpart or if you have one and are working around him rather than trying to develop his abilities along with the project.

A second and more wisely chosen path is the one that provides for the development of counterparts in all areas of your activities. This includes officials or officers with whom you might be working. During all phases of the Buon Enao project, working with the many varied counterparts was a

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-13-

set rule. As soon as an American acquired an additional job he also obtained a counterpart trainee. This system ran all the way from pay clerks and secretaries to instructor cadre, radio operators, etc.

Official counterparts may be ARVN officers, PSO officers, or province chiefs. In addition, the chief of medicine, the agriculture chief, and the area commander plus the national delegate are all in a sense counterparts in your project. In many cases your official counterpart will provide liaison with these people. However, opportunities should be taken by you to make all of these people feel informed and interested in the project and to draw them in as needed.

Your own individual ability to get along with your counterparts will be directly proportionate to your tolerance and understanding of their way of doing things. The counterpart's desire to adjust to your way of thinking will follow as a result of this understanding. If you take the opposite stand and attempt to force your counterpart, rather than lead him, the antagonism created will establish a barrier between you not easily broken. In such cases your own lack of ability to adjust, understand, and establish mutual confidence between you and your counterpart will determine the degree of success of the project. This will probably be the most difficult part of any project.

As your program develops conflicts will undoubtedly arise as to general policies, development concepts, and political interests. Most of these disputes will have to be resolved in Saigon but your understanding of why they occur can help prevent the occurrence of many. Most important is the fact that your understanding can prevent adding to antagonisms.

In conclusion one should always remember that the peasant and tribesman of Vietnam are not politically oriented to one side or the other but rather that they "bend" as necessary to maintain home and family. On the other hand these same people will follow anyone who shows them a sound and fair method of protecting what they consider most important to their way of life. This seems to be the key to success in the village defense program.

THE END

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

2  
64

**THE VILLAGE DEFENSE PROGRAM**

**BY**

**CAPTAIN RON SHACKLETON**

**A. INTRODUCTION**

1. Purpose: This report is published as a guide for personnel who may find themselves responsible for the planning, assistance or operation of the Village Defense Program. Guidance contained herein is limited to the information and experiences learned from my association with the Buon Enao project. This project has dealt strictly with the Rhade Tribe and was the first application of village defense, as a sole project, in South Vietnam.

2. Scope: This report presents the principles which govern the Village Defense Program. It describes the planning of the program, implementation of the program, and effects of the program as observed and from the viewpoint of the operational level.

**B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROGRAM**

In the case of the Rhade, confidence needed to be re-established in the National Government by the creation of the feeling that the tribesman was to be considered a part of South Vietnam and have a degree of importance. It was generally felt that the villagers would agree to defend themselves against the Viet Cong and that the entire program would act as a blocking element to stop the accessibility the Communists had to the tribesmen because of the neglect by the Vietnamese.

The Village Defense Program was developed along the lines of training wanting tribesmen in the use of weapons and tactics so that they might protect their families, land and possessions from the terrors of the VC. The idea of the program was not to resettle these people into a "safe area", thus giving up valuable land to the VC, but to defend what was now held and therefore deny the VC his most important food source, intelligence source, and recruiting source (often by force) in the area. If effective, this program would then deny the VC the freedom of movement and accessibility he possessed over the entire plateau. This encompasses approximately 100 square kilometers of land and over 100,000 Montagnards.

Initial development began with the locating of a village willing to play an active role in the initial or experimental stages. This calls for the villagers to openly denounce the VC and face retribution. This in itself is quite a task when operating from strong VC territory. The village councils and leaders must show the initiative and desire to be free regardless of the cost. They had to be shown that the Vietnamese Government was supporting the program and that other developments would also follow.

Indoctrination to the cause of "freedom vs Communism" had to be hammered home. That with successful village defense came freedom. That if all the villagers supported the program they would have the strength and position to ignore the demands of the VC, and the arms, equipment and training to enforce their stand.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

-2-

These problems, indoctrinations, meetings and etc. must all be worked out and assured prior to the program being initiated. This is best done by those familiar with the people, customs and area of operations; by those trained in politics, propaganda and psychological warfare. Notably, the Area Specialists.

When a working agreement has been established, preparations are begun at all levels to physically institute the program. It must be mentioned at this time that the initial development phase may take many, many weeks to develop and establish. The results must be, without a doubt, that the populace will definitely support and strive to make the program work. The length of time it takes to assure this depends on the people, the region of operations, politics and a million other considerations too numerous to mention.

At Buon Enao it took almost two months of negotiating before the physical preparations were started. However, the planning for the preparation phase was accomplished while the negotiations were in progress thus preventing a further delay. This planning must consider the fields of logistics, operations, politics and personnel. Three to four weeks is normally the time necessary to complete the preparation phase of the program. It is then necessary to train a Strike Force for three weeks and then another two weeks of training for the village defenders before we have sent our first group of villagers to their homes able to defend themselves. So four months have already elapsed and we have trained a handful of villagers.

Don't be discouraged, we are now ready to turn out defenders at a rapid pace; a pace that must be set at each specific project depending on the training facilities, logistical support, tactical situation and administrative workload

#### C. DUTIES OF OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL

1. Project Supervisor is normally a member of a United States civilian agency working closely with the military on projects of this type. He might also be a military man with this project as a special assignment. If the project supervisor could also be the Area Specialist I mentioned earlier, with a working knowledge of the language, needless to say this would be invaluable to the program.

As the project director he generally administers the entire program from the operational level. Some of his more specific areas of concern are:

- a. Hiring of necessary civilian personnel such as interpreters.
- b. Securing of land for administrative structures and training facilities.
- c. Handling of funds for the utilization of payrolls, materials, labor, information, rewards, guides, special transportation, etc.
- d. The selection and notification of personnel and villages for training.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

-3-

e. Handling of the many personal problems of people, villages, refugees, and government based on his knowledge of the customs and traditions of the people.

f. Coordination and liaison with military and civil heads in the area.

g. Establishing the duties and working relationship of the Special Forces team working with him.

2. Special Forces Team Leader is naturally responsible for the activities and performance of duties of his team members. He must insure that a harmonious effort exists between the responsibilities of the project director and the mission of the team. The following areas were finally agreed upon to be the direct responsibility of the Team Leader due to the experience and training of the team. It must be noted, however, that the Team Leader and the Project Supervisor must work closely in all fields due to the overlap in responsibilities and the interrelation of duties especially in the absence of one or the other.

- a. Training
- b. Operations
- c. Intelligence
- d. Logistics
- e. Processing
- f. Administration of the camp facilities
- g. Control of transportation

3. Government Representative may or may not be assigned to each project. Since this program was being developed around the Montagnards a representative, directly responsible to the President, was assigned to assist us as well as keep the Vietnamese abreast of the operation. His specific duties include:

- a. Coordinate with all Vietnamese military and civilian officials in the area of operations.
- b. Necessary administration and reports required by the Vietnamese.
- c. Direct coordination with the Project Director, Team Leader and Province Chief in all matters and functions of the program.
- d. Insuring the interests of the Vietnamese Government are being adhered to as well as impressing upon the people, in this case, that this is a Vietnamese-sponsored program.

D. PREPARATION PHASE (PHYSICAL)

1. Project

**CONFIDENTIAL**

- a. Logistics - A determination must be made on the number of ammunition, clothing, webbing and so forth

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-1-

b. Transportation - This is a critical necessity and will vary with each area of operation depending upon location of training areas, areas of operation, administrative requirements, terrain, weather, etc. As a guide we find that a minimum of five  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ton trucks, two  $\frac{3}{4}$  ton trucks and two  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton trucks is imperative. We also find that during the rainy season four wheel drive is a must. Helicopter support is also a necessity as the program develops for operations, resupply and intelligence.

c. Facilities - The following facilities are desirable but by no means mandatory for the success of the program. We find that they have increased our effectiveness as well as standard of living.

(1) Headquarters Building (see photo) - Should be located away from the general flow of traffic but not so isolated as to be a conspicuous target. It should contain an orderly room, operations/intelligence room, interpreters room, day/room/mess hall and a kitchen.

(2) Quarters for US Personnel (see photo) - It is best if US personnel are quartered within the village. That they live in native type houses, in groups of threes or fours, dispersed throughout the village. This offers better security, better working relations with the people, and is an informative way of keeping abreast of everything that occurs.

(3) Latrine (see photo)

(4) Shower (see photo)

(5) Washing and shaving facility (see photo)

(6) Barracks for trainees (see photo)

(7) Living quarters for Strike Force and dependents

(8) Ammunitions bunker (see photo) - Should be an underground facility with a large degree of overhead concealment and protection. Best if located in an area where destruction of such will not cause damage to other facilities. Proper precautions to eliminate dampness should be taken such as dunnage and rotation. A good idea if this facility is charged and wired for immediate destruction as this is a prime military target. If additional bunkers could be located throughout the area so as not to have "all your eggs in one basket" without causing a security problem then this would definitely be an advantage.

(9) Arms Room (see photo) - The same considerations must be given as to the ammo bunker; however, this is best if kept above ground and in an area where dampness is not prevalent. It is also wise to keep most weapons in their protective shipping containers until actually needed for issue.

(10) Supply Room (see photo)

NOTE: Items 8, 9, and 10 should also be enclosed with fencing or wire and be maintained by a 24-hour guard.

(11) Guard House (see photo) - Keeps the guard centralized for easy location and disposition.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



**CONFIDENTIAL**

-5-

(12) Hospital (see photo) - Should be a type of structure that has sufficient ventilation, dryness and is free from dust. It should contain an admitting room, diagnosis room, treatment room, operating room, pharmacy, wards (best if wards are separated for communicable diseases, extended recovery and short stay), latrine and kitchen.

(13) Communications Shack (see photo) - Located where it is best free from obstructions with facilities to house the commo personnel, store commo equipment and supplies and house the "on duty" trained native personnel as a 24 hour net is maintained.

(14) Processing Area (see photo) where the necessary photographs, questioning and forms can be filled out.

(15) Interrogation Room (see photo) - An out-of-the-way facility where the normal type questioning and abuses may be conducted without interference and knowledge of other members of the camp as well as denying the captive the opportunity to observe any activities or facilities in the area.

(16) Helicopter Pad and/or Light Aircraft Strip.

(17) Ranges (see photo) - Should be close in so as to ease the transportation requirements as well as the security problem. Should be a minimum of 100 meters in length and consist of at least 25 points. Many times an ARVN facility might be available.

d. Special Equipment - The following equipment was found to be almost a necessity. Some were available through supply channels, others had to be procured locally and still others had to be constructed.

- (1) Refrigerators, kerosene ea 2
- (2) Generators ea 2
- (3) Cameras, 35mm
- (4) Camera, polaroid
- (5) Mimeograph machine
- (6) Cabinet, filing
- (7) Safe
- (8) Typewriters ea 2
- (9) Communications (radio and wire)
- (10) Cans, water ea 20
- (11) Cans, gas w/nozzles ea 10
- (12) Tables and chairs
- (13) Mosquito bars and sleeping gear
- (14) Office supplies and maps
- (15) Pioneer and carpenter tools
- (16) Lister bags
- (17) Light sockets and wiring
- (18) C rations

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

-6-

e. Procurement of Personnel

- (1) Interpreters
- (2) Cook
- (3) Drivers
- (4) Houseboys
- (5) Army Cadre
- (6) Village recruits for Strike Force
- (7) Administrative personnel
- (8) Vehicle mechanic
- (9) Carpenter

NOTE: In many cases the above will be available from the villages or can be trained to perform the jobs. In our situation we could not use anyone but Rhade due to their feelings toward outsiders living in their villages.

2. Villagers

a. Defensive Préparations

(1) Protective Fences - Normally made of bamboo, logs, barbed wire, natural growth or a combination of all of the mentioned materials, this fence is erected to completely encircle the village. There are two of these fences, an inner and an outer. Both are tall enough to cause difficulty in scaling as well as being barbed or pointed. The fence should be tight enough to prevent either man or animal from crawling through. The fences, inner and outer, should be far enough apart to prevent scaling of both simultaneously; or to crash or topple the outer fence against the inner fence thus having a ramp effect. Gates should be held to a minimum but sufficient enough to afford the villagers easy accessibility to their fields. These gates should be sturdy, easily opened and closed, provided with locking devices and constantly guarded. Between the inner and outer fence, various natural and man-made obstructions are emplaced. These might be nail mines, punji stakes, M14 mines, trip flares, pit holes, explosives, poison plants or whatever the imagination may provide.

(2) Fortifications - Weapons emplacements, foxholes, bunkers are prepared and strategically located around the village. They are built with the same considerations that we use. They must be durable during the rainy season, offer good fields of fire, back from the fence so as to be out of grenade range and mutually supporting. A two-man foxhole is considered much more effective than one-man.

(3) Fields of Fire - Clearing of brush, underbrush and jungle growth for observation, security as well as fields of fire should be made for a distance of at least 100 meters from the protective fence. This land could be utilized for the planting of low crops to avoid the waste of precious land.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

-7-

(4) Shelters - Family shelters, for the protection of women and children, are erected throughout the village normally in the vicinity of the dwelling but by no means close to the fence and defensive positions. These shelters are of the underground type so as to be protected from flat trajectory as well as high angle fire.

(5) Early Warning Systems - Watchtowers, observation posts, listening posts, noisemakers, tree houses, booby traps, etc. are a must, especially where a village is located close to mountainous or jungle terrain.

b. Protective Measures - It must be mentioned that to this point we still have not trained one villager nor do we have a village capable of protecting itself from the VC. The erection of the defensive structures will likely rile the VC. He will tear down fences, terrorize the people, kidnap village chiefs and force the young to join his band. Some villagers will find themselves building their fence many, many times. It is with this in mind that it becomes necessary for us to obtain protection for these villages during the preparation phase and until we have trained a Strike Force to provide the coverage and protection for these villages. ARVN forces as well as Civil Guard and Civic Action will have to be relied upon for assistance.

#### E. ESTABLISHING A STRIKE FORCE

1. Definition: A unit of sufficient size and training to be capable of conducting intelligence, security, protective and offensive operations within the area of operations.

##### Elision

- a. To operate from villages that are in the process of training so as to protect them from the VC.
- b. Be immediately available for deployment to a village under VC attack or to an area of suspected VC activity.
- c. To gather intelligence and gain contact with the VC.
- d. Conduct offensive type actions against VC targets of opportunity.
- e. Conduct security type operations.
- f. Assist in the training of village defenders.

3. Organization: See Inclosure 1

4. Group (Squad) Armament and Specialties

- a. Five sub-machine guns, 4 carbines and two AR's.
- b. One man cross trained as a medic.
- c. One man cross trained in communications.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

-8-

5. Individual Equipment

- a. Civilian or peasant type clothing.
- b. Tennis shoes
- c. Pistol belts w/canteen and ammo pouches
- d. Binoculars, compasses, watches, grenades, etc. are normally issued to team leaders.

6. Training: See Inclosure 2

7. Administration

- a. These people are hired and placed on a payroll and work and operate as we see fit.
- b. They have a command structure with rank and chain of command with an appropriate pay scale.
- c. With sufficient training and guidance you will find that this force will soon be able to operate on its own initiative and direction of its own leaders.

F. ESTABLISHING A CADRE

1. General

Selected personnel from the Strike Force are given extensive training by Special Forces personnel. If they are acceptable they are designated Cadre and act as instructors for classroom work and advisors on operations. They are distinguished by a special type of uniform, black leather belts, a side arm, knife and scarf. This is a way of enhancing their prestige and indicating that they are supposedly the "cream of the crop". Training cadre is a continual process.

2. Training: See Inclosure 3

G. VILLAGE DEFENSE TRAINING

1. Selection of Village

- a. This must be based on some pattern or plan of organization of the village defense system.
- b. A village is selected because of its strategic location, desire to oppose the VC, strength and ability to defend itself.
- c. The village is given a series of talks, indoctrination, psychological warfare and propaganda prior to acceptance into training.
- d. Any prior indications either in favor of the village or against are considered and weighed.
- e. The village chief is told that he is responsible that those selected for training will abide by the pledge to defend the village against the VC.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

-9-

## 2. Notification

a. The village is notified in sufficient time as to when training will commence and for what number of villagers.

b. They are told to prepare for Strike Force personnel who will be operating from their village area and may need logistical and intelligence support.

c. The village is notified as to what equipment the villagers must bring with them to the training camp. This is normally limited to the clothes and bedding and cooking materials they will use during the training cycle.

d. The village chief is told to appoint a leader of his group who will report at a specific time and with a roster of personnel to be trained.

## 3. Processing

a. When the villagers arrive they are met at the gate by a cadre who briefs them on what is to occur.

b. They are brought to their area and instructed on the administrative details of the program and then given sufficient time to prepare their sleeping areas.

c. They are then moved to the processing area where individual photos are taken, a personal history is filled out to include finger prints, and a group picture is taken. Also, other information is obtained at this time like the population of the village, number of women, children and men, number of houses in the village, etc. A folder containing all this information is then prepared and forwarded to higher headquarters. In our situation here at Buon Enao this is the closest thing to a census that has ever existed among the Montagnards.

## 4. Training

a. The village defenders are trained by Cadre under the supervision of Special Forces personnel.

b. See inclosure 4 for training subjects.

## 5. Completion of Training

a. A village is returned intact to its home village, if tactically sound, or to another village when not strategically sound.

b. The Strike Force section which has been protecting the village during the training cycle, will remain with that village for an additional week. During this period of time they will accomplish the following:

(1) Set up the village alert system to include post of each man.

(2) Work with the villagers on their patrolling and ambush actions.

(3) Work on gathering intelligence by the use of women and children.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

## CONFIDENTIAL

(4) Establish a method of cooperative assistance between villages.

(5) Establish communications between villages either by sound or runner or visual.

c. Once the Strike Force has departed the village it becomes the responsibility of the village chief to accomplish the following:

(1) Appoint a leader of his defense force.

(2) Insure that a system is devised where there are always sufficient defenders protecting the village and where those working the fields can be rapidly recalled in the event of VC activity.

(3) Coordination with other nearby villages to include intelligence, operations and mutual support.

(4) Report all actions and intelligence as soon as received to the operational base via runner or through the sector radio.

(5) Insure that his force maintain their weapons, continually train and carry out their duties in the best interests of the program.

(6) Continually improve on the village defenses; conduct practice alerts and train youngsters and women to fit into the program, especially the intelligence effort.

(7) Request ammunition, cleaning materials and assistance as needed.

### H. EXPANSION (See Inclosures 5 and 6)

The expansion or growth of the program in your area will probably be the most gratifying phase of the operation and cause you the most problems. You now have a force of sufficient size to deal the VC many setbacks. Where you once dealt in numbers of tens you are now dealing in hundreds. Where once your area covered ten square kilometers it now covers 1,500 square kilometers. Where it once took ten minutes to reach the farthest village it may now take many hours.

To assist us in many of these problem areas we felt it was necessary to more or less decentralize. This was done by first determining how much of an area, within our zone, we could successfully control and support from our Operational Base. As we began expanding we then decided to go one step further in setting up our defensive structure. We split up our area into sectors. Each sector had a "control village" equipped with radio communications and normally the strongest and best defended of that sector. A sector chief was appointed who controlled and coordinated the efforts of the sector. With the expansion it was natural that the time/distance factor increased which of course effected a delay in our intelligence, mutual support effort, increased need for communications and transportation and the number of Strike Force needed to cover our expanded area of operations.

### I. COORDINATION

To preclude dual efforts and the strong possibility of having conflicts with friendly units (ARVN) all efforts of the village defense program must be coordinated with the Province Chief. Since we conduct operations daily from many, many sub-bases (the villages) as well as with our Strike Force we

## CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

-11-

delineated a boundary that became the responsibility of our program. No other force would operate in this area without contacting and coordinating with us nor could we operate outside this boundary without the same coordination. As a rule a village had the right to operate in a radius of 2 kilometers from their village. This we feel is imperative for the security of that village. They are permitted to do this without instructions or coordination with the Operational Base. We merely assume that each of these village areas is operational each day.

#### J. FOLLOW-UP PROGRAM

To insure and satisfy ourselves that the Village Defense Program is being carried out to our satisfaction we must have follow-up action. During this follow-up we accomplish the following.

1. Conduct an inventory and inspection of all weapons to include repair and replacement where necessary.
2. Conduct sick call and replenish the village medical supplies where a trained medic exists.
3. Inspect the village defenses.
4. Inspect village sanitation.
5. Talk with the chief and people to create good will as well as try to solve their problems.

NOTE: Just this program in itself will occupy one vehicle, one medic and a weapons man continually if a village is to be visited at least once a month.

#### K. SPECIAL FORCES PHASE-OUT

To be able to move to another area within our zone, and conduct this same type program, we must have a program in which we can satisfy ourselves that the area we have just completed can and will continue to operate efficiently and effectively in their fight against the VC. Keeping this in mind we continually trained Rhade in supply, communications, leadership, administration and medicine. We appointed leaders to whom we gradually increased the authority and right to make decisions. How long it will take you to complete an area and your program to reach this stage will depend on much the same factors that affect other portions of the program. At any rate, preparation for this is much the same and I will relate some of the things that might be done not only to help with the phase-out but to also produce a more efficient operation.

1. Organization - We firmly felt that before much could be done in any phase we must be organized to the extent that each man who was in a position of authority had this authority; and that each man knew whom he was assigned to and whom he took his orders from. After the initial organization we concentrated our efforts on the leaders. We slowly worked them into making decisions and taking the initiative so that their decisions were now much the same as ours would have been. No longer did we have to be at formations to insure that training started on time; no longer did we have to handle

**CONFIDENTIAL**

## CONFIDENTIAL

-12-

disciplinary matters; the chain of command was established and the team was now advising the unit leader rather than commanding the unit. It must also be noted here that though initiative is good, make certain that you are kept informed on all decisions made.

2. Training - This we knew was in good shape and in proper hands. We had formed a training section utilizing Cadre we had trained and had observed their instruction for many months.

3. Administration - Here we worked with certain individuals in handling the necessary paperwork needed for processing, finance, interrogation, intel reports, after-action reports and the like.

4. Logistics - Sufficient people were trained not only in the accountability, storage and maintenance of supplies but as weapons repairmen as well.

5. Communications - Though we did not get into the technical aspects and repair of radios we had sufficient radio operators trained to operate and maintain the voice sets we were utilizing.

6. Medical - We reached the point where medical students could now give the basic medical training to other students and the medical technician could administer medicines as well as perform births and minor surgery. We gradually let the entire medical program, including sick call, administering of the hospital, medical records, etc. become his responsibility so now he would not miss the Special Forces medic when we phased out.

7. General - At this point I would like to add that I personally feel two control people need be left in the area, whether these be US or Vietnamese, to handle the coordination between the area and source of supplies and control. We must not forget that because the phase-out has been completed it does not mean that the logistical support is not as important as ever.

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13

**L. CONCLUSIONS:**

The following comments that I am about to make concerning particular points of this program are my own opinions and in no way are meant to be derogatory or boastful. I express them merely with the thought that they may be useful in creating an impression of what lies ahead for you as well as stimulating your thoughts as to what you can do to improve your program of Village Defense in your area. I am of the opinion that as more and more of these areas open up and more and more new people work with this program that solid principles and doctrine can be formulated so that some day a well established program can be written by those much more capable than I.

(1) **QUESTION:** How well trained and effective are the people we have trained?

**OPINION:** I won't try to compare these people to the US soldier because the US soldier is generally given 14 weeks of training on what we cover in from two to three weeks. Our Strike Force is better trained and can operate in this area much more effectively than his VC counterpart. Our village defenders are trained to protect themselves and their property from VC groups equal to the size of their force. In all cases it is not our desire to train these people so well that they present a force that a trained Army unit could not control. In short, we train them to be a little better than the VC although we do find that many become as good as any fighters I have ever worked with. The record might give a good indication of their effectiveness. To date we have lost one rifle and have had no casualties in combat actions. We have captured three weapons, killed over 30 VC and wounded upwards of 50 in combat actions.

**QUESTION:** What are the possibilities of agents of the VC entering your program; of villages turning to the VC after trained?

**OPINION:** The possibility of VC agents entering our program are rather good, however, the possibility of them remaining seems to be very slim. The fact that our agents have detected and captured over 40 of these bears out my opinion. The possibility of villages reverting to the side of the VC is now fact. Two such villages collaborated with the VC and we lost a total of 34 weapons. However, with over 2000 weapons issued and over 70 villages trained the percentage is definitely in our favor.

**QUESTION:** How has this program affected the VC?

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14

**OPINION:** It has cut their food supply, intelligence source and freedom of movement in the area to a great degree causing them much hardship. As told to us by over 60 defectors to date, this program has caused them to be moving continually, to go without food for extended periods of time, change their tactics as well as force them to put half their combat effort into a program that didn't exist four months ago.

**QUESTION:** Are you able to recruit enough of these village defenders?

**OPINION:** We don't recruit anyone. They are strictly volunteers who want to be trained so that they may return to their homes and defend and protect what is theirs from the VC. The 3000 + you see here now are a good example of the determination they possess. They do not want to be resettled or given land in safe areas. As a result we don't relinquish ground to the VC.

**QUESTION:** What is the future of this program?

**OPINION:** I believe that this program has more possibilities than any other program that I am aware of. Here we are essentially fighting the VC at his own game. We are recruiting the people to the side of freedom through indoctrination as well as giving them the means to resist the terrorisms of the VC. No longer is the montagnard moving with the VC because no other choice is available. The program must move as rapidly as possible because any delay is in favor of the VC. It is important that this program is logistically supported. These people must be treated and shown that they are a part of South Vietnam and are relied upon to achieve the goals of the Government. That they are a part of the future and definitely have a place in the plans of the coming years.


**Inclosures:**

- 1.- Buon Enao Organization
- 2.- Strike Force Training Program
- 3.- Cadre Training Program
- 4.- Village Defenders Training Program
- 5.- Schematic (Area of operations)
- 6.- Schematic (Sectors of operations)
- 7.- Photo Supplement

s/ Ron Shackleton  
t/Captain Ron Shackleton

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# BUON ENAO ORGANIZATION



## ADMIN SECTION

Interpreters  
Drivers  
Cook  
Hospital Attendants  
Finance Clerk  
Supply  
House Boys  
Commo

## SECURITY

Guards  
Interrogators

## INFANTRY SECTION

Section Leader  
Section Sgt  
Radio Operator  
Medics

## INFANTRY GROUP

Group Leader  
AR Man  
Submachine (5)  
Carbine (3)

## WPNS SECTION

Section Leader  
Section Sgt  
Radio Operator

## LMG GROUP

Group Leader  
Gunner  
Asst Gunner  
Ammo Bearer (2)

## MORT GROUP

Group Leader  
Gunner  
Asst Gunner  
Ammo Bearer (2)

## SPECIAL SECTION

Section Leader  
Section Sgt  
Radio Operator  
Medic

## ASSAULT GROUP

Group Leader  
Grenadiers (4)  
Submachine (5)

## CROSSBOW GROUP

Group Leader  
Crossbows (23)

Inclosure 1

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79

16

## Inclosure 2 To Village Defense Program

STRIKE FORCE TRAINING CYCLE

## 1st Week (Basic Training)

Periods

1-8  
9-16  
17-20  
21-24  
25  
26  
27-28  
29-44

Subjects

Springfield '03  
Carbine  
Swedish K  
Madsen & Schmeisser  
Grenades  
Flares and booby traps  
Review of weapons  
Range Firing

NOTE: Additional firing is given during off-duty time for those who show the need.

## 2nd Week (Advanced Training)

Periods

1-8  
9-16  
17-20  
21-24  
25-28  
29-32  
33-36  
37-40

Subjects

Patrolling  
Ambushes  
Immediate Action  
Combat Intelligence  
Search and Seizure  
Interrogation  
Raids  
Village Defense

## 3d Week (Operational Training)

Patrols

1  
2  
3  
4

Type

Daylight Reconnaissance  
Night Combat/Ambush  
Overnight Ambush  
48 hour patrol

NOTE: These patrols are actually conducted in an active operational area.

Refresher Training (Conducted by section at least quarterly)

One Week- A review of tactics and weapons firing

## Special Training

The heavy weapons section receives training on the 60mm mortar, LMG and 57RR Rifle.

The special section receives training on the crossbow, silent kill and sabotage.

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17

Inclosure 3 To Village Defense Program

CADRE TRAINING CYCLE

<u>Periods</u>	<u>Subjects</u>
1-2	Principles of Leadership
3-4	Carbine
5-6	'03
7-8	Madsen
9-10	Swedish K
11-12	Sten
13-14	Schmeisser
15	Luger Pistol
16	P38 Pistol
17-18	Grenades
19-26	Range Firing
27-30	Ambushes
31-34	Immediate Action
35-38	Patrolling
39-42	Combat Intelligence
43-50	Map Reading and Use of the Compass
51-58	PRC-10
59-62	Search and Seizure
63-66	Interrogation
67-70	Raids
71-74	Village Defense
75-78	Intell Nets and Security
79-82	MOI

NOTE: Cadre have already been through a three week cycle and have been operating with the Strike Force for many weeks. The above training is conducted as a review with the emphasis placed on method of teaching each particular subject.

As new weapons are received or additional requirements found necessary then these are covered during off duty time in special classes.

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Inclosure 4 To Village Defense Program

### VILLAGE DEFENSE TRAINING

1st Week (Basic Training)

Periods

1-16  
17-32  
33-40  
41-44

Subjects

Individual Weapon  
Range Firing  
Security  
Warning Systems

2nd Week (Advanced Training)

Periods

1-8  
9-16  
17-24  
25-32  
33-36  
37-44

Subjects

Combat Intelligence  
Patrolling  
Ambushes  
Intelligence Nets  
Immediate Action  
Village Defense

NOTE: After a village has been trained we send one Strike Force Team with those villagers for one week to assist them in setting up their defenses, give them guidance, bolster their confidence and emit psychological warfare.

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
## CONFIDENTIAL

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ZONE OF OPERATION  
 AREAS OF OPERATION ---  
 OPERATION - BASE @  
 CONTROL BASE @  
 RS-1 Communications

NOTE: TO SET UP EACH  
 AREA OF OPERATION  
 WOULD REQUIRE 1/2  
 OF A TEAM.  
 EACH AREA OF OPERATION  
 EXPANDS UNTIL ALL ARE  
 LINKED THUS COMPLETING  
 THE ZONE

AREAS OF OPERATION



INCLOSURE 5 TO VILLAGE DEFENSE PROGRAM

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
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20

LEGEND  
 AREA Boundary ———  
 OPERATIONAL AREA  
 SECTOR Boundary - - -  
 TRAINED VILLAGE  
 SECTOR CONTROL VILLAGE  
 COMMUNICATIONS


SECTORS OF OPERATION



NOTE ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO SECTORS IS ON A COMMAND FREQUENCY  
 THIS IF RANGE IS DESIRABLE SECTORS HAVE WALK-TO-TO  
 JACK KETON

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
HEADQUARTERS BLDG




QTRS US PERSONNEL




LATRINE




SHOWER




WASHING & SHAVING AREA




COMM. SHELTER




*ENTRANCE*




*ENTRANCE*




*GENERATOR SHED*



*SUPPLY ROOM*



*ADJUTANT GENERAL*




## Protective Fence

10 mls. 100% alcohol



FAMILY SHELTER (UNDER CONSTRUCTION).

OBSTACLE



OBSTACLE

Hospital


## II. DEVELOPMENT CONCEPTS OF ETHNIC/AREA PROGRAMS

### B. "KEYS" TO AREA DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.

1. Man will normally fight to defend home, family, food supplies, adequate clothing, land rights, religious and cultural practices, and if properly directed he will fight against political forces that he feels detrimental to the achievement of his desires.
2. Underdeveloped populations becoming targets of communist propaganda and subversion offer extensive potentials for directed development from any force providing that those persons responsible for direction understand the group culture, distress, and desires.
3. Every population group establishes a scale of potentials that must be determined before any economic, social, political, and security developments can take place.

I. DEVELOPMENT CONCEPTS OF ETHNIC/AREA PROGRAMS

C. ANTHROPOLOGICAL SURVEY



**MATERIAL BASED ON FACTS GATHERED FROM MY  
MANY RHAE FRIENDS. SPECIAL THANKS FOR  
HISTORICAL MATERIALS GO TO**

**Y - KLONG  
AND  
Y - NO**

**TRANSLATION OF MATERIAL COLLECTED FROM  
RHAE SOURCES AND DRAWING BY:  
Y - CA NIE**

**THIS MATERIAL IS DEDICATED TO THE BETTER  
UNDERSTANDING OF MONTAGNARDS OF THE  
HIGH PLATEAU.**

**DAVID A. NUTTLE  
International Voluntary Service  
Bamethuot, Viet-Nam**

**Second printing  
July 1962**

## EDE MONTAGNARD IN THE HIGH PLATEAU OF SOUTH VIETNAM

\* \* \*

I. Origin. Various authorities seem to indicate that most of the tribal groups migrated from greater China. Some may have come from regions near Tibet and Mongolia. The Indochina area acted as a funnel in the early movement of people from the China area to Malay, Indonesia and the South Seas. There is some evidence that a reversal of this movement occurred meaning that some groups moved through and back into this area from the various geographic areas they had moved to in the Malay & Indonesia. Thus, a relationship is established between tribes in South Vietnam and similar groups in the Malay peninsula, Indonesia, and the Polynesian islanders.

It is difficult to determine at what stage of migration each of the various tribal groups in South Vietnam settled in their respective areas.

II. Settlement. Occured by family groups within a selected tribal region. Each Tribe and Tribal region is still distinct and separate, as is each family group within each tribe. Some variation does seem to occur in the degree of contact between family groups. This is generally created by custom and beliefs. Various tribal groups have a very limited association according to custom.

Evidence of the different family groups among the tribes is indicated by an example among the Rhade tribes in South Vietnam. The Rhade Kpa, around Banmethuot, are considered to be the original Rhade group. In the area they are known as the real Rhade. In the area of Mdrak are to be found the Rhade M'dhur, who have a notable variation from the Rhade Kpa in some words. The Rhade Bih are around the Buon Trap area near Banmethuot. Another family group, the Rhade Adham, may be found around Buon Ho district.

III. Association with Nature. Tribal life revolves around a natural scheme as provided by nature in the form of land for growing rice, bamboo thatch, and timber for house. The forest is for game; water, for drink, bathing, crops and fish.

Legend has it that each clan of a family group was to lay claim to specific things upon being the first occupants of a new area, which meant that



members of a clan would decide between laying claim to land, trees, mountains bamboo, streams etc. . . closing off what was not selected by previous clans. Each clan would then set a price for use of a part of its claim by other clans.

In the case of the Nie Kdam, or owners of the land, among the Rhade, a price was set in paddy for practicing shifting agriculture. On the other hand the Nie Kdam was required to sacrifice a white buffalo each year to the spirits of the soil. Under this system the Nie Kdam did not have to cultivate the soil themselves. However, their eventual need for more rice caused them to sell land to other clans. Thus, other clans came to have land. This selling of original claim land by a clan broke down the whole system whereby a clan would own a single thing such as bamboo, streams etc. At present each clan usually own enough land, forest thatch etc. . . to provide for the family group without trading or selling of any one of these things.

An important factor in the tribal association with nature is the scattering of villages to prevent disrupting the natural scheme of field and forest by over-population. This helps to explain the general lack of any concentration of tribal population or villages. A knowledge of this system also provides some understanding of the antagonism created when an influx of foreign population disrupts the tribal balance with nature.

IV. Beliefs. Are centered around a God (RHADE: AE DIE), a devil (RHADE: YANG LIE), and spirits of the soil forest, stream, mountain, ancestors, etc. . . Sacrifices are made during the year to all Gods and spirits in the form of a buffalo, pig, chicken and jugs of rice wine. The Yang Brua Asei is each Rhade man's promise to the Gods and spirits shown by wearing of brass bracelets around the wrist. Each bracelet represents one buffalo, pig, or chicken promised in sacrifice. The number of cuts on the bracelet shows the number of rice wine jugs promised in sacrifice.

Spirits may be called in the case of family disturbances, such as sickness, in which case the enchanter or sorcerer is called in with stick and candle. The enchanter supervises the preparation of jugs of wine and the animal sacrifice. If the sickness is serious, a buffalo and jugs may be sacrificed. Usually the first sacrifice is a pig with 5 jugs of rice wine. If the family is poor and cannot provide all of the sacrifice, it may be promised for another year. It is believed that the spirits should be called for occasions such as birth, marriage, death, planting, harvest etc. . . This will be discussed in section IX on rituals.

V. Superstitions. Center around animals of the forest, legends, and spirits. Dreams also have a strong relationship to superstitions. An example of animal superstition is the belief that 3 barks of a barking deer on a newly prepared rice field will cause death in the family if the area is planted. Another case is where the alighting of a crow on the roof of a longhouse during the process of construction calls for abandoning that house and starting another for fear of bad luck to the family. When one walks on a trail, a certain bird call on the left will bring bad luck whereas the same call if heard on the right will bring good luck.

Rhade believe that a tiger can change into a man. This is called a tiger-man, who will have a special grain of rice under his tongue. When the grain is removed, he will turn back into a tiger. It is his duty to kill his enemy as a tiger or tiger-man. In the case of dreams, those which predict some bad event cause the individual to take a different course of action. If one dreams of an accident the following day one should stay home to avoid misfortune. A dream about fishing means that if one goes fishing the next day and catches a white fish he will have good luck. If a Rhade dreams about harvesting eggplant, he thinks people will speak no good of him. A pregnant mother, dreaming of a gift of a knife or crossbow for her child, will have a boy whereas a dream of a gift of a basket means having a girl. A dream about a red blanket will bring bad luck.

An old custom, seldom observed at present, provides that if a Boa constrictor snake-crawled through the village, it would have to be moved. There is certain superstition about sneezing. A sneeze before going to work calls for good luck. A belief exists that masculine gifts to an expectant mother causes the baby to be a boy, a feminine gift would cause the baby to be a girl.

A legend exists which prevents a given family from killing cattle because of a belief that a female ancestor mother was lost and was suckled by a cow. Another legend exists about a nomadic women of Buon To clan, was killed by some men of the Mlo-Duon-Du clan because she was poaching fish from their traps. The women's young daughter was caught at the same time but her life was spared. It was found that the child had webbed fingers, so they cut them with a knife called Dhong To. Dhong To is a name the girl and her ancestors were then to be known by. The girl lived as a member of the Mlo-Duon-Du clan and later sacrificed a buffalo and accepted membership in the Nie Kdam clan. This legend prevents Dhong To clan members from marrying either Mlo-Duong-Du or Nie Kdam.

There are many different species of spirits. The head of a stream is a spirit. There are the spirits of the water, forest, mountains, trees, rice, thunder, foam of cascades, stones, sorcerers and the spirit of the world. A man must not blaspheme the name of the spirits and cannot speak of them in fun, or in a scolding manner. When sickness occurs, the spirits are called, group by group.

VI. Marriage system. Various family groups are prevented from marriage because of legend about kinship and pseudokinship. If two members of the same clan marry, this angers the spirits, and a wild buffalo must be sacrificed.

It is the custom of the family to allow the girl to take a husband as soon as she is big enough. The reasoning behind this custom is to prevent a young girl from having affairs and bringing shame on herself. Generally, girls younger than 16 are not allowed to marry unless they are large for their age.

When a girl comes of age, the parents hold an assembly and discuss the possibilities of a husband for the girl. Once a boy is selected, they call his uncles and his brothers into the assembly to see if his family accepts this idea. If the brother and uncles of the boy agree, they then go to hold an assembly with the boy and his parents. Providing that the boy and his parents agree, a day is then set when everyone from the boy and girl's families will meet at the boy's home. Before this day takes place, a wise man must speak to the boy and girl about the proposed marriage.

On the day both families meet at the boy's home, the ceremony of wedlock takes place between the boy and girl. The boy sits on one side of a mat and the girl on the opposite side. Each of them places a bracelet on the mat. If the girl likes the boy, she takes his bracelet from the mat, and if the boy likes the girl, he takes her bracelet from the mat. The families are witnesses, and the wedlock is completed.

At the end of the bracelet ceremony the boy's parents ask for a dowry (ngan mau) from the girl. She is expected to give in accordance with the position or wealth of the boy. If the boy is a state official, she might give one large flat gong which costs about 20,000 piasters; a lesser gift for a boy of good standing might be a buffalo worth 5,000 piasters. Dowry is usually given to fit the needs of the boy's family. If the girl has no family or cannot pay the dowry, the parents of the boy ask the girl to live in their long house. If, at the end of 2 or 3 years the girl can pay the dowry, both families gather

together again, and the wise man speaks for the marriage. A buffalo or pig is then sacrificed, according to the wealth of the young girl. Providing the girl has a family, the couple then moves to the home of her parents, this being the rightful place of her husband, once the dowry is paid.

Should the marriage be broken at any time by the husband, he must pay his wife double the dowry she paid for him, plus a fine for each of the children he leave her with. If the wife breaks the marriage, she must pay her husband the same dowry she gave his family for him. Divorce is rare among the Rhade, and it is even more seldom that both parties agree to divorce, since neither would pay the other.

Other customs for marriage include the following: When the wife dies, the husband returns to his family unless there is another free woman in the family for him to marry. In case he returns to his family, any children he has stay with another female member of his former wives family. His former wife's brothers are responsible for their care.

In the case where the husband dies, the wife raises the children whether or not she marries again.

Rules for adultery are included as a part of the marriage system. If the wife should catch her husband with another woman, she levies a fine against him according to the wealth of his family. The husband must then obtain this money from this family and give it to his wife.

If the wife is caught committing adultery, she is likewise fined, unless the man is unmarried, in which case he pays a fine to the husband. In any case of adultery, where both parties are married, a fine is levied against each. The man must pay his wife and the woman, her husband. In the case of the woman, the money must be given to the parents of her husband. Neither she nor her husband can use that money.

A man may take more than one wife if he is rich and if the brothers of his first wife agree. The wife's brothers also have the power of correction in all family matters. Women cannot marry more than one husband.

In the case where a boy and a girl have a private affair, a bracelet may be exchanged in secret. This provision ensures that a girl rarely becomes pregnant without having a husband she can lay claim to. It would be a rare

case where the boy tried to deny the secret marriage, because he would be formed to pay a heavy fine.

VII. Family relationship. The oldest female owns the house and part of the jars, paddy, and animals. When a man marries, he lives with his wife's family and is required by custom to show great respect for his mother-in-law. Her compartment in the house should be avoided by the sons-in-law, and they should avoid any behavior that might be interpreted as intimate. They treat her with distant respect and this behavior is mutual. At all costs there must be no joking between them. Any breach of this practical requires the po-ri-ce-yang or sorcerer to determine what sacrifice will serve as a remedy. Usually, the son-in-law guilty of a "breach of avoidance" is expected to sacrifice a pig. E'pih is the term used, meaning "to wipe away bad blood with a branch."

All joking in the household is considered undersirable, with children and old people exempted from this rule. Still all elderly members of the family must be treated with respect. It is considered permissible to joke with members of other clans, but not with clan brothers.

In the building of a house, all members of a family are called together to determine who wishes to live in the same house among those desiring to build their own house. Those members of the family desiring to live together will build a long house according to the size of the family.

All members of the clan may assist in the construction of a house. Such assistance is voluntary and the only reward is a feast given by the family of the new house upon its completion.

Upon approaching the front of a long house, one finds a round pole carved with footsteps to help reach the floor level of the house, which is about four feet off the ground, built upon holes.

This round pole with footsteps is the male staircase. There will usually be a flat carved ladder with breasts carved at the top. This is the female staircase. This porch is used by women of the family to pound the day's rice with a long pole and wooden mortar. Visitors should leave their weapons on this porch, as old custom forbids these being brought into the house.

Once over the porch or Bhok-gah, one passes through the front entrance into the tung-gah or main room of the house. Here one is usually received by

the head man of the house. The tung-gah is a place for receiving guests, holding ceremonies and a sitting room for the family. Weapons, tools, and other effects of family members are stored in this room. This room also holds all things needed for ceremonies and the calling of spirits. Such essential items include the long bench carved from an enormous piece of local hardwood, a large drum made from buffalo skin, gongs, wine jugs, a carved bed for guests, and poles for holding the jugs in their arranged row in the center of the room during the ceremony.

Proceeding toward the back of the house from the tung-gah, the next room is private for female guests. If the female guest is married, her husband may also sleep here. In most cases male guest sleep in the tung-gah.

Behind the female guests room or tung-yuan is the Adir-Pit, a series of private rooms for the family living in the house. The compartments are usually open, having a corridor running along one side to the back of the house. There are open fire places along the corridor, used for preparing meals for those residing in the house. All members of the same lineage may eat together, or each nuclear family may prepare its own sa-boh-go or rice pot. The last compartment of the Adir-Pit is reserved for the elders of the family. A guest should not enter the Adir-Pit or back of the long house.

When calling a member of the family, one asks for the father or mother of that person's daughter or son by saying the daughter or son's name. If the man or women have no children, one may ask for them by their name. All children take the first name of their mother. All girl's husbands live with the family but may make a separate field, if they desire. When boys marry, they leave the family to go to their wife's family, unless the boy's family requests his wife to stay with them until a second ceremony of wedlock, a period of a few months to three years, as discussed above in customs of marriage.

Wealth passes to daughters upon the death of parents. Sons may not receive any of the wealth of their parents. Old family custom, not presently in use, provided that should an older brother die, the younger unmarried brother was required to take the widow as a second wife, although it is not obligatory. Another brother, however, may never marry the widow of a young brother.

The maternal uncle is responsible for his sister's children, should her husband die. Even if the father is not dead, the maternal uncle must pay any fines, should his nephew get into trouble.

Custom for receiving a guest in the family provides that the guests be given a mat and shown to the sitting table near the fire place in the ceremony room or tung-gah. They should be offered the warmth of the fire and tobacco for smoking. A blanket and pillow should be offered, should they be tired. If they have traveled far and wish to rest with the family, the women cook food for them to eat. If the guest is of high standing he is offered rice wine. The job of the man of the family includes cutting trees, clearing land, weaving bamboo, fishing, hunting, building houses, carrying heavy things, making ornamental instruments, regulating affairs of business, selling things, making coffins, burying the dead, obtaining money, rice storage, making hand tools, weapons, building stock pens, striking gongs, and last but not least, putting water in the jars of rice wine.

Jobs for the women are: to draw water, to get fire wood; cook food; clean the house dishes and kettle; mend clothes; weave skirts and blankets; prepare cotton thread and dye the thread the traditional black, red, yellow and blue; wash the clothes, clean the fire place; pound the rice; and carry a load on the back when the family travels.

Children from 5 to 8 years old are responsible for the younger children while the parents work. From 9 to 12 years of age they help their parents in the fields gather wood, cook food, and guard livestock. Men and women work together in planting and harvest of fields, plus raising of all livestock. As parents, they are responsible for teaching their children the way of the family and village. They must be taught not to be lie or steal, to respect property, livestock fields, and forest. Children must respect elders and speak badly of no person or spirits.

VIII. Village system. The guardian of the village land is the Po Lan who is usually the eldest female of the eldest line in the subclan of each territory. If it should happen that there are no girls in the direct line, a male may become Po Lan. However, his daughter will assume the role after his death.

The limits of the clan are well marked by natural boundaries, such as rivers, hills, rocks or trees. A record of this boundary is passed by word of mouth from generation to generation. Under the Po Lan system, the Po Lan must visit the limit of the clan land. The Rhade believe that the souls of the ancestors lie in the soil within each sub-clan area. The Po Lan must sacrifice a buffalo each for the souls of the ancestors so they will bring rain. If the two members of the same clan marry, or marriage occurs between two clans

not permitted to marry, the Po Lan must make a sacrifice to appease the affronted ancestors.

If anyone should violate the territory by practicing shifting agriculture or cutting the forest without the permission of the Po Lan, the Po Lan can levy a fine against the offender. Parts of the forest are considered sacred and it is forbidden to cut trees there. If this is done, great misfortune will occur to the subclan that owns the territory and sorcerers must contact the spirits. The Po Lan receives 2 or 3 baskets of rice, pigs, chicken, cotton etc... every seven years as a fee for her services. In addition to this, she receives drinking wine and food in places she visits without obligation.

Villages are lead by a village headman and a council of elders. The village headman is selected by the villagers but is generally the wealthiest and most intelligent man in the village. He must be approved by the council of elders, a group of old, respected men selected by the villagers. Headmen are responsible for selecting a new site if a village must be moved. More than this, he must be responsible for all village affairs and must organize all village rituals, particularly those associated with rice cultivation and the Nga Yang Tuh Ea or spirit of the fountain.

In the village system the Rhade travel around the forest, looking for a good location on virgin soil or land that has been unused 60 to 70 years. They judge carefully of their dreams. If one dreams of a horse with a small body, they believe rice will not grow on that new land and misfortune will come to their family. A dream of a dog will bring some shameful affair in working with other people in clearing the new field. If a monkey should appear in a dream grave sickness will occur for the man clearing the new field. When the field advances in preparation, should the man hear the back of the roe-deer 3 times, death will come to the family if they do not leave that field.

Before they burn they take away the dry leaves from around the edge of the field to prevent the spread of the fire to the village or forest. All unburned material is gathered in piles and burned about 5 days after the first fire. Rhade realize the value of the wood ash as fertilizer, as seen in the extra growth of rice plants on a field with woodash. Once the rain comes at the beginning of the rainy season, they plant corn, squash, potatoes, cucumbers, eggplant, and the banana first. The rice is then planted after these go into the ground.

A few fields may be planted during the rainy season. In this case grass



is cut and burned when the rain holds off for a few days. They then gis up and burn the roots of the trees in the field.

It is the custom of the traveler from a village not to carry food on his trip as the proprietor of any Rhade house he goes to gives him food and drink without expecting pay whether or not he may know the traveler.

At the start of a journey the hearing of a certain bird's song means that the man one is going to see will not be home. If the roe-deer barks, the traveler's family will have sickness, should he go on the trip. The traveler's fingers accidentally hitting against stone tells him that people will not buy if he is going to sell.

The same bark of roe-deer and the call of a bird that stops a journey if heard at the beginning has a different meaning if heard after the trip has started. It tells the travelers not to stop in any village in which there is death. During the trip a sneeze calls for one to stop and wait if one does not desire misfortune. Village courtesy calls for one to knock or call when entering a house, shake hands and be polite, and obtain permission to enter the long house. If asked to drink rice wine, one should at least take a few sips.

Custom says that no person should take anything without proper payment not should a man touch the breasts of women or force attention on any women. One should not enter private quarters or the back of a long house. No person in the village should allow a cow to mate with a water buffalo or a dog with a pig.

Sports in the village include games of running, jumping, riding, spear fighting with sticks, and fighting with wooden sabres. Children make kites, walking stilts, wooden gongs, and play games. Most people in the village use stilts to travel between long houses when the village is muddy.

Hunting weapons for the Rhade village, or Buon, include crossbow with non-poison arrows, knives, spears, traps, and snares.

Dogs are used for the hunt and in years past horses were ridden by mountaineers to run down and spear wild buffalo. Many villagers were killed when the old practice of spearing buffalo was in full glory. Sparrowhawks have been caught and trained for many years to catch fish.

Traps and snares are used for foxes, hares, deer, peacocks, rats, and other small game. Birds are shot with crossbow and fish are taken with net, basket, or spear.

The village system for dealing with a thief is as follows. The person who has had property stolen comes to the village magistrate (who is usually anyone who will plead for him). The property owner asks the magistrate to go to the home of the suspected thief and ask questions regarding the stolen property.

If a judgment is made against the suspect, the chief of the village is informed so that he may summon the suspect to his home. A day and place is then set for trial. The trial is usually held in the house of the suspect and the owner of the stolen property along with the village chief and counsel for the accused, are present. Speaker for the accused is his counsel and speaker for the owner is the magistrate he has selected. The magistrate protests the action allegedly committed by the suspect with parables. If a judgment is made against the suspect, he must return to the owner of whatever he has stolen, unless he is pardoned by that owner, in which case he might only return double or exactly what he has stolen.

A certain village code operates in correction with selection of a sorcerer or male witch. If a man sleeps much in the daytime and dreams of hunting, eating burned meat, and talks in his sleep, he is thought to be a sorcerer. This is especially true if he makes many predictions which come true. On the other hand, those persons who have bad luck might kill this man, believing that he is really a sorcerer.

In other cases the person suspected of being a sorcerer may be required to choose one of 3 alternatives. First, he may select being submerged in water for a long period of time. Secondly, he can elect to put his hands in a pitch fire or molten brass. Third choice is the wine drinking test. The wine drinking test is the one usually selected. Before this test, a sacrifice is made and the spirits are called. Old belief provides that the suspect will be protected from becoming drunk or sick upon drinking the required 8 liters of wine. If the suspect drinks only 1 litre and becomes drunk or sick, there is no doubt that he is a sorcerer. The people then ask the suspect's family if this man has come to do evil. If the family answers yes, the man is killed. Note: this custom is no longer practiced.

Rhade law requires that if one man slanders another without actual proof of what he is saying, he must sacrifice a pig or buffalo in honor of that man. The value of the sacrifice required is determined by the harm done to the man by the slander.

Standards for loaning animals or placing them in another person's care are established in the Buon or village practice. The second calf born will go to the guardian; the first and the third go to the owner. After this time the cow is generally returned and the guardian has the second born calf without further obligation. For loaning pigs, 5 out of 8 go to those who have the pigs, 3 of 8 going to the owner. Should the sow die, the small pigs are divided half and half between owner and guardian. This system allows all villagers to raise the animals needed for sacrifices for funerals, weddings, and other ceremonies. In case of famine, the animals may be sold for food. They may also be sold to purchase other things for the village. Standard practice is to turn animals loose during the dry season, as it is felt that they don't need guarding at this time. Purchasing an elephant is very expensive but all of the family members might trade buffalo, cow jars, blankets, and money to obtain one because of their value in building houses, travel, and hunting. For 6 months to 1 year after purchasing the elephant, the family must make a sacrifice for that elephant on the first of every month. Members of the family must also be very strict about their behavior during this time.

If a man should steal from another and not be able to pay the fine, he then becomes a slave of that man unless his family can afford to pay his debt.

Under the old system of killing sorcerers, children of those killed were sold as slaves and the children of these children would also be slaves. These slaves were bought and traded, the same as buffalo or cows.

If a man took a slave girl for wife, her parents, brothers, and sisters were no longer slaves but members of that man's family. None of this custom exists at this date.

IX. Rituals. For planting, harvest, birth, marriage, death, sickness etc. . . exact routines must be followed if the spirits are to be pleased. The type of ritual and wealth of the family determines the sacrifice in most instances. In the case of sickness the sorcerer determines what is needed for the sacrifice. He usually starts with 1 to 3 jugs of wine with a chicken for each jug. If the victim's condition gets worse, the sorcerer will suggest a pig with 5 jugs of

wine. If this fails, a buffalo is then tried with 7 jugs. The family will have to borrow or trade something if they cannot afford all of these sacrifices.

Women in the family are responsible for obtaining firewood, drawing water, and cooking food for the sacrifice. The men prepare the jugs and wine tubes; organize men from other families to kill and prepare the animal sacrifice, and spread the word to other relatives in far villages. Early in the morning of the day of sacrifice the wine jugs are tied in place along with the gongs which may be played a short while at this time. The sacrificial animal is killed and prepared, along with rice for meal. People dress in their ceremonial clothes, which are black with red stripes. The sacrificer calls to the spirits to tell them to dress in their ceremonial clothes. Men are organized on the long-bench to play gongs and drums, others sit behind each jug to keep each one level full. The sacrificer calls out to tell the spirits of his ancestors to come and drink and eat of the sacrifice. After this he proceeds to call out to the spirits of the mountain, field stream, gongs, cascades and, all others to ask them to come and drink and eat of the sacrifice. He asks for the good health of his family, blessings for the marriage, a good harvest or whatever else might be the reason for the sacrifice.

After the calling of spirits, the people may sit and sip from the wine tubes, alternating between men and women. The men filling the jugs measure each person's quantity, as they keep the jugs filled. Gongs are played from time to time. About six o'clock the food is prepared and everyone eats. After this meal the drinking and songs continue until nine or ten o'clock. The meat of the sacrifice is then divided for the final meal of the day. The man who makes the sacrifice always eats first followed by everyone, even children one or two days old in theory.

The end of the second meal calls for many to return to their homes, but the unmarried usually continue drinking, gong playing, and singing until early morning. If the sacrifice was chickens (one for each Jar) the ceremony will end here.

Sacrifice of a pig calls for a second day's ceremony. The ceremony may last 3 to 4 days in the case of a buffalo sacrifice. Second, third and fourth day ceremonies are much the same. Jugs must again be prepared along with the sacrificial meat, which cannot be eaten until the calling of spirits takes place. For a buffalo sacrifice two bowls of meat are prepared along with 2 jugs and 2 flat bowls of rice. All of these quantities would be five for the

sacrifice of a pig.

The head and tail of the buffalo or pig are placed on the East side of the wine jugs, as the Rhade believe the East is the place of the great spirit. On the East side of the jugs one will also find a candle, fire place, pipe, and tobacco for the great spirit. All of this preparation is also in place as on the first day.

Different spirits are called on the second day; they call to the spirit of their bodies and spirit of their head, their father and mother to drink and eat of the sacrifice and in return keep peace and prosperity in the family. The rest of the ceremony is the same as on the first day. If the ceremony lasts three or four days, all of these spirits are called in these ceremonies.

At the end of any sacrifice, one or two jars and chickens are sacrificed to bid the spirits farewell.

Custom for the sacrifice for rice is to call to the spirits of Bao and H'bia, keepers of the different varieties of rice seed. These spirits are asked to give good health to the rice grains. Other spirits are asked to help rice grow, to bring rain, and to protect the crop from insect damage. The owner of a field calls people in to help with the planting. Most are usually members of the family. All women and children over 16 are included, as each family has its own rai or plot of ground. M'nam Buh is the planting ritual for the family. The headman of the family, with the assistance of the Po-Kiu-Yang, or planting sorcerer, places a wine jug in the center of the field during the early morning of the planting day. At noon a chicken is sacrificed and the spirits are called to assist with the planting. They again eat and call the spirits in the evening at the end of the day's work. Gongs or flute music may be used to call the spirits in the field ceremony. At the harvest ritual only flute music may be used.

Once a year a village-wide planting sacrifice or Nga-Yang Kam-Mah is organized by the village chief with the assistance of the Po-Kiu-Yang or planting sorcerer. One of the family rai or plots is selected for the building of a small miniature granary in the field's center. Under this granary, built on sticks representing poles, is placed a carved figure of Yang Lie, the evil spirit.

Yang Lie's head is encased in a carved wooden yoke called a Klong. His feet are carved in a heavy wooden block called a HNUK. As a part of the ritual, a long sabre is stuck in the head of Yang Lie. This being done, the villagers descend on

the animal and bird figures placed in the field the previous day. The figures are placed in the traps or destroyed with knives, arrows or clubs. Action here serves to chase out the evil spirit in the animals, and birds that might destroy the crop, allowing the great spirit to stay in the granary. These broken figures are allowed to remain in the field throughout the year.

Only after this ritual can planting by the village start. The custom for planting is for men to make holes in the ground as they walk over the field, a stick in each hand. At times they move over the field to the rhythm of drums as they make the holes in even rows. Women move in groups, bending low to place a few grains in each hole. Periodically, the group breaks to drink from the jar placed in the field for the M'nam Buh or family planting ritual mentioned earlier. A mid-season sacrifice is made for the rice when the plants are about 3 feet in height. This ritual is called the Mnam-tuh-plum-mdie. Here again a village-wide ritual is held in which the Po-Riu-Yang sacrifice a pig. Each family also has its own sacrifice of at least a jug and chicken. These ceremonies take place at different times to allow each family to invite guests. The village ritual may be held in a long house, whereas the family ritual is held in the family's field. As a part of the ceremony the Po Riu-Yang mixes blood from a chicken with rice wine and sprinkles the mixture on the four corners of the field and in the center. This is intended to invite the Yang Sari or paddy spirits, to come to the field and reside, thus sustaining the crop.

The Mnam-Put is the ritual of the ripened rice. This is a family feast with the Po-Riu-Yang again sacrificing a pig and the ritual is held in the middle of the field. The paddy spirit is invited to partake of the sacrifice.

Nga Yang-Mdie is the harvest ritual for the soul of the rice. If the harvest is very good, families may sacrifice a buffalo. The sacrifice takes place in the Tung-Gah or ceremony room of the long house. First day's ritual includes a jar and chicken for the ancestors. Five jars and a pig are sacrificed to honor the head of the house. One of these jars he dedicates to his wife and children, another to guests, friends, and village leaders. In the following days a buffalo is sacrificed to the Yang-Sare or paddy spirit. After this, a cow is sacrificed to the Yang-Tao, the souls of the ancestors. This ritual is usually the greatest and longest of all during the year.

The Nga-Yang-Mggat-Mdie is the celebration to mark the storage of the rice in the granary. A pig is sacrificed here; depending on the wealth of the family, a chicken might take the place of a pig. An egg is mixed into a jar of

win and a portion of the mixture is poured over a basket of rice by the Po-Riu-Yang or sacrificial sorcerer. He gives thanks to the spirits as a part of this ritual. Music for the rituals includes three navel gongs, five small flat gongs, one large flat gong, one extra large flat gong, one drum, one flute with six finger holes, one flute with one finger hole, and a one string-gord instrument. Strings or flutes are never played together with drum and gongs. Singing is without music and is usually done as a chant by one person or two persons chanting to each other, as if in conversation.

Sacrifice is made for the birth of a new child. This the Rhade call the Nga Yang Ko anak or Mrao Ko Kieng. A chicken and one jar are sacrificed for the new baby and meals are cooked for the midwife who assisted in helping the mother give birth and in washing the new baby. After the sacrifice, the midwife puts the baby on her lap and gives it a small piece of chicken liver, plus a taste of dew, which she collects on her fingers from the early morning. The baby is then named by the family and given a crossbow, arrows, and sabre, if he is a boy. This is to make him strong, wise, and rich. A girl baby receives a small shirt, skirt and jacket for the same purpose.

The midwife receives some gift, which may be money, for her services. Mothers of newborn spend two to five days resting by the fire and then return to their work.

Yang-Atao is the name of the ritual for the burial ceremony. This same name is used for the calling of the ancestor spirits. When a man dies, he is laid out in his bed in the long house after he is dressed in new clothes and Rhade jewelry. Custom requires different jewelry and articles for men, women or children. The dead person is laid out on a mat on his bed. His hands will be wrapped to the body with clothes as will his feet be wrapped together with cloth. The body will be covered with one to three blankets, depending on the wealth of the family.

All families of the village bring jars of wine, chickens, and rice for the coffin-making ritual. The ritual takes place and gongs are played as men are in the forest making the Coffin. Coffin makers return in the evening to join the ceremony. Once the coffin is finished, which usually takes 3 to 5 days, it is brought to the long house so that the body may be placed in it. All the family and friends of the deceased spend one night in the long house with the coffin. During the ritual of that evening, any person who should receive payment of debt from the deceased is expected to inform the family. If a man has

died and left a wife, any man wishing to take the widow for his wife should let his desires be known during this same evening.

The next morning the men take digging tools and go to make a earthen tomb for burying the body. Others of the family and friends bring gongs, jars, rice, and prepare animal sacrifice. Still others might carve statues or make a miniature long house for the grave covering. Once the tomb is partially completed, the sacrifice for the deceased is made, all people taking of the sacrifice wine and meat.

The first stage completed, the coffin is placed in the grave. A coverage is then built with wood and leaves to provide an air space where the dirt will not fall.

This space will contain a live chicken, one jar, and rice, since the Rhade believe the spirit lives in the tomb for one year. A rich man will receive a ceremony of the tomb one year later when his spirit departs from the tomb.

At the completion of the spirit chamber of the tomb, the family of the deceased will first start additional digging of dirt from the trench around the circular tomb. This dirt is placed so as to form a peaked, conical tomb of earth. Friends help to complete the last stages of the tomb and place the carved poles and miniature long house at the top. The tomb completed, hands are washed and the last stage of the sacrifice begins. Jars are brought from most families of the village, and drinking lasts till midnight. Many fires are built around the tomb, all work is stopped for three days, then another sacrifice is held at the tomb side. If this is not done, Rhade believe the spirit of the dead person will roar.

X. Remedy for sickness. All sores should be cleaned with hot water. Then tree or plant medicines should be prepared to paint the sore. If this does not work, the enchanter is called with his stick. By placing his hand in a certain place he determines the proper sacrifice to cure the sore. Custom for curing a boil is to let it come to a head and then puncture the head and drain the puss. If it does not start to heal, they burn a small hole into the boil with heated metal.

Belief is established that small children have diarrhea because their teeth are growing. If the diarrhea continues, a jar and chicken should be sacrificed. Older adults and children with diarrhea should drink tree medicine.



If they pass blood, then a scorpion should be caught by a member of the family in order secretly to give the person affected urine from the scorpion. The reason for secrecy is that the person probably wouldn't drink it otherwise. If this does not work, a sacrifice, chosen by the family, should be made. When the abdomen is severely swollen, the belief is that the spirits are angry or the sorcerer is jealous of that person. The enchanter is called to determine what spirit is angry. An immediate sacrifice must be made, appropriate for the spirit. An effigy sacrifice must also be made to that spirit. A statue of a cow, buffalo or elephant might be made from banana leaves and trunks. Flat gongs are made from gourds and jars, from wood. If an elephant effigy is made, the effigy of a man must be placed on its neck. The effigy sacrifice is then placed near the sick man's field or any place that might be advised by the enchanter. The enchanter proceeds to cut the ropes the spirit has tied around the neck, hands, and feet of the sick man. He also takes away those things placed in or on the man by the spirit, to give him sickness and pain. At this time the sick man is required to drink and eat. Then the enchanter, family, and friends carry on with the gong-playing and sacrifice.

The purpose of the effigy is to separate the angry spirit from the sickness. If the man dies, the enchanter claims the spirit did not like the effigy. It is the custom for all rich or poor to give aid and assistance to the sick. When a man dies in the forest from snake bite or for any other reason, he is buried where is found without ceremony because of the Rhade fear of the Djie Ndrieng spirit, or the spirit of immediate death. The sacrifice in this case is a goat or a dog killed in the forest near the village. Blood and the head from the animal are taken to the spot where the man died in the forest. Meat from the sacrificial animal is given out to all villagers. Should an injured man be found in the forest and be brought back to the long house where he dies a normal death ceremony takes place. However, one exception does occur. The dead man's head is turned to the West, away from the great spirit, whereas all others face the East, the place of the great spirit. If a man has a headache, it is believed that his spirit lives with the dead, and a sacrifice of a pig or chicken should be made. Recurring fever is called "the thunder fever." The cure for this is to obtain firewood from a tree struck down by lightning and warm oneself by the fire for one to three days. Ruptures receive attempted cure by the use of tree medicines and use of a wise man's hands in rubbing the rupture.

Medicine for a cough is prepared by cooking certain grass plants. Rashes call for making medicine from plants and bitter leaves. Plant medicines are also used to wash out infected or sore eyes. Sprains are treated by a wise


man with hot water. Tree medicines may be used to ease birth pains.


Rules for lepers call for them to remove themselves from the other villagers, usually in the forest. No family can keep a leper in the house without being guilty of misbehavior. Severe action will be taken by the other villagers. When the leper dies, he and his house will be burned.


Custom calls for the leper to prepare plant medicines, to drink water embittered by plant juice, and to avoid eating meat, for fear the disease will spread faster.

XI. Consideration of the Rhade civilization of the past and present indicates that the Rhade had a very advanced culture at one time with law, ceremonies, and regulations, plus an exacting way of doing each thing associated with village life. Their method of house building and agriculture was highly advanced, if they used this same system several hundred years ago, as custom indicates. A few Rhade tell of a history of wars with other tribes and struggle during the period of migration and establishment. Most stories here are very vague, as these things were not passed on as a part of customs or superstition.

To date, it appears that many patterns of village life are followed as a matter of habit, if for no other reason. This makes adjustment to a changing life slow and difficult.









*The wedding*



Gör djur Edle  
Rhode family




RHADÉ LONGHOUSE




Sang Eté  
The long house of  
the Rhads




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RHADE

FRENCH NAME

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

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
DARLAC  
QUANG DUC  
PHUOC LONG

PHU YEN  
KHANH HOA


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
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*Woman shirt*



*Man's shirt*



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Saigon Research Series

No. 2

*Printed by USIS Saigon*

**II. DEVELOPMENT CONCEPTS OF ETHNIC/AREA PROGRAMS**

**D. SURVEY OF NEEDED DEVELOPMENT INFORMATION**

1. Economic
2. Social
3. Political
4. Security

0

SECRET

D. SURVEY OF NEEDED DEVELOPMENT INFORMATION

1. Economic Area:

a. Economic development in association with counterinsurgency programs usually demands immediate advancement of underdeveloped economies.

b. Analysis of individual situations will determine the most feasible development approaches.

c. Analysis should include:

Potential for directed economic development.

Conditions of soil, climate and weather.

Present crops under production.

Possible improvement of present crops or introduction of new crops.

Consideration of world markets as related to the export potential of an area.

Industrial capabilities to include cottage industries.

Types of tools and machinery in use.

Methods of crop production.

Animal husbandry practices.

Land practices.

Organization of cooperatives.

Potential of finance or loans to farmers or new industries.

Extension information services and/or training facilities to teach new techniques.

d. Development potentials for ethnic minorities will in most cases demand simple techniques that will produce an immediate effect.

e. Many of the effective programs with indigenous groups have included practices that were well known in the U. S. as of 100 years ago. However, in progressing, we have forgotten many of the old techniques.

f. Methods and techniques that might prove valuable to re-learn in their simplest forms:

Soap making

Leather tanning

Forging techniques

Simple tools - types and uses.

Hand looms for weaving.

Cottage industries - all types.

Manufacture of simple firearms.

Making of gunpowder

Cash crops

Fruit and tree crops

Production and use of fertilizers

Uses of animal power

SECRET



Vegetable gardening  
Prevention of animal diseases  
Vaccination programs for prevention of animal diseases.  
Uses of animal products and by-products.  
Animal industries.  
Crop disease control  
Field practices and crop rotation  
Effects of slash/burning.  
Animal powered equipment for farming and industries.  
Development of loan and credit facilities.  
Training and use of extension teams.

g. "Keys" to development programs recognize the need for immediate as well as long-range effect. The most valuable "key" states that directed development must be "geared" to the individual group.

h. Past development programs have been concerned with long-range progress of national economies. All too often such programs have no immediate effect on ethnic minorities which often become a primary target for insurgency efforts.

i. Detailed techniques of economic development practices will be included in a special annex; however, all techniques require individual application.

j. The enclosed paper explains a few of the development programs presently being used for ethnic minorities in South Vietnam.

## HELP TO THE MOUNTAINEER

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### INTRODUCTION

Today, more than ever before, the Mountaineers of South Vietnam must learn to adjust to a changing world. No longer can they depend on the forests to supply them with enough wild fruits, vegetables, and game to meet their needs; no longer can they shift their rice fields from location to location as fertility lowers. An increasing population in the Highlands and the relocation of thousands of Mountaineers to population centers are forcing a change in the hunting and slash-and-burn culture of the tribesmen of Vietnam.

In a program of Mountaineer development it is important that the Mountaineer carry out the program himself. It should be done so that old patterns of life are not greatly disturbed. As an example, the Rhade have very good houses built two to three meters off the ground. He should be encouraged to continue living in this type housing. A great deal of emphasis must be put into the training of Montagnard leaders. The advancements will be simple things which will allow the leaders and their people to advance at a steady rate, but not drastically change their style of living.

Changes and improvements should take into consideration certain advantages which the tribesmen have. Some of these are:

- a) Fairly large animal populations (buffalo, cattle, swine, and chickens).
- b) Vast knowledge of the forests.
- c) Large land holdings when compared with the Vietnamese.

At the same time, he has certain disadvantages such as:

- a) A small amount of money to start a business. Perhaps more important he has had little experience in using money and is often taken advantage of at the market place.
- b) Little formal education.
- c) Not familiar with a permanent type of agriculture.

The Mountaineer generally live in family groups in long houses in villages of 25 to two or three thousand people. Each three or four years a new forest area is roughly cleared and burnt over. Burning the forest area before planting is not only the most simple way of clearing an area but is probably very beneficial in destroying insects that might do great damage to the crops. However, the land is laid open to the violent monsoon rains. Leaching and erosion rapidly lower the productivity of

the land. Upland rice, the most important crop, is planted and corn, hot peppers, tobacco, squash, and egg-plant interplanted with the rice. A few fruits, especially bananas, are planted in the villages.

This pamphlet is being written to describe some of the projects the Ministry of Agriculture, USOM and International Voluntary Services have jointly undertaken to help the Mountaineer develop a better agriculture for himself and his families. In all cases emphasis is placed on simple improvements with the Mountaineer himself administering the change. Most of the programs are "village" projects which involve the whole community. Some of them such as the Rhade Extension Team or the Pilot Village Project at Phuoc Luong attempt to make changes in many phases of village life; others such as the well digging project or the rice demonstration project concentrate on one part of the life of the villager.

## RHADE PLANT NURSERY

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The Rhade Plant Nursery was established in July, 1961, to give practical training to the Rhade in the use of simple tools and in the planting and care of tree crops, vegetables, and other crops which might be of value for village use and as a source of income. Asia Foundation gave the financial assistance necessary to open and maintain the nursery during the first year of operation. Since then it has been financed by Land Development.

The nursery consists of approximately 3.5 acres. Title to this land has been purchased for five years. The contract will be void in June 1966. One building was purchased with the land title and a dormitory was constructed to house the workers and trainees. A small stream provides easy access to water at all times. This is especially important during the dry season. A gasoline pump is used for irrigation.

Running trials with vegetables and the propagation of seed is carried out by six or seven laborers, supervised by one manager. Then the agricultural classes were started, an assistant manager, who is an animal husbandry graduate of the agricultural college, was hired to help in instructing the trainees. The students do much of the work in caring for the plants as part of their training. Several students were hired for a short period after they completed their regular classes to give them additional training in agricultural methods. Plans are to have tribesmen manage and operate the nursery as soon as sufficiently capable men can be hired and trained.

Fifteen thousand fruit trees were purchased in November 1961. These have been distributed among the Rhade villages in the Samnethuot area. They were distributed to the villagers at the beginning of the rainy season in June 1962. Experimental plots of local and imported varieties of vegetables are planted to find which are the best suited for the highland area. The nursery makes use of the experimental findings of the Ea Khat experiment station. The proven varieties are then propagated in the nursery and distributed to the villages.

An agricultural training class was held during the first year of operation. The primary purpose of this program was to teach the tribesmen the basic methods of crop cultivation and the use of draft animals and simple implements for soil tillage. After the training session was completed the tribesmen returned to their villages to pass on their knowledge to the rest of the people. The training sessions covered a six day period and each class consisted of about fifteen trainees. The trainees for each class were selected from five villages, three from each village. All food, lodging, and training materials were provided during the training session.

The topics covered at each session included seedbed preparation, planting and transplanting methods, use of manure and compost, seed selection and storage, livestock selection and care, and the use of wooden plows and draft animals. Each student was assigned a plot to plant and cultivate during the week. The students worked several hours with a plow and draft animal. There were not adequate facilities to demonstrate the training of draft animals as had been initially planned.

Forty seven villages were invited to send trainees to the classes. Forty four villages sent a total of 102 men. In addition, a special, one-week class was held to train twenty-two mountaineer village teachers in basic methods of agriculture.

Fifteen thousand fruit trees are waiting in the nursery to be distributed during the next rainy season. Plans are being made for more training schools. The next sessions will be two weeks so as to include instruction in the training of draft animals.

The nursery has been received with great enthusiasm by the tribesmen as evidenced by their great interest in past training sessions and by the many requests for more. The people are now suggesting specific topics in which they would like to have instruction. One of its most important functions is to provide planting materials to the Traveling Extension Team. It also serves as a center to train the members of the Extension Team and to try new ideas which will later be demonstrated by the Team in the villages.

## MOUNTAINEER EXTENSION TEAM

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The remote and scattered nature of Rhade villages in Banmethuot does not lend itself to easy development. Viet Cong agents have taken advantage of this situation in several ways; the most important of which is their effective propaganda toward convincing the tribesmen that the National Government is against them and only gives them token assistance.

In 1961, Asia Foundation, in cooperation with the Vietnamese Extension Service and IVS started a pilot training project with the Rhade tribesmen in the Banmethuot area. The basic idea was to draw on the resources of talent in the provincial agencies such as the Extension Service, Animal Husbandry, Agricultural Services, and the Office of the Province Chief. Efforts from these agencies were key factors in selecting 69 Rhade from 60 villages to attend a ten day training school in Banmethuot. Courses covered such things as animal disease control, tree crops, soils, forestry, fertilizer use, and improvement of crops in Rhade villages. Practical demonstrations were given in use of animal power for tilling fields and carrying loads. Demonstrations in building were also given. It was hoped that the tribesmen would take their new knowledge back to their villages.

The training program proved to be very effective but a follow-up was needed. Also, there were more lessons to be taught and more people to be reached. For this reason a Mountaineer Extension Team was proposed to carry out an extension - information program. The team was designed to get a maximum amount of information to maximum number of people in a manner that would make a favorable impression on the population and provide a means of perpetuating the flow of information.

Such a Mountaineer Extension Team was established in the Banmethuot area with funds provided by the Extension Service. The primary purpose of the team is to introduce improvements in agriculture, the home, and health through continued personal contact with the villages. It complements already existing programs through the introduction of new ideas as well as being able to follow-up help given by other projects. By showing movies at night and encouraging games, good will and cooperation with the government is encouraged.

The first team began work in March, 1962. It was made up of six members, all of whom were <sup>Rhade</sup>. They included two agricultural extension agents, three home improvement agents, and one medical technician. The team is headquartered in and supplied from Banmethuot. One day is spent in each of 40 villages. Each village is revisited periodically. The schedule remains flexible to allow for more time in a village or for visiting villages not on the regular schedule when the need arises.

- 2 -

Each member of the extension team has a demonstration to be shown in each village. Before the team makes its tour of the villages each team member receives a week's training in the particular demonstration he or she is to give. The training is done by specialists. This allows the use of individuals who have not had a great deal of formal training. The agents, however, must be people with the ability to explain things well. After a complete circuit of the 40 villages is made, the agents return to Bamethuot for a week's training in a new demonstration.

The Agricultural Agents, during the first circuit, placed emphasis in getting home gardens started and on improvement of rice culture. They gave specific demonstrations on building and filling a compost pit, preparing vegetable plots, and developing trial plots in the rice fields to show the value of turning under stubble. They also distributed plants and seed. On their second circuit demonstrations on transplanting citrus trees and distribution of seed and citrus trees were the important items.

The Home Agents demonstrated how to make a fresh vegetable salad, how to make tomato soup, and cooking fish in nutritious sugar sauce. During the second circuit they demonstrated five new food dishes and the techniques for bathing a baby.

The Medical Technician demonstrated the technique of building a pit privy, and gave out simple medicines to sick people.

The most important thing was that in each demonstration something was actually done for and by the villagers. They helped to plant fruit trees in their own village and are now watching them grow. They helped to prepare the food and then ate it. In each case they could feel that the team had made a contribution to their village as well as being involved in the learning process.

Movies in the evenings added a great deal to the popularity of the team. Both educational and entertaining movies are shown. They have included such topics as: San Antonio (a feature western), Buffaloes for plowing (in Rhade), Pig Raising, How to Double Rice Production, and How to Build a Pit Privy. The showings are attended by two or three hundred villagers. The use of polaroid film has also been an effective method of building up good working relations in the villages.

One of the biggest problems with the team has been the transportation. Because of the mobile nature of the team it is necessary for each team to have a vehicle. A program which would involve several hundred or several thousand villages would require many vehicles. Maintenance of the vehicles is also a problem as the roads in the rural districts where the teams work are usually bad and there is considerable wear and tear on the vehicles. The use of Lambrettas would cut the vehicle and fuel cost considerably.

- 3 -

Another problem is that during rice planting and harvest the villagers are very busy in the fields and the attendance at meetings is quite low. These times can be used effectively in training team members in new demonstrations and working on specific projects such as well repair and maintenance of equipment.

The value of the extension team in reaching a large number of people through a package extension information program and as a means of providing direct aid in the form of seed, trees, etc. has been recognized by provincial authorities. Extension leaders in Darlac and Lam Dong Provinces have requested additional teams. The cost of a team, not including the cost of the vehicle is about 400,000\$VN per year. This includes additions to the budget for self-help projects which are expected to increase the effectiveness of the team.



### MOUNTAINEER GARDEN PROJECT

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A "self help" agricultural project for Mountaineer in Lam-Dong Province was initiated for the purpose of helping to establish family gardens. A garden plot near the house which would include such relatively easy to grow crops as manioc, sweet potatoes, beans, and corn would supplement the diet and add variety and additional vitamins.

As the gardens develop, additional vegetable and fruit crops will be planted and the surplusses sold to provide needed cash. This way the Mountaineer would gradually be introduced to a more permanent system of Agriculture which would make them more self-sufficient.

The program, which was started in the Fall of 1961 with funds provided by the Directorate of Rural Affairs, was intended to supplement the already existing 4-T program in the province. The program was developed and carried out by Agricultural Affairs Service personnel and technicians of USOM and International Voluntary Services as a cooperative effort.

VILLAGE WORK - Where security conditions permit the work in the villages is supervised directly by 4-T advisors and IVS technicians. Regular visits are made to villages near Bao-Loc, Di-Linh and Da-Hoa, first to introduce the program and then to follow this up with instructions on planting of crops, use of manure, and care of the gardens. Seed, cuttings, hand tools and insecticides are distributed to anyone who showed initiative by clearing a site and building a fence for a garden.

The villagers who were contacted for the first time during the Fall of 1961 were most receptive to the idea of starting gardens. This was an opportune time for beginning the work because many of the people were becoming short of food since they had not yet harvested their new rice crop. Also they were not busy working in their rice fields at that time.

In the beginning of the rainy season it is more difficult because at that time the people are busy planting rice. Also many strategic hamlets were being constructed and villages relocated. These activities consume a major portion of the available labor.

The biggest handicap in the extension work in the villages is the lack of personnel and transportation. The time that can be spent in each village is not adequate enough to give instructions to all of the people. A team working fulltime on the project, with their own means of transportation is needed, so that each village could be visited at least once every two or three weeks, and up to a day spent in each place.

- 2 -

DEMONSTRATION GARDEN AND NURSERY - In order to aid villages which could not be reached directly because of security, two demonstration gardens were established. These are located near Mountaineer guest houses in Bao-Loc and Di-Linh. These guest houses are used by people from distant villages when they come into town for shopping or other matters.

A worker was hired to start the gardens and to care for them. The gardens are planted to a variety of crops, including sweet potatoes, manioc, corn, beans, peanuts, lettuce, radishes, carrots, onions, chouchou, squash, bobo, and pineapple. The gardens do not necessarily represent the ideal size for an individual family, nor is it intended that everyone try to plant all of the crops that are included. Rather it was to show what kinds of crops can be grown to demonstrate the various planting methods, to show the effect of using manure, and to show how some crops could be harvested throughout the year.

The demonstration gardens are also used for training classes and people from nearby villages are brought in at times to see them, and given instructions on planting.

A nursery was established in connection with both gardens for the production of sweet potato and manioc cuttings. These are for distribution at classes and to anyone who visits the demonstration garden and requests them. Some fruit trees have also been started in the nursery in Bao-Loc.

Near each garden a shelter was constructed for making and storing compost. Since no animal manure is available, plant material is being composted for use as fertilizer. Manure is nearly always available in the mountaineer villages.

PRIMARY SCHOOL - At the beginning of the Fall school term a practice garden was established at the Mountain or primary school in Bao-Loc. The garden was fenced and divided into equal plots, one for each class. The garden was planted to manioc, sweet potatoes, beans, onions, and peanuts, by the students. Assistance is given at the regular class and work periods and the teachers from the school were instructed in the demonstration garden.

Tools were also provided to the school, as well as seed and insecticides. In order to get the garden started in time, manure was obtained from the Bao-Loc Experiment Station to fertilize the crops. A shelter for making compost from pig manure will be constructed soon.

A second garden has been prepared in a lowland nearer a water supply. This garden is to be used during the dry seasons and planted to such crops as tomatoes, cabbage, lettuce, Chinese cabbage, and other vegetables.

- 3 -

TRAINING CLASSES - A total of four training classes on garden planting and care, consisting of from one to three hours of instruction were held during the year. These were conducted by 4-T advisors at the demonstration gardens. After the classes, seed and tools were distributed to all who attended.

TRAINING AIDS - A series of photos showing the steps in preparation and maintaining a garden was made. Three bulletin boards were constructed for displaying the photos. Two of these are permanently displayed at the demonstration garden in Bao-Loc and at the primary school. The third one is moved from village to village and left in one place for a week or two at a time.

The same series of pictures is being put into a bulletin with simple captions and when printed, it will be distributed in villages and at training classes.

A set of black and white 35mm slides was also made from the photo series.

SEED AND TOOL DISTRIBUTION - A total of 75 hoes and 10 knives was received from the Directorate of Rural Affairs and distributed to different villages. Additional tools including rakes, forks, weeding hoes and watering cans were purchased locally out of the project funds.

Seed was also purchased on the local market, from farmers in Dalat, or obtained from the Bao-Loc Experiment Station. Packets were prepared for easy distribution of the seed. There was enough seed in each packet for a single garden, and instructions for planting were printed on the outside.

MEDICAL AID - A medical kit, stocked with medicines furnished by USOM was prepared to take on trips to villages. Simple medicines are distributed at each visit, which has proved to be an excellent way to win friends among the people.

TRAINEE - Besides the worker who was hired to establish and maintain the demonstration gardens, a second agricultural trainee was hired. He is a tribes boy who has completed primary school. He is receiving practical training by working in the demonstration gardens, assisting at the agricultural classes at the primary school and going on trips to villages.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS - The interest and enthusiasm shown by people when they were first introduced to the self help project was consistent in every village contacted. For example in the Fall of 1961, six villages in Da Hoa were visited for the first time and promised

- 4 -

seed and cuttings if they would prepare land. By the time of the second visit about a week later, garden plots had been started in all except one village, and these people began work later. These were all villages of the Maa, a rather backward tribe, which had either no gardens at all or just small plots of tobacco. The idea of cultivating crops other than rice and protecting them against animals was largely new to them, but despite these difficulties some families were able to harvest good crops of sweet potatoes and beans from their gardens.

At the beginning of the next planting season five of these six villages were being relocated or the people were building fences for strategic hamlets so they did not have time to work on gardens. As for Dang Hoang which had become a strategic hamlet the previous year, several families started gardens again and obtained even better results than during the previous year.

Even a complete failure the first time did not mean the end of all interest in garden work. In Kon-teh village, near Bao-Loc, almost every family had a plot in the community garden area the first year. However, because it was a community affair, no individual family seemed to want to accept the responsibility for maintaining the fence or seeing that gates were kept closed. As a result, the village livestock completely destroyed the garden before anything could be harvested.

The following year the village chief began another garden by his own initiative, with a fence separating it from the others. He even placed a crude sign in front of the garden with the Koko words meaning model garden, in imitation of the sign on the demonstration garden in Blao.

The demonstration garden proved to be an important factor also in stimulating the interest of the chief of Tan Lu, a resettlement village with a population of over a thousand. When the idea of starting family gardens was first proposed to him he was interested and said himself that a program of this type was very important to help his people become more civilized. But he said little could be done until the next rainy season because the people were busy building a fence and moat around the village. He was invited anyway to visit the demonstration garden in Bao-Loc and as soon as he saw it he began taking measurements of the beds and planting distances. A week later when another visit was made to Tan Lu to see if the chief might be interested in starting at least one garden as a demonstration he had already prepared the land and was almost finished with the fence. He was given seed, cuttings and tools and helped to plant the garden. Since it was already late in the season most of the garden was planted to sweet potatoes and manioc.

- 5 -

The effect of the demonstration gardens and training classes on people from more distant villages is more difficult to determine because it is impossible to go to these villages. However word has been received from three villages where the people were given seed and tools at a training class, and excellent results were reported. In at least one village the people were able to grow two crops, saving seed to replant, and reported sweet potatoes "as big as your leg". This is probably an exaggeration but shows the satisfaction the people received from a successful garden.

The most important factor in making this program a success is to be able to follow up on the work once it is started. A proposal has been submitted for the formation of a full time extension team for the Koho in Lam Dong Province, similar to the one that is in operation with the Rhade. They would make regular visits to the villages throughout the year. Besides helping with fruit and vegetable gardens, they would provide information and assistance on rice improvement, livestock care, home improvement, medical care and sanitation. Qualified tribesmen are available to form this team, and from what has been learned in the past, the people are eager to receive the help.

## HAND DUG WELLS IN LAM-DONG PROVINCE

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The using of unsanitary water for drinking and food preparation is a major health problem for most mountaineer villages. It is necessary to aid the villagers to find an adequate source of relatively pure water which is fairly accessible. The distances which some of the mountaineers must go to obtain water varies from a few hundred meters to as much as one or two kilometers.

With these problems in mind a program was envisioned by GVN, USOM, and IVS to help to encourage the villagers to dig village wells. It was decided to keep the wells as simple as possible and to involve the villagers in the actual construction. In this way it would be their project. Money was obtained from the Vietnamese Extension Service to build ten wells which would give a good start to the program. From this initial phase it would be possible to foresee future needs. The money is used to purchase the materials to build a well cap and drainage apron, to pay the wages of a mason, and to buy a rope and bucket. Rural Affairs supplied 100 bags of cement to be used in the program. The average cost of a completed well is 700\$VN including the value of the cement.

With the money and cement available the field work began the first of December, 1962. Villages around Bao-Loc and Di-Linh were chosen for the first series of wells.

The procedure for approaching the village chief and his people on the possibility of digging a well are basically the same in each village. First the benefits of having a centrally located well near the village to provide fresh water for drinking and cooking are discussed. Then an agreement is made with the village whereby they will provide the labor for digging the well, and the materials and mason to build the cap and drainage apron will be provided for them. In all cases the villages which have been contacted have been anxious to provide men to dig these fresh water wells.

After agreement on the points, the possible locations for the new wells are inspected. After discussing the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed site, one is chosen and the digging begins.

Each well is one meter in diameter and at present they vary from four to ten meters in depth. In order to speed up the digging a crowbar and pick-axe are provided in addition to the mountaineer's own tools. With an average of three men digging, a well is completed in three or four days in the Bao-Loc area. In each case enough dirt is excavated that one meter or more of water is standing in the well.

As soon as the digging of the well is completed, stone, sand, and cement are transported to the site. The mason constructs the well cap and drainage apron. This part of the job usually takes three days. At the same time some of the villagers cut poles to make a windlass. This has proven to be the simplest and most economical method of lifting the water from the wells. The cost is negligible and since the windlass is made of wood and has no mechanical parts, there is no chance for mechanical failure. There will be no operating cost to the village. In two weeks when the dirt mixed with the water during the digging silts to the bottom, gravel and lime are put into the well to make it cleaner.

At present five wells have been completed. These are in the villages of Tan Lu, Djour L'mour, Bobla, Klong Trao, and But Sut. Another well in Dong Dor was recapped.

It should be pointed out that this particular project will not necessarily adapt itself to all areas. The relatively high water table in Lam-Dong Province made the hand digging of the wells easier.

The initial enthusiasm of each village was very encouraging. In each case all the people wanted to have a well which would provide them with cleaner water. From these first ten wells it is hoped that other neighboring villages will take the initiative and dig their own wells with no outside help. The advantage of a simple procedure with a very low cost per well will help to make this a self-perpetuating program.

# MAA TRIBES RICE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM

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Because of the large scale tribes resettlement program being carried out, there is a great need for increasing the food supply. In past years the tribes people depended on their ability to move around the Highlands, planting their rice in the same spot for one or two years. After two plantings the soil fertility would be badly depleted and it was then necessary to shift the rice field to another site. This nomadic type of life is no longer possible. One of the best ways to raise their standard of living is to increase the yield of upland rice.

Mr. Vu Phuong Tho, Chief of the Agricultural Services of Lam-Dong Province, requested that demonstration fields be set up in the resettlement villages of Tan Lu near Bao-Loc and Dong Dor near Di-Linh. These will include an area for an upland rice demonstration in each village. The use of compost, commercial fertilizers, and insecticides will be demonstrated. The villages in the Bao-Loc and Di-Linh areas will each send a representative to the demonstration areas for the period of preparing and fertilizing the land, and planting the rice.

Asia Foundation made available \$5,000\$US to be used to set up the demonstration areas. This grant will cover the development and operating costs of the two fields for one year. It will also provide for the purchase of cement, spraying equipment, insecticides, and fertilizer. The villagers will provide the required labor.

Work will soon begin on building three combination cattle-compost sheds for each village. Each village has approximately 1200 people. When they came to the resettlement area, they brought about 50 head of buffalo with them. It is estimated that three buildings, 10m x 5m for each village will be adequate housing for these animals for the next three years. The village people will provide all labor for the construction of the buildings. Wood, bamboo, and thatch will be taken from the nearby jungles. Approximately 100 bags of cement will be used for the floors and compost pit in each village. There will also be the cost for rock and gravel, to hire a mason, and to purchase the sprayers, insecticides, and fertilizers.

The compost collected in the buffalo pens will be used in fertilizer demonstrations with the rice planting. If this demonstration indicates that this program is economical it will be expanded. At that time a one-month training course could be set up for training village representatives to handle each individual village problem.



### PHUOC LUONG - A PILOT PROJECT

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Phuoc Luong is a mountaineer resettlement village located near Nha-Trang. Approximately 1200 refugees settled there November 31, 1960. They had been driven from their homes by the Viet Cong who tried to move the villagers into a dense jungle area which was completely under the control of the Communists. The villagers were forced to abandon all except what they could carry. They left behind food, clothing, household goods, tools, seed, and livestock. All that they were able to take with them was a small quantity of rice. The refugees were in dire need of help to meet their basic needs of livelihood.

The Mennonite Central Committee and the Catholic Relief Agency supplied the refugees with 2000 bags of rice. This was their only source of food for a nine month period. The rice was used for consumption and the village had no seed for planting crops for the coming year. The group had cleared some land, but was reluctant to continue such work without a source of seed.

During July and August, 1961, meetings were held with Phuoc Luong village officials and Vietnamese government officials to learn possible ways that the villagers might be helped to make themselves self-sufficient. The 200 families had only 100 hectares of cleared land. They lacked the tools to adequately clear the land and had no seed to plant. They had to rent farming tools and in some cases were forced to hire operators with the tools.

Meetings were held with the village leaders and the District Chief to determine what help the villagers wanted most and how this help could be coordinated with Agricultural Services. Possibilities of starting small industries which might provide income were also discussed. These included blacksmith work, a bamboo factory, the making of mats, baskets, and jewelry, dressmaking, and charcoal manufacture. It appeared that the blacksmith project was the most worthy of immediate promise. The village people placed it on a high priority. Ten of the men were experienced blacksmiths. All that was lacking was the tools to work with. These tools represented a relatively small investment.

Money was obtained through the Asia Foundation to buy seed and simple blacksmith equipment. Twenty-six thousand piasters were supplied to purchase seed and 5,000\$VN for blacksmith tools. Since the villagers did not have a great deal of experience in agriculture, it was decided to limit the crops to those which are easy to grow-upland rice, corn, and beans. Two blacksmith shops were set up to make simple tillage and wood-cutting tools. The tillage implements greatly expedited planting crops.

The woodcutting tools were used in land clearing, in constructing a stockade for the village, and in cutting wood for market. The latter was their only source of cash income.

To improve health, casings were built for wells and a travel fund was established to enable sick people to go to the missionary hospital twenty miles away. A small school was started which is attended by 75 village children.

The crops planted from the seed provided the main source of food during the first half of 1962. The villagers saved seed from the best plants for the May-June rainy season. The conditions in the village improved considerable during the first year at Phuoc Luong. Probably most important in their successful resettlement was their own ambition and cooperative spirit.

The help came from many sources. The Agricultural Services office in Nha-Trang provided technical assistance. The Directorate of Agriculture provided a truck to carry the seed from the Banmethuot to the village. Asia Foundation furnished the money to buy the seed and tools. American Girl Scouts in Saigon collected clothing. USO provided carts to be used to carry the wood to market. The Mennonite Central Committee and Catholic Relief Agency provided food. IVS team members worked closely with the people of Phuoc Luong as they planted their seed or made hand-tools in their new blacksmith shops.

Certain lessons were learned in the work at Phuoc Luong which will be of use in future projects with other mountaineer resettlement villages.

1. Selection of the site is very important.
2. Greater enthusiasm is developed if the villagers meet together to decide what kind of help they need and want and to plan a work program.
3. Help given should be fairly simple and not involve having to learn new difficult skills. It should also be of a nature which is fairly certain to succeed. Seed should be local and obtained in the area if possible. Germination should be checked. The villages cannot afford to gamble with untested foreign varieties.
4. Very often special skills, such as the blacksmiths in Phuoc Luong, are available and can make a valuable contribution with encouragement and a little help.
5. Most resettlement villages will have to go through a long difficult period of adjustment. They will require help over a fairly long period on a step-by-step basis.

**SECRET**

**D. SURVEY OF NEEDED DEVELOPMENT INFORMATION**

**2. Social Area:**

a. Educational systems are almost non-existent among many ethnic minority groups. Establishment of simple educational systems for children and adults can be of extreme value as a part of counterinsurgency systems not to mention their value for long-term development and progress.

b. Essential elements for starting education programs include:

- Teacher training.
- Salary system for teachers.
- Local population and/or government construction of school facilities.
- Establishment of an educational system.
- Introduction of the school system to remote areas.

c. Social development programs may include any of a number of types of things that promote public well-being. Medical aid programs, however, are usually the most pressing and immediately beneficial programs that can be started.

d. Medical aid programs include:

- Training of village aid types.
- Establishment of medical aid facilities.
- Distribution systems for medicines.
- Health and sanitation programs.
- Dispensary and/or hospital centers.

e. As many persons as possible working on the counter-insurgency effort should have some general knowledge of first aid, midwifery, and diagnosis and treatment of common area diseases.

f. Talented locals may be available for recruit to form the base for medical and health programs.

g. Included are two papers explaining:

1. Courses for village health workers.
2. Special forces village medical program.

**SECRET**

CURRICULUM  
Course for Village Health Workers

This outline is intended as a guide for a minimum course of training for Village Health Workers. The course may be lengthened and other subjects added at the discretion of the Provincial Medecin-Chef.

I. Purposes:

- a/ To familiarize the Village Health Workers with the over-all objectives and organization of the Rural Health Program and to define his functions and responsibilities as a team member.
- b/ To prepare the Village Health Worker to carry out his functions as an effective worker.
- c/ To emphasize the preventive aspects of disease.

II. Length of Training:

The Village Health Worker shall have a four weeks' period of training at the Provincial Hospital or District Dispensary. On successfully completing this training he shall receive a certificate qualifying him to function as a Village Health Worker.

Qualifications of Candidates:

- a) Over 18 years of age
- b) Ability to read and write
- c) Good health
- d) Good habits of personal hygiene
- e) Ability to work with village people

III. Instructor:

- a/ One qualified person should be appointed as instructor to have complete charge of the course and the students. This instructor may be either a health technician or a head nurse. He should have had experience working in the Rural Health Program, preferably, as District Health Chief.
  - b/ Other health personnel may assist in teaching
- . . . / . . .

- 2 -

some subjects. For example, a Sanitary Agent may teach "Village Sanitation" and the Dispensary Nurses supervise the practice of the students in the Dispensary.

IV. Facilities Needed:

- a/ Housing and meals for the students
- b/ Class-room furnished with: 1) Waste basket, 2) Tables or desks, 3) Chairs, 4) Blackboard, chalk and erasers, 5) Roll book, 6) Fully equipped Village Medical Kit, 7) Other Supplies as indicated for each lesson in the "Instructor's Guide."
- c/ Text Book - A copy of the "Village Health Workers' Manual" for each student.
- d/ Reference Book - A copy of "Manual of Policies and Procedures 1957" for use of the teacher.
- e/ Additional reference material is included in the Instructor's Guide.

V. Course Content:

As outlined this course will consist of 130 hours which have been allotted to the different subjects as follows:

- Orientation : 6 hours
- Disease Prevention and Health Education : 12 hrs
- The Village Health Worker, Health Station and Medical Kit : 10 hours
- Reports, Records and Ordering Supplies : 5 hrs
- Injuries and First Aid : 40 hrs
- Diseases of the Skin and Eyes : 18 hrs
- Respiratory Diseases : 16 hrs
- Intestinal Diseases : 8 hrs
- Fever and Pain : 15 hrs

Health Education is included in the course as, "The Village Health Worker teaches prevention of the disease which he treats." Simple nutrition is taught as the "Prevention of deficiency disease." The taking of slides for malaria control is included because this is one of the new functions of the Village Health Worker.

... / ...

- 3 -

VI. Teaching Methods:

It is felt that the most important method of learning for the Village Health Worker is practice. Also that he should practice each treatment in the class room before doing the treatment in the Dispensary. Therefore 45 hours have been allotted to classroom demonstration and practice and 47 hours is allotted to supervise practice in the Dispensary. 15 hours is devoted to lectures which should be short and practical. 15 hours is allotted to discussion so that the student can ask questions or matters which are not clear to him. 7 hours is allotted to Field Trips.

VII. Rating Students:

The Instructor will observe students practicing in the Dispensary and rate the students according to their performance. A final test in practical work may be given if the instructor wishes. A written examination is not advised.

- 4 -

Outline of Four Weeks' Course for Village Health Workers.First Week

A.M.

Monday	: <u>Orientation to Hospital</u>	: <u>Orientation to Course</u>
	: <u>Introduction to Hospital Personnel:</u>	: <u>Discussion - Purpose, Re-</u>
	: <u>Rules and Facilities</u>	: <u>quirement and Content of</u>
	: <u>Tour of Dispensary, Hospital and</u>	: <u>the Course.</u>
	: <u>and Maternity.</u>	
Tuesday	: <u>Functions of the Village</u>	: <u>How Disease is Spread</u>
	: <u>Health Worker</u>	: <u>Lecture and Discussion:</u>
	: <u>Lecture and Discussion-Responsibili-</u>	: <u>"Five Methods of Spread of</u>
	: <u>ties, Relationship to District,</u>	: <u>Disease."</u>
	: <u>Provincial and National Health</u>	: <u>Demonstration and Practice:</u>
	: <u>Programs. Referral of Patients.</u>	: <u>Handwashing.</u>
	: <u>Relationship to Village Health</u>	
	: <u>Council.</u>	
Wednesday	: <u>Prevention of the Spread of</u>	: <u>Prevention of the Spread</u>
	: <u>Disease.</u>	: <u>of Disease.</u>
	: <u>Lecture and Discussion-"Food Rules"</u>	: <u>Lecture and Discussion:</u>
	: <u>"Sickness Rules."</u>	: <u>"Village Sanitation."</u>
	: <u>Demonstration and Practice: Use of</u>	
	: <u>the Handkerchief, the Improvised</u>	
	: <u>Sputum Cup.</u>	
Thursday	: <u>The Sanitary Toilet, The Safe</u>	: <u>Symptoms of Disease</u>
	: <u>Well and the Sanitary Market.</u>	: <u>Discussion - Observations on</u>
	: <u>Field Trip with Sanitary Agent.</u>	: <u>Field Trip</u>
		: <u>Lecture-"Pain, Fever, Loss of</u>
		: <u>Function, Unconsciousness."</u>
		: <u>Demonstration and Practice:</u>
		: <u>"Use and Care of the Ther-</u>
		: <u>monometer."</u>
Friday	: <u>Aseptic Technique</u>	: <u>Malaria Control</u>
	: <u>Lecture-"Importance of Good</u>	: <u>Lecture-"Symptoms, Cause,</u>
	: <u>Technique."</u>	: <u>Treatment and Prevention."</u>
	: <u>Demonstration and Practice: Boiled</u>	: <u>Demonstration and Practice:</u>
	: <u>Water, Potassium Permanganate So-</u>	: <u>Making of Malaria Slides.</u>
	: <u>lution, Safe Utensils and Instru-</u>	
	: <u>ments.</u>	
Saturday	: <u>The Malaria Eradication Program</u>	
	: <u>Field Trip-Provincial Malaria</u>	
	: <u>Eradiation Center.</u>	

- 5 -

Second Week		
	A .M	P.M.
Monday	<u>The Dispensary</u> <u>Observation - Signs of Illness:</u> <u>Practice under Supervision:</u> <u>Temperature Taking</u>	<u>The Village Medical Kit</u> <u>Lecture - "Precautions in Giving Medicines."</u> <u>Demonstration and Practice:</u> <u>Dosage, Care of Medical Kit</u> <u>Discussion - Observation in Dispensary.</u>
Tuesday	<u>The Dispensary</u> <u>Observation - Giving of Medicines.</u> <u>Practice under Supervision:</u> <u>Temperature Taking.</u>	<u>Wounds</u> <u>Lecture - "Symptoms, Cause and Prevention."</u> <u>Demonstration and Practice:</u> <u>Simple Dressings, Care of Infected Wounds.</u> <u>Discussion - Observation in the Dispensary.</u>
Wednesday	<u>The Dispensary</u> <u>Practice under Supervision:</u> <u>Temperature Taking, Simple Dressings, Care of Infected Wounds.</u>	<u>Headaches, Back and Joint Ache, Sprains and Bruises.</u> <u>Lecture - "Cause and Prevention."</u> <u>Demonstration and Practice:</u> <u>Cold and Hot Packs</u> <u>Discussion - Practice in Dispensary.</u>
Thursday	<u>The Dispensary</u> <u>Practice under Supervision:</u> <u>Cold and Hot Packs, Temperature Taking, Dressings etc.</u>	<u>Burns</u> <u>Lecture - "Symptoms, Treatment, and Prevention."</u> <u>Demonstration and Practice:</u> <u>Care of Burns.</u> <u>Discussion: Observation in the Dispensary.</u>
Friday	<u>The Dispensary</u> <u>Practice under Supervision:</u> <u>Care of Burns, Temperature Taking, Dressings etc.</u>	<u>Eye and Ear Infections</u> <u>Lecture - "Symptoms, Cause and Prevention of Eye and Ear Infections."</u> <u>Demonstration and Practice:</u> <u>Treatment of Eye and Ear Infections.</u> <u>Discussion - Observation in the Dispensary.</u>
Saturday	<u>The Dispensary</u> <u>Practice under Supervision:</u> <u>Treatment of eye and ear infections, Burns etc.</u>	



- 6 -

	A.M.	Third Week	P.M.
Monday	<u>The Dispensary</u> <u>Practice under Supervision:</u> <u>Infected Skin and Scabies,</u> <u>Temperature Taking,</u> <u>Dressings etc.</u>	<u>Infected Skin and Scabies</u> <u>Lecture-"Symptoms, Cause and</u> <u>Treatment of Infected Skin and</u> <u>Scabies."</u> <u>Demonstration and Practice:</u> <u>Treatment of Infected Skin and</u> <u>Scabies.</u> <u>Discussion - Observation in</u> <u>Dispensary.</u>	
Tuesday	<u>The Dispensary</u> <u>Practice under Supervision:</u> <u>Treatment of Infected Skin</u> <u>and Scabies, Temperature</u> <u>Taking, Dressings etc.</u>	<u>Virus Rashos. -- Lice</u> <u>Lecture-"Symptoms, Cause and</u> <u>Prevention of Virus Diseases."</u> <u>Discussion: How to Distinguish</u> <u>a Virus Rash from a Skin Infec-</u> <u>tion.</u>	
Wednesday	<u>The Dispensary</u> <u>Practice under Supervision:</u> <u>Treatment of Lice.</u>	<u>The Immunization Clinic</u> <u>Lecture-"The Village Health</u> <u>Worker's Function in the</u> <u>Immunization Clinic."</u> <u>Demonstration and Practice:</u> <u>Supplies and Set Up for Clinic,</u> <u>Sterilizing Needles and Syringes</u>	
Thursday	<u>The Dispensary</u> <u>Practice under Supervision:</u> <u>Sterilizing Needles and</u> <u>Syringes.</u>	<u>Colds and Lung Infections</u> <u>Lecture-"Cause, Symptoms, Treat-</u> <u>ment and Prevention."</u> <u>Demonstration and Practice:</u> <u>Treatment of Lung Infections</u> <u>and Colds.</u> <u>Discussion - Observations in</u> <u>the Dispensary.</u>	
Friday	<u>The Dispensary</u> <u>Practice under Supervision:</u> <u>Sterilizing of Needles and</u> <u>Syringes.</u> <u>Treatment of Colds and</u> <u>Lung Disease.</u>	<u>Infectious Diarrhea and</u> <u>Common Worms.</u> <u>Lecture-"Cause, Symptoms, Treat-</u> <u>ment and Prevention."</u> <u>Demonstration and Practice:</u> <u>Treatment of Infectious</u> <u>Diarrhea and Common Worms.</u> <u>Discussion - Observation in the</u> <u>Dispensary.</u>	
Saturday	<u>The Dispensary</u> <u>Practice under Supervision:</u> <u>Treatment of Infectious</u> <u>Diarrhea and Worms.</u>		

- 7 -

## Fourth Week

A.M.

P.M.

Monday	: <u>The Dispensary</u> :	: <u>First Aid - Fractures</u>
	: Practice under Supervision :	: <u>Lecture-"Symptoms, Treatment,</u>
	:	: <u>Prevention.</u>
	:	: <u>Demonstration and Practice:</u>
	:	: <u>Application of Splints</u>
	:	: <u>Discussion - Observation in the</u>
	:	: <u>Dispensary.</u>
Tuesday	: <u>The Dispensary</u> :	: <u>Snake bite, Dog bite,</u>
	: Practice under Supervision :	: <u>Poisoning.</u>
	:	: <u>Lecture-"Symptoms, Treatment and</u>
	:	: <u>Prevention."</u>
	:	: <u>Demonstration and Practice:</u>
	:	: <u>Treatment of Snake bite, Dog</u>
	:	: <u>bite and Poisoning, Use of the</u>
	:	: <u>Tourniquet.</u>
Wednesday	: <u>The Dispensary</u> :	: <u>Deficiency Disease</u>
	: Practice under Supervision :	: <u>Lecture-"Cause, Symptoms and</u>
	:	: <u>Prevention."</u>
	:	: <u>Demonstration: How to Improve</u>
	:	: <u>the Diet of the Villager.</u>
Thursday	: <u>Health Education</u> :	: <u>The Village First Aid Station</u>
	: <u>Lecture-"Function of the</u>	: <u>Lecture-"Location, Facilities,</u>
	: <u>Village Health Worker in</u>	: <u>Maintenance etc."</u>
	: <u>Health Education."</u>	: <u>Demonstration and Practice:</u>
	: <u>Role Playing-"The Village</u>	: <u>Floor Plan of Village Health</u>
	: <u>Health Worker Teaches</u>	: <u>Station.</u>
	: <u>Prevention of the Disease</u>	:
	: <u>which he treats."</u>	:
Friday	: <u>Reports and Records</u> :	: <u>Ordering Drugs and Supplies</u>
	: <u>Lecture-"The Importance of</u>	: <u>Lecture-"Importance of Care in</u>
	: <u>Accurate Reports and</u>	: <u>Ordering Drugs and Supplies.</u>
	: <u>Records."</u>	: <u>Demonstration and Practice:</u>
	: <u>Demonstration and Practice</u>	: <u>Making Out the Order Sheet for</u>
	:	: <u>Supplies.</u>
Saturday	: <u>Closing Exercises</u> :	:
	: <u>Awarding of Certificates.</u>	:

DBW 7/62

USOM/Saigon Public Health Division

BRIEFING GUIDE FOR  
SPECIAL FORCES MEDICAL SPECIALISTS

SPECIAL FORCES  
VILLAGE MEDICAL PROGRAM

G

## PART I. INTRODUCTION

### PRIMARY MEDICAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS:

The S.F. Team is introduced into a selected training area to provide para-military training as specified. The S.F. Team's Medics primary duties are:

- a. to provide medical support for the S.F. Team.
- b. to provide medical support for indigenous personnel of the established training camp.
- c. to provide medical support for indigenous trainees receiving para-military training.
- d. to train indigenous field medics to support various types of action units receiving para-military training.
- e. to provide any other medical support which will aid in the successful completion of the S.F. Team's primary training mission.

### GENERAL SCOPE OF MEDICAL PROGRAM:

The established medical program, which will be discussed in detail, will provide S.F. Medics adequate materiel and facilities to fulfill all primary requirements.

Requirement a. It is to be understood that this briefing excludes those medical activities personally performed by S.F. Medics for the S.F. Team. The scope of S.F. Medic activities, the limitations and restrictions placed on them are established by their parent organization.

Requirement b., c., d. S.F. Medics are well-trained in medical support activities and training methods. No discussion of these subjects are included in the briefing.

The content of training courses will be discussed in detail however, and the scope and limitations of each will be presented. It must be understood that scope and limitations set forth in the briefing restrict only those medical activities connected with civilian programs. The S.F. Medics may be called upon to provide training for Vietnamese military units. After training, these units revert to their parent military organizations and will be supported by the military system. This briefing will not include discussions of S.F. Medic activities connected with medical training for military units.

The scope and limitations presented in this briefing WILL RESTRICT ALL ACTIVITIES connected with civilian medical care activities. S.F. Medics will train, supervise and work with indigenous medical personnel to provide care for the local populations. Regardless of their capabilities and training, the indigenous medical personnel ARE NOT AUTHORIZED and should provide no medical service which is not permitted under the Vietnamese Rural Health Program. They can be held responsible under Vietnamese law for the performance of any such services, regardless of who trained them, regardless of who directed them to perform the services.

Requirement e. Providing medical care to the indigenous people has proved a rapid and very successful means of generating good will, stimulating interest and active support for the overall Village Self Defense Program. It has proved so successful that it is considered a primary medical support requirement under requirement e.--"duties which will aid in the success of the primary mission".

#### IMPROVEMENT OF LOCAL MEDICAL SERVICES AND HEALTH CONDITIONS.

This is not the U.S. as is probably already apparent. Stateside medical standards are the ideal to strive for but the real goal is improvement of existing medical conditions.

When S.F. Medics are introduced into an area they will find that Viet Cong activities have almost completely eliminated village medical care services. Rural medical services are badly needed; indigenous peoples want and eagerly accept any medical help offered.

In addition to supporting the primary S.F. Team mission, the medical program established will provide S.F. Medics an opportunity to initiate and establish a long-term medical care program for the village people in their area of assignment.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF A LONG-TERM VILLAGE MEDICAL PROGRAM:

The S.F. Medics can personally provide needed medical care in any area only during the time they are assigned to that area. When the S.F. Medics are withdrawn permanently personally provided medical care is also withdrawn. To establish medical services then discontinue them completely may fulfill the primary medical requirements, but will help the local people for only a relatively short time.

Then the main weakness of any medical support program which would only fulfill primary requirements was it would not establish badly needed rural health services which could be supported on a long-term basis.

It was found that the only program that COULD AND WOULD continue any S.F. Medic established medical services was the Vietnamese Ministry of Health National Rural Health Program. This program was developed jointly by the VN Ministry of Health and USOM Public Health Division personnel; is supervised and aided by USOM.

A S.F. medical program has been worked out with these two agencies whereby S.F. Medics can initiate and firmly establish the VN Ministry of Health Rural Health services in their area, then when they withdraw, these services can be integrated into the Rural Health Program which will continue the services in the future.

This program is designated the S.F. Village Medical Program, and is approved and supported by the VN Ministry of Health and the USOM Public Health Division.

OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF SPECIAL FORCES MEDICAL SPECIALISTS.

Special Forces Medical Specialists are in VIETNAM providing MEDICAL TREATMENT for the VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN POPULATION.


Special Forces Medical Specialists have been given official PERMISSION by the Vietnamese Ministry of Health to PROVIDE MEDICAL SERVICES to the Vietnamese CIVILIAN POPULATION WITHIN THE SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE VIETNAMESE NATIONAL RURAL HEALTH SERVICE.

WHEN DEALING WITH CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, Special Forces Medical Specialists' Dispensaries have been authorized to function as and provide the services of a Rural Health Service DISTRICT HEALTH UNIT.

SPECIAL FORCES MEDICAL SPECIALISTS are authorized to provide to VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN POPULATIONS ONLY THOSE SERVICES WHICH MAY BE PROVIDED BY RURAL HEALTH SERVICE DISTRICT HEALTH TECHNICIANS (SUB-DOCTORS).

From the very beginning the S.F. Medic Dispensary must be considered an official part of the Rural Health Program, different only in being supervised by Americans. The Dispensary must fit into and the S.F. Medics must follow the rules of established Rural Health Service treatment and referral program.

PART II. THE VIETNAMESE MINISTRY OF HEALTH RURAL HEALTH PROGRAM.



RELATIONSHIP OF VILLAGE AND DISTRICT HEALTH SERVICES TO NATIONAL HEALTH PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES

#### PROGRAM BASIS:

In Vietnam at present there are very few medical personnel fully qualified by World Health Standards. The VN Ministry of Health-USOM are developing a medical education program which will in the future produce required numbers of trained medical personnel.

Presently available qualified medical personnel and those who will complete training in the near future will be retained at the National level. As greater numbers complete training, they will be available to progressively lower levels. However, it will be many years before they will be available down to the village level.

#### PROGRAM OUTLINE:

The National Rural Health Program is an interim program during which all medical care at the District and Village level will be provided by semi-qualified personnel who can be trained in a short time and in large numbers.

The program is designed to provide progressively more extensive services at each higher medical level. The village level will provide only basic first aid and minor medical care; the District level will provide dispensary-infirmar-y-midwife clinic care; the Province level will provide general hospital care; the National level will provide specialties care. Any patient introduced to the referral system at the village level will be referred upward as required until he reaches the level of medical care required for his case.

#### PRESENT STATUS:

The Rural Health Program has not been able to reach this goal. Any program or service provided by the South Vietnam Government for the people which is successful and popular is of course a primary target for destruction by the Communists. The Rural Health Service did establish many Village Health Units but the Viet Cong destroyed many of the facilities, stole the medical supplies, threatened and killed the Village Health Workers and terrorized villages which accepted Rural Health Services. Since the stolen medical supplies were providing the Viet Cong badly needed medicines for support of their guerilla activities, the South Vietnam Government was forced to sharply restrict the supply of medicinals to undefended village areas. These factors greatly reduced the number of Village Health Units that were set up.

Without protection for the Village Health Worker against Viet Cong activities the Rural Health Service Program cannot be successful.

The VN Ministry of Health and/or USOM cannot, but the S.F. Team can enter an area and:

- a. by establishing village self-defense systems, provide the protection critically needed to successfully provide the village Village Health Services.
- b. train a Village Health Worker and establish him in each of the protected villages, then integrate these Village Health Units into the Rural Health Program.



```
graph TD
    subgraph Left_System [Patient Referral System / Medical Supply Flow]
        VP1[VILLAGE POPULATION]
        VHW1[Village Health Worker]
        DHU1[District Health Unit]
        PCM1[Province Chief of Medicine  
Province Hospital]
        VNM[VN Ministry of Health  
Medical Supply]
        USOM[USOM Public Health  
Medical Supply]
        VP1 --> VHW1
        VHW1 --> DHU1
        DHU1 --> PCM1
        PCM1 --> VNM
        VNM --> USOM
        USOM -.-> VNM
        VNM -.-> PCM1
        PCM1 -.-> DHU1
        DHU1 -.-> VHW1
        VHW1 -.-> VP1
    end

    subgraph Right_System [S.F. DISPENSARY-TRAINING UNIT / SPECIAL FORCES SAIGON]
        VP2[VILLAGE POPULATION]
        VHW2[Village Health Worker]
        DHU2[District Health Unit]
        SFD[S.F. DISPENSARY-  
TRAINING UNIT]
        SFSA[SPECIAL FORCES  
SAIGON]
        VP2 --> VHW2
        VHW2 --> DHU2
        DHU2 --> SFD
        SFD --> SFSA
        SFSA --> SFD
        SFD -.-> PCM1
    end

    Left_System -- "Patient Referral System" --> Right_System
    Left_System -- "Medical Supply Flow" --> Right_System
```

**S.F. VILLAGE MEDICAL PROGRAM**

The program outline chart will indicate that the S.F. Village Medical Program is not new--it is the VN Rural Health Program with some special features.

A Dispensary-Training Unit will be provided to enable S.F. Medics to fulfill primary medical requirements. This Unit will also be recognized by the VN Ministry of Health as an official VN District Health Unit and will be expected to provide District Health Unit services for the indigenous people of the area.

The S.F. Medics will be responsible for the assembly, training and supervision of a District Health Unit staff.

The S.F. Medics will be responsible for training, establishing and supervising the activities of one Village Health Worker for each village which is given village self defense training by the S.F. Team.

#### PRIMARY DUTY OF THE S.F. MEDICS:

As indicated above, the S.F. Medics most important job will be TRAINING. S.F. Medics should enter their assignment area with one major goal in mind--TO WORK THEMSELVES COMPLETELY OUT OF A JOB JUST AS RAPIDLY AS THEY CAN.

They should initiate training, continuously train and repeatedly train selected indigenous personnel until they are completely capable of taking over the program and its medical services and continuing it without help.

#### PRIMARY GOAL OF THE S.F. VILLAGE MEDICAL PROGRAM.

As the chart indicates the S.F. Program is almost identical with the VN Rural Health Service. When S.F. Medics are finally removed from an area, they should have established a medical organization that can be easily integrated into and adequately supported and supervised by the VN Rural Health Service.

#### S.F. VILLAGE MEDICAL PROGRAM BASIS:

This program is based upon the following conditions, which are repeated, intentionally, many times in the following discussions:

1. S.F. Medics will remain in Vietnam a relatively short time: The Vietnamese people will be here the rest of their lives. Any short-term service provided them will only be a passing luxury.
2. the Vietnamese Ministry of Health National Health Program is the only program which CAN AND WILL support and continue S.F. Medic established medical services on a long term basis.
3. The S.F. Village Medical Program must be designed to initiate and firmly establish basic medical services for the rural people; services which can be integrated into the Rural Health Program.
4. The VN Ministry of Health through the Rural Health Program will take over management and support of all medical services the S.F. Medics establish when S.F. Medics are withdrawn from the area.
5. No Medical Service, support or training is included in the S.F. Village Medical Program which exceeds the VN Rural Health Program provisions; which the Rural Health Service CANNOT AND WILL NOT continue in the future.

5. To carry out this program, S.F. Medics will build and equip a temporary District Health Unit. While they remain in the area they will also provide supplies for this Unit.
6. When S.F. Medics leave, this Dispensary will be left intact and turned over to the Province Chief of Medicine as part of his Rural Health Service.
7. S.F. Medics will train and establish Village Health Workers in their villages. If the Province Chief of Medicine has trained medical personnel in his province who are not employed the S.F. Medics will include them in their program.

The Province Chief of Medicine should of course be kept fully informed of the S.F. program progress and accomplishments. It will be the Province Chief of Medicine who will assume actual responsibility for its continuance.

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PART IV. SPECIAL FORCES VILLAGE MEDICAL PROGRAM  
STANDARD PROCEDURES GUIDE.

FORWARD.

The following briefing is a detailed report of the establishment of a successful Village Medical Program in support of a Village Self Defense Program.

The report was prepared almost entirely from reports, material and information provided by Special Forces Medical Specialists.

When a S.F. Team is first introduced into an area, it is planned that an unattached Special Forces Medical Specialist with previous experience in initiating a Village Medical Program, building a Dispensary-Training Unit will accompany the Team to supervise and assist the S.F. Medics assigned to the Team.

PROGRAM OUTLINE.

The establishment of S.F. Village Medical Program services will generally require S.F. Medics to:

1. assist in gaining acceptance and support for the entire program from Provincial officials.
2. initiate and supervise construction of a Dispensary-Training Unit in the village selected as the central training area.
3. visit village areas, provide medical treatment and explain program benefits for villages participating in the program.
4. initiate and conduct a Village Health Worker Training Program.
5. assist Village Health Workers in establishing themselves in their village areas.
6. supervise and support activities of Village Health Workers during the life of the overall S.F. Team program.
7. assist the VN Ministry of Health and Province officials in assuming responsibility for continuance of established medical services.

1. Assist in gaining acceptance and support for the entire program from Province officials.

The Chief of Province is appointed by and directly responsible to the Presidency. He has complete authority for all government services within his Province, including the Province Chief of Medicine and all medical services. Although USOM and Vietnamese Ministry of Health officials approve of this program and have agreed to support it, no program can be affected or effective without first gaining the acceptance and support of the Chief of Province.

Before or as soon as possible after an S.F. Team is introduced into an area, the Chief, Rural Health Service, VN Ministry of Health and the Chief, USOM Public Health Rural Health Program will personally visit the Province Chief and Province Chief of Medicine. During this visit, Province officials will be briefed generally on the S.F. Village Medical Program; more importantly Province officials will be informed that the VN Ministry of Health approves of this program and authorizes the Province officials to provide all assistance normally provided by the Rural Health Service to an official VN District Health Unit plus the additional support specifically outlined in the following discussions.

Regardless of the timing of this visit by National officials, it is MOST IMPORTANT that the S.F. Medics pay an initial courtesy call on the Province Chief of Medicine at the earliest moment, fully explain the S.F. Village Medical Program and REQUEST his approval and support for the program.

The following points concerning the S.F. Village Medical Program which should be emphasized:

1. The S.F. Village Medical Program is primarily to provide medical services for the MINORITY GROUPS (MONTAGNARDS, HILL TRIBES).
2. It is understood that the Province Chief of Medicine has established and will continue to establish medical services among the Vietnamese people in his area. S.F. Medic work among the minority groups is not intended to overlap or interfere with his work but to supplement it.
3. the S.F. program is to be initiated in those areas where Viet Cong activities make it difficult if not impossible for the Province Chief of Medicine to establish and maintain medical services.
4. The S.F. Village Medical Program is an inseparable part of the Village Self Defense Program which provides its protection. No Village Health Worker will be placed in a village where he is not protected by a Village Self Defense Unit.
5. The S.F. Program simply initiates and establishes VN Rural Health medical services. When the S.F. Team withdraws from the area all established services will be turned over to the Province Chief of Medicine to be integrated into his established services.
6. The Province Chief of Medicine will be kept fully informed of program progress and accomplishments. He will be invited to visit freely, participate actively in the program.


2. Initiate and supervise construction of a Dispensary-Training Unit in the village selected as the central training area.

If there is a suitable building available for use as a Dispensary-Training Unit, construction of a new building will not be necessary. But it may be necessary to construct a temporary dispensary in the selected central village training area.

In determining the best location for the Dispensary, S.F. Medics should remember that:

- a. the Dispensary service is a public service; should be open to and easily reached by all of the people of the area.
- b. the Dispensary must be protected against Viet Cong raids.
- c. the Dispensary should be located so the large numbers of patients visiting it cannot wander around freely in the main camp area.

The following will indicate how similar units have been located to meet these requirements:



Until Village Health Workers have been trained and established in their areas, the Dispensary will also provide Village medical services. After the village services are established, the Dispensary will be the center to which Village Health Workers can refer patients they are not trained or supplied to take care of.

Attached is a workable floor plan and drawings of furniture items which will fit within the dimensions of a Dispensary-Training Unit.


Local construction materials found in the area should be used as much as possible. Leave the selection of materials and actual construction work to the local people; they know what stands up best and how to work with the local materials.

Offer no pay--start paying and everything will carry a price tag. Stress the fact that the villagers must help themselves in gaining these medical benefits. They must provide the labor force for gathering materials and construction of the building. During the construction period, it may be necessary to provide food for those workers who give up food production time to assist.

Building materials found close enough to the village to be transported to the construction site without a vehicle may be prized village wealth. The villagers will be very reluctant to provide them for Dispensary construction; they will need them for future house building. Some form of transportation should be provided for gathering materials beyond the immediate village community area.

For ease in cleaning and cleanliness, the Dispensary should have a cement floor. If thatch building material is used for roofing, an old parachute canopy attached to the ceiling and side walls of the doctor's office and treatment room will help keep the area dust and dirt free.

Remember, electricity will not be available. Maximum window space should be provided to allow sufficient light into each room.




DISPENSARY FLOOR PLAN





30 Cm.


210 Cm.



45 Cm.




BENCHES - TRAINING AREA, WAITING ROOM



50 Cm.


50 Cm.

130 Cm.




100 Cm.

65 Cm.




WORK TABLES




180 Cm


70 Cm



80 Cm




TREATMENT TABLE





WASH TABLE


Same dimensions as treatment table with wash basins set into holes cut in table top. Dimensions for holes dependent on size of basin available locally.




MEDICINE CABINET



MEDICINES CABINETS



TREATMENT ROOM-RUNNING WATER SYSTEM



EMERGENCY LIGHT SYSTEM

3. Visit village areas, provide medical treatment and explain benefits for villages participating in the overall program.

While the Dispensary-Training Unit is being constructed, sick-call visits should be made to villages in surrounding areas. These visits will provide the S.F. Medic with an idea of area medical problems, health conditions and will give the people a sample of the aid they will receive if they participate in this program.

The medical program is explained to the village chiefs. It is important to emphasize to them that if they expect Village Health Workers to do a good job, the village must actively support them. The village must provide a small aid station for him and must provide some food and support. If he must provide his own livelihood he will have little or no time for medical duties. The village chiefs must understand that the Village Health Worker will have complete control of the Village Health Unit, medical treatment and medical supplies. He is the trained authority and must be respected as such. Further, the village is expected to follow his advice in the improvement of village sanitation and living conditions.

For best results in actual student recruitment for medical training, the Province Chief should be asked to request the Village chiefs of the area to attend a meeting. The request coming from the Province Chief will lend authority to the program. At this meeting, the medical program can be explained more fully and the chiefs should be informed to select a student representative from each village to attend the medical training course.

Note of advice. After a few visits to a village, the village leaders--"elders"--will stand out among the others. They may not be the official chiefs, but are respected by the villagers and their opinion carries a lot of weight. Don't slight the village chiefs, but attempt to win the village elders' acceptance and support, they will get the people to go along with the program.

4. Initiate and conduct a Village Health Worker training program.

The Rural Health Program outlines the extent of medical services which may be performed at each medical level and by each type of medical personnel. Since the S.F. Medical Program initiates the Rural Health Services, medical training provided must remain within the scope and limitations of that program.

a. VILLAGE HEALTH WORKER TRAINING.

Duties as outlined by the VN Ministry of Health.

Functions of Village Health Workers  
(First Aiders)

Insofar as they are able Village Health Workers should confine their activities to the procedures outlined in the Village Health Workers Manual.

Since Village Health Workers are not licensed by law to practice medical care of the people they should be careful to stay within the procedures outlined.

Remember that good health is an individual matter with each one of us. The health of your people will be improved only as each member of your country attains this state. Every opportunity should be used to teach the basic rules of good hygiene.

FUNCTIONS:

1. Treat persons within the limits prescribed by the Village Health Workers Manual.
  - a. No surgical operations may be performed.
  - b. No reduction of fractures may be attempted.
  - c. No long continued course of treatment may be undertaken.

Persons needing surgical operations, reduction of fractures, or long continued courses of treatment should be referred to the District Health Worker and Provincial Hospital for treatment.

Illustrate treatment functions by demonstrating contents of first aid kit, medicine and other items. Discuss and illustrate what they are used for.

2. Assume responsibility for first aid station and kit.
  - a. housing of kit and selection of clinic
  - b. other basic equipment; drinking water, cups, furniture.
  - c. sanitation of equipment and surroundings.
3. Organize maternal and child health and vaccination clinics for the District Health Worker and assist at these clinics.
4. Refer patients to District Health Worker, District Dispensary, or Provincial Hospital as indicated.
5. Visit sick persons in their homes as necessary.



## 6. Keep records on drugs distributed and patients treated:

- |            |                    |
|------------|--------------------|
| a- Name    | e- Complaints      |
| b- Age     | f- Treatment given |
| c- Sex     | g- Advice given    |
| d- Address |                    |

## VILLAGE HEALTH WORKER MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

The initially issued Village Health Medical Chest and all resupplies for Village Health Workers will be provided by the Province Chief of Medicine. To obtain these supplies the S.F. Medic has only to submit a requisition to the Province Chief of Medicine.

Attached is a copy of the official Requisition Form to be used; the Province Chief of Medicine can furnish these. The figures entered in the Quantity on Hand column of this sample form are the quantities of medical supplies included in the initially issued Medical Kit. These are packed in a wooden chest with lock and included is a sick call book in which the Village Health Worker records medical services.

The Province Chief of Medicine must account to the VN Ministry of Health for all medical supplies provided his Province; including all supplies furnished the S.F. Village Medical Program. He sends in a monthly report of his Province medical activities. To enable him to account for supplies furnished S.F. Medics, S.F. Medics must provide the Province Chief of Medicine a monthly medical report of Medical activities supervised by them. Attached is a report form to be used.

A duplicate of this report should be forwarded to the Medical Advisor so he can report on program progress and accomplishments.

In at any time the Province medical supplies are insufficient to fill S.F. Medic requisitions, the S.F. Medic should forward a note to the Medical Advisor, generally listing items and quantities needed. USOM has agreed, when notified, to immediately advise and assist the VN Ministry of Health in forwarding to the Province Chief of Medicine supplies sufficient to completely support the Village Health Workers supervised by the S.F. Medics.

## VILLAGE HEALTH WORKER TRAINING COURSE CONTENT:

The training course runs for approximately 15 days--132 hours. The Ministry of Health Rural Health Service Village Health Workers Manual is the textbook. An English translation of this manual will be furnished S.F. Medics. The S.F. Medics should request the Medical Advisor to obtain and send them as many of the Manuals as they need for their training classes. The language of the area should be specified. USOM presently has manuals printed in English, Vietnamese and Rhade; will have them translated into other languages required if they can find competent translators for languages needed. Each student should receive and retain a copy even if he is unable to read. Someone in his village can read and help him study.

**Y-Tế Hướng Thôn (Rural Health)**

Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06091A000100010001-4

**Đơn xin thuốc và tiếp liệu của xã (Village Request for Drugs and Supplies)**

Xã (Village): \_\_\_\_\_ Ngày xin (Date Requested): \_\_\_\_\_

Quận (District) \_\_\_\_\_ Ngày nhận (Date Received) \_\_\_\_\_

Tỉnh (Province) \_\_\_\_\_

Thuốc và tiếp liệu (Drugs and Supplies)	Số xin cấp: (Quantity: Desired	Số hiện có: (Quantity: on hand)	Số đã phát tháng trước (Quantity distributed previous month)
Aspirina 5 grains - chai (bottles) 1000 viên (tablets)	:	4000	Aches, pains, fever
Thuốc mỡ (Ointment) Aureomycine Ophthalmic ống (tubes) 1/8 oz.	:	30	Eye Infections
Benzyl Benzoate - chai (bottles) 1 pint	:	4	Scabies
Brown Mixture - chai (bottles) 1000 viên (tablets)	:	2000	Cough
Chloroquin - chai (bottles) 1000 viên (tablets) 0.25 grams.	:	4000	Malaria
Thuốc bột (Powder) DDT 10% - hộp (boxes) 1 pound	:	2	lice or fleas
Diarrhea Tablets - chai (bottles) 1000 viên (tablets)	:	1000	Bismuth & Morphine Diarrhea
Piperazine Tartrate Tablets - chai (bottles) 1000 viên (tab.) 250 mgm	:	1000	Intestinal Worms
Petrolatum - hộp thiếc (cans) 1 pound	:	2	Keep bandages from sticking
Thuốc tím Potassium Permanganate - chai (bottles) 100 viên (tab.) 250 mgm	:	300	Skin disinfectant
Thuốc mỡ diêm sinh (Sulfur Ointment 5%) chai (bottles) 1 pound	:	2	Skin infections Sulfadiazine Oint.
Sulfathiazole Tablets - chai (bottles) 1000 viên (tablets) 0.5 grams	:	1000	Skin, Ear, Throat lung Infections
Deficiency Tablets - chai (bottles) 1000 viên (tablets)	:	2000	Vitamin B & Iron Anemia & Fatigue
Bông thấm nước (absorbent cotton) cuộn (rolls) 1 pound	:	2	
Băng keo - cuộn (Rolls of Adhesive Plaster)	:	4	
Băng gạc - cuộn (Rolls of gauze bandage)	:	12	
Gạc lót - gói 100 miếng (Package of Gauze Pads - 100 pads)	:	2	
Các thứ khác (other)	:	1	
	:	2	

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Chữ ký Cán bộ y-tế Xã (Signature Village Health Worker)

MONTHLY MEDICAL REPORT, \_\_\_\_\_ (Month)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(location)

- A. Total out-patients treated at Dispensary.
- B. Total bed-patients treated at Dispensary.
- C. Total patients treated by Village Health Workers.
- D. Other.

TOTAL.

- E. RESPIRATORY, TOTAL
  - 1. (Break down by diagnosed condition, disease)
- F. EYE, EAR, NOSE, TOTAL
  - 1. (Break down by diagnosed condition, disease)
- G. GASTRO-INTESTINAL, TOTAL
  - 1. (Break down by diagnosed condition, disease)
- H. GENITO-URINARY, TOTAL
  - 1. (Break down by diagnosed condition, disease)
- I. V.D. SPECIFIC, TOTAL
  - 1. (Break down by diagnosed condition, disease)
- J. DERMATOLOGICAL CONDITIONS, TOTAL
  - 1. (Breakdown by diagnosed condition, disease)
- K. INJURIES, TOTAL
  - 1. (Break down by diagnosed condition, disease)
- L. SURGERY AND SPECIAL TREATMENT, TOTAL
  - 1. (BREAK DOWN BY diagnosed condition, disease)
- M. DENTAL, TOTAL.
  - 1. (Breakdown by diagnosed condition, disease)
- N. INFECTIOUS DISEASES, OTHER THAN ABOVE, TOTAL.
  - 1. (Break down by diagnosed condition, illness, ie-  
Measles, chicken-pox, malaria, etc)
- O. DIETARY DEFICIENCIES, TOTAL
  - 1. (Break down by diagnosed condition, disease)
- P. WORM INFESTATIONS, TOTAL
  - 1. (Break down by diagnosed condition, disease)
- Q. MISCELLANEOUS, TOTAL.
  - 1. (Break down by diagnosed condition, disease).

## PROGRAM OF DISSEMINATION


SUBJECT-REFERENCES HOURS TOTAL	SCOPE OF INSTRUCTION REMARKS
At graduation-Introduction of new students, ARVN REGULATIONS Hours-3	Exercise on closing date.
Conduct of sick call on- job training. Individual Cases Hours-18	One hour daily, 6 day week, sick call for Dispensary patients
On-job-training in native villages VILLAGE HEALTH WORKERS MANUAL Hours-30.	2 hours daily, 5 day week, visit to presignated village, conduct sick call apply prev native med. subjects.
Injuries and First Aid VIEW MANUAL; TM 9-230 para. 18-20, 11-12, 91-95, 126-128, 148-149; MED Emerg. Pgs 115-161, 210-213; TM 8-230, para 83-88. Hours-28	Bruises, Sprains, Fractures, Wounds, Infected Wounds, Burns, Infected Burns, Snake Bites, Dog Bites, Poisoning, Unconsciousness
Diseases of skin and eyes, VIEW MANUAL; HANDBOOK OF MED TREAT. pgs 65-93; FM 21-11, para 22. Hours-10	Infected Skin, Scabies, Lice, Infected Eyes, Virus, Rash es.
Respiratory Diseases & Cough VIEW MANUAL; HANDBOOK OF MED TREAT. pgs 108-111; MERCK pgs 1290-1302; HANDBOOK OF MED TREAT. pgs 122-135. Hours-18	Colds, Ear Infections, Sore or Infected Throat, Lung Infection.
Intestinal Diseases VIEW MANUAL; HANDBOOK OF MED TREAT. pgs 479-482; FM 21-10 para 179-190; MERCK pg 592. HOURS 10.	Infectious Diarrheas, Common Worms.
Fever and Pain VIEW MANUAL; HANDBOOK OF MED TREAT. pg 477; MERCK pgs 1009-1014, 1000-1008; FM 21-10, pgs 246-263. Hours-17.	Malaria, Headaches, Backaches and Joint Pains, Deficiency Diseases.

In the field of sanitation, USOH and VN Ministry of Health are teaching Village Health Workers the construction of water-seal pit privies instead of the open pit type. This privy has the advantages of controlling odors and insects.

The water-seal pit privy operates on the same principle as the flush toilet. It simply employs a hand made U-shaped concrete pipe to connect the squat-hole to the privy pit. After each use, a dipper of water is poured into the hole, flushing the U-shaped pipe; the water standing in the U-neck seals the privy pit.

Hand-made concrete squat plates are recommended if the villagers can afford them. These are easily washed and of course much more sanitary than bare ground.

DIAGRAM-WATER SEAL PIT PRIVY



The P.O.I. Guide lists visits to pre-designated villages to conduct sick call as part of on-the-job training. The S.F. Medic, with the entire training class should visit each village which has a trainee in class at least once. This has proved extremely valuable in establishing good relations with villagers and officials, it builds prestige for the trainee in his village and provides the S.F. Medic a chance to show the village exactly what village cooperation and support will be required to improve village health standards.

Students attending the training course should be given a food and expense allowance. The initial program provided VN \$15 per day.

The S.F. Medics should obtain from the Province Chief of Medicine a Village Medical Kit to be used for class demonstrations.

If S.F. Medics want them and request the Medical Advisor to get them Wall Anatomy Charts in Vietnamese can be provided for training.

If arrangements can be made with the Province Chief of Medicine, the top two students from each class can be sent to the Province Hospital for an additional two weeks on-the-job training. First, this gives the students a chance to practice skills learned during training. Secondly, the Province Chief of Medicine becomes an active part of the program; his hospital training is the prize offered for the best students.

At a class graduation ceremony each graduate should receive the Special Village Health Worker I.D. Card and the Official Rural Health Village Health Worker Certificate. Honors should be awarded, ie--additional training at the Province Hospital. It may improve working relationships if the Province Chief of Medicine were invited to act as Master of Ceremonies at the Graduation ceremony.

The S.F. Medic should obtain from the Province Chief of Medicine an official Province Rural Health Service Certificate and a Village Health Unit Medical Kit for Each graduate.

The S.F. Medic should request the Medical Advisor to provide them the Special Village Health Worker I.D. Card forms. A picture should be taken of each trainee for these cards. These cards especially identify those Village Health Workers who received American training, will serve as identification cards for entrance into village areas in the S.F. Team area, will identify the worker when he returns to the Dispensary to obtain resupplies. A duplicate photo should be maintained in the Dispensary files to match against the I.D. Card photo for positive identification.

The S.F. Medic should prepare a list of trainees in each class which includes the trainee's name, village, hamlet and district name for the village IN WHICH HE WILL WORK AS THE VILLAGE HEALTH WORKER, and map coordinates of this location. The list must be signed by the village chief and have attached some birth certification for each name to be officially acceptable. The original with attachments is submitted to the Province Chief of Medicine. A copy of this list should be forwarded to the Medical Advisor for submission ~~the~~ to the VN Ministry of Health. These Village Health Workers will be placed on Rural Health Service payrolls and receive VN \$600 salary per month.

It is equally important the same information be provided on any trainee or Village Health Worker previously reported, who for any reason no longer works at his job.

Viet Cong propaganda continually charges that all Americans "have bloody hands"; that American medics are actually issuing poisons to their patients. To prove their point, they hold such public demonstrations as showing a captured bottle of potassium permanganate with its poison and skull and cross-bones label; killing a dog with an overdosage of medicine.

It is of UTMOST IMPORTANCE that S.F. Medics review the side effects and characteristics of medications they use, however minor they may seem. Whenever ANY MEDICATION is given the S.F. Medic must carefully explain that external medicines must not be taken internally; that internal medications must be taken exactly as directed because taking too much may cause sickness and death; that medicines given are only for the patient and must never be given to someone else; that medicines must be kept in the house safely away from children; and describe in detail any side effects which might occur, any unusual circumstances connected with taking the medicine.

Examples:

Side Effects: belladonna may cause dry mouth and vision disturbance; antihistamines, barbiturates and narcotics may cause drowsiness, some drugs may cause skin rash, etc...  
OVERDOSAGE: even two or three tablets of chloroquine can kill a child, etc.....

Direct Action: Tetracycline and similar antibiotics given orally for diarrheas may temporarily make the diarrhea worse before making it better; may produce diarrhea when there is none.

Peculiar Circumstances: Povan Suspension comes out of the patient the same color it goes in--the patient is not bleeding to death when his stools turn bright red, etc.....

ALL indigenous medics who are trained by S.F. Medics should be carefully trained in these subjects, for the medications they are taught to use.

### 3. SPECIAL VILLAGE HEALTH WORKERS.

S.F. MEDICS WILL TRAIN MEDICS FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF ACTION GROUPS; those who will not go to work in permanently established Village Health Units. The Rural Service can support these medics if they will also act as "Itinerant Village Health Workers".

They will first provide medical support for their group. In addition they can act as roving Health Workers, protected by their action group. They can provide medical care and treatment for the people in unprotected villages they visit; villages which cannot have a permanent Village Health Unit because they lack the needed protection against Viet Cong raids.

Both at present and in the future when S.F. Medic support will no longer be available, the Rural Health supplies will provide all medical supplies needed for the action group requirement and the roving Health Worker requirements.

Then indigenous medics trained to support action groups should also be taught the Village Health Worker course. Other subjects--especially those on Emergency First Aid of War Wounds, Evacuation of Wounded Procedures--should be additionally presented, but all training given should be limited to the use of the same medicines and supplies the Rural Health Service provides the Village Health Workers.

These action group medics should receive the Special Village Health Worker I.D. Card. At some future time, for many reasons, one of these medics may find himself without a job. If they have received the Village Health Worker training and have this I.D. Card as proof they will be given preference when personnel are employed for Village Health Worker positions.

GIẤY CHỨNG NHẬN	
chứng nhận	_____
sinh ngày	_____
tại	_____ đã dự khóa huấn luyện
CÁN BỘ Y TẾ-XÃ	
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 100px; display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;">           Ảnh 4x6         </div>	từ ngày _____, 19__
	đến ngày _____, 19__
	Đương-tự có đủ điều-kiện phụ-trách một «TRẠM CỨU THƯƠNG».
	Ngày _____ tháng _____ năm, 19__
TRƯỞNG-TY Y-TẾ	
Tỉnh _____	

The Itinerant Health Workers should not be issued a Village Medical kit, these are clumsy, heavy wooden boxes. The S.F. Medic should request the Medical Advisor to provide enough empty shoulder-strap backpack medical cases for these medics. The S.F. Medic will requisition directly from the Province Chief of Medicine enough Rural Health Service medical supplies to fill these kits and resupply these medics as needed.

NOTE: It has been found that while the indigenous people are strong they have little stamina; cannot carry heavy loads long distances. The Medical Kit provided them, weight they will carry in addition to other equipment, should not exceed 20 pounds. Medics supporting groups provided shoes, something they usually are not used to, should be additionally supplied fungicidal ointment and powder. Group medics and all members of these groups should be instructed in proper foot care and use of foot medications.

#### c. TRAINING AN INDIGENOUS DISTRICT HEALTH UNIT STAFF.

The S.F. Medic Dispensary functions and provides the services of an official VN District Health Unit, which includes accepting and providing District Health Unit level medical services to patients referred by the Village Health Workers.



Any patient appearing at the S.F. Medic Dispensary for treatment should have been first seen at the Village Health Unit; should have with him a referral slip from the Village Health Worker. Patients without referral slips of course should not be turned away but instructed in the future to go first to their Village Health Unit. Any patient who can be provided adequate follow-up out-patient care by the Village Health Worker should be referred back to their Village Unit with written instructions detailing the follow-up care they are to receive.

The District Health Unit staff may provide medical services up to and including minor surgery which can be done under local anesthesia, midwife services, bed-patient care for cases requiring only short-term in-patient care; up to approximately 72 hours.

The Province Chief of Medicine is responsible for providing all extensive medical treatment, complicated minor and all major surgery, long-term patient care. All patients requiring Province level medical care should be referred by the S.F. Medic Dispensary staff to the Province Hospital as quickly as possible. Regardless of their capabilities and training, the indigenous staff is not authorized and should not provide Province level services for any patient.

The S.F. Medic must not personally provide Province level medical services to the Vietnamese civilian population. As stated in Part I, when providing medical services for the civil population, S.F. Medics have been officially recognized only as District Health Medical Personnel. The S.F. Medics are authorized to provide only those services which a VN Rural Health Service District Health Unit is authorized to provide.

The referral system provides medical care at the lowest level possible by personnel who can be trained quickly and in large numbers. It is designed so that higher level facilities will not be swamped with patients; will be able to provide adequate services for any patient which needs that level's services.

A trained District Health Unit staff will be needed to take over from the S.F. Medics and provide District level services in the future. As a frankly unfriendly Vietnamese-minority race relationship exists throughout the country, local people should be trained or hired to fill as many of these District Staff jobs as possible.

In recognition of this need, USOM Public Health has agreed to try to find qualified medical personnel of the area's minority race who can be hired to fill as many of these staff jobs as possible. They are willing to train local people and qualify them for these jobs. Further, USOM has agreed to accept medical training given personally by the S.F. Medics as qualifying local people for some District jobs, as pre-requisite medical training required to enter some other Rural Health Service Training Courses.

For any jobs still unfilled, when S.F. Teams withdraw from an area, USOM will have to fill them with Vietnamese personnel.

A District Staff adequate to provide District level services can be assembled if:

1. A Rural Health Service trained District Health Technician (sub-doctor) or Nurse is available and employed.
2. A Rural Health Service trained Mid-wife is available and employed.
3. a sufficient number of Assistant Nurses are trained by the S.F. Medic.
4. a sufficient number of District Health Workers are trained by S.F. Medics and receive two additional months training at the Province Hospital. An additional two months of Rural Health School training is required but can be postponed. There should be one District Health Worker to visit, supervise, assist and provide additional services for every ten Village Health Workers trained and established in area villages.

More detailed information concerning availability of trained personnel, training course content, availability of Rural Health Service training, etc., will be provided the S.F. Medics.

5. Assist Village Health Workers in establishing themselves in their village areas.

To emphasize that medical training is not separate, but one part of the Village Self Defense Program, Village Health Workers should attend medical training during the same period the Village Self Defense unit is receiving training. They should return to the village with the trained Self Defense units. Village Health Workers and medical benefits provided by them rapidly gain wide popular acceptance. Establishing a Village Health Worker in a village without protection may subject him to Viet Cong harassment, result in destruction of facilities, confiscation of supplies.

The Village Medical Kit should be provided each graduate at the time he returns to his village. If possible, A S.F. Medic should go with him on his return and outline to the Worker and village officials the steps necessary to set up the Village Health Unit.

There is complete agreement among medical people associated with the various programs that if the Village Medical Program is to be successful and acceptable to the people, it must not be associated or affiliated with other government services and activities. Such affiliation, association has in the past and will in the future cause unfavorable impressions among the population the program intends to favorably influence.

6. Supervise and support activities of Village Health Workers during the time S.F. Teams remain in the area.

Every graduating Village Health Worker will be issued a Rural Health Service Village Medical Kit prior to returning to his village, will need resupply. In addition he will need supervision, assistance and possibly additional training.

To supervise and control village medical treatment and supplies, each Village Health Worker receives a sick call book in his original Village Medical Kit. When treating each patient he enters that patient's name, age, sex, village of residence, complaint and diagnosis, treatment given including type and quantity of each medication. Village Health Workers should be taught to give only a daily supply of medicine to each patient. The patient's daily return for treatment not only controls the amount of medicines leaving the village area, but provides the Worker an opportunity to control treatment and follow-up results.

All Village Health Workers should be informed to return to the training center every one to two weeks for supplies. They bring their sick book with them, report on their activities and receive additional supplies. A check of this sick book provides a check on their medical treatment and an opportunity to provide corrective instruction whenever necessary, and provides an estimate of quantities of supplies needed.

Village Health Workers should be given the impression that when the S.F. Medic inspects their village, he will check patients that have been treated, thus checking accuracy of the sick call book.

During the training course, a personal history file should be prepared on each student. This file should carry a passport type photograph, a duplicate on the photo attached to the Special I.D. Card. This will provide positive identification of the Village Health Worker when returns for additional supplies.

Village Health Workers are instructed to treat all patients who come to them without question. They should only inform patients that the medical assistance is provided for their benefit by the Central South Vietnamese Government. They should be informed to make no statements against the Viet Cong. They should turn over their medical supplies to the Viet Cong under any threat of personal injury. The safety of the Village Health Worker is more important than the loss of the few supplies he will have in his possession under the above system of supply and resupply.

### MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

Attached is a list of medical supplies and equipment which will be provided as standard stock items. During the life of the program all Dispensary-Training Unit supplies will be furnished by the Medical Advisor. These are provided FOR USE BY AMERICAN S.F. MEDICS and will be discontinued at the termination of the S.F. Team training program.

The attached "MONTHLY REQUISITION" presents a list of standard stock items which are continually stocked in quantity and available within a short time. The figures in parentheses indicate:

1. the quantities of supplies which will be provided as a package unit to open a new DISPENSARY TRAINING UNIT. This Unit is intended to support the medical requirements of a 12-man S.F. Team which has two S.F. Medics and will establish a B.E. (Down Enao) Complex.
2. The quantities of supplies estimated as a two month requirement for each item. One month stock of supplies are for use in the treatment of patients during a current calendar month. An additional one month stock of supplies should be kept on hand at all times as an excess to draw upon in case there is an unusual demand for certain items, resupplies orders are delayed in shipment.

When a 12-man S.F. Team is divided into two 6-Man units, each with an S.F. Medic, each 6-man unit will be initially furnished a MEDICAL AID STATION package unit. This package will contain one-half of a B.E. Complex Dispensary Training Unit package; one-half of the quantities of supplies appearing in parentheses on the attached MONTHLY REQUISITION.

The attached "EQUIPMENT ITEMS-INITIAL ISSUE ONLY" list is what the title indicates--equipment furnished to open a new B.E. COMPLEX DISPENSARY TRAINING UNIT which will support a 12-man S.F. Team. Each six-man S.F. Team which establishes a MEDICAL AID STATION will be furnished the same list and quantities of equipment. Replacements for worn, broken or lost items will be ordered as needed.

The S.F. Medic can requisition resupplies as follows:

1. the attached MONTHLY REQUISITION form will be furnished in quantity as needed
2. as stated above, the figures in parentheses are quantities estimated as a two months supply for a B.E. Complex. These figures can be used as a guide to quantities of stock to keep on hand until experience in an area dictates actual needs.
3. each month, around the 25th day, the S.F. Medic has only to check quantities of each item on hand against the figures in parentheses and order sufficient quantities to bring the actual stock up to that level.
4. this mimeo MONTHLY REQUISITION is forwarded to the Medical Advisor. It will require about two weeks to deliver ordered supplies. It is important that the requisition form be sent in each month even if no supplies are required. Requisitions are held until all Units are heard from; if for any particular item, the supply in stock

is not sufficient to completely fill all requisitions, the actual quantity on hand is apportioned among Units so all receive some, nobody does without.

5. When actual experience in an area indicates that the average two months figures are excessive or insufficient, they should be changed on the next Monthly Requisition sent the Medical Advisor. He may need to increase or decrease stocked quantities to meet requirements without delay.
6. EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS will be provided AT ANY TIME upon notification in any form, as quickly as possible.
7. Necessary equipment and supplies not included in the initial package units should be made or purchased locally whenever possible; ie-towels, blankets, mattresses, mosquito nets, wash basins, pails, etc. See attachments for suggestions for some of the required furniture which should be purchased locally. If required items cannot be made or purchased locally, a list of the items, detailing exact requirements as to dimensions, etc., should be forwarded the Medical Advisor for procurement.

Several requests have been received from S.F. Medics asking for information on some of the drugs appearing on the MONTHLY REQUISITION. A Booklet has been prepared to provide information on only those drugs appearing on the Requisition Form which may be new to Special Forces Medics. See attached.

MONTHLY REQUISITION

6505-		
100-6245	Acetylsalicylic Acid, Acetophenetidin and Caffeine Tabs., 1000s	Bo(12)
153-8730	Acetylsalicylic Acid Tabs., 0.324 Gm, 1000s	Bo(12)
104-8000	Alcohol, Quart	Cn(36)
105-8905	Aluminum Hydroxide Gel Tabs, .324 Gm, 100s	Bo(18)
105-0875	Ammonia Inhalant Solution, Arom., 1/3cc, 10s	Bx(6)
105-5330	Ammonium Chloride Tabs, .5 Gm, 100s	Bo(12)
103-3505	Ascorbic Acid Tabs, 50 Mg, 100s	Bo(24)
103-4975	Atropine Sulfate 2 Mg, 1 cc, 4s	Bx(3)
299-8740	Bacitracin-Neomycin Ointment, 1/2 oz	Tu(150)
721-9121	Belladonna Alkaloids W/Phenobarb, Tabs, 500s	Bo(6)
299-8123	Benzalkonium Chlor. Tr. 1:1000, 10 cc, 3s	Bx(12)
H04-0072	Benzoic & Salicylic Acid Oint(Whiffield), 1 oz	Tu(48)
153-8737	Benzoin Tincture Compound, Pint	Bo(3)
110-4035	Bismuth Subcarbonate Tabs, 0.324 Gm, 100s	Bo(6)
110-8400	Burows Soln Tabs, 500s	Bo(3)
110-9530	Caffeine & Sod. Benzoate Inj, 0.5 Gm, 2 cc, 12s	Dx(1)
111-1230	Calamine Lotion, Modified, 1.825 Gm	Bo(288)
559-5143	Calcium Glucoheptonate Inj, 50 cc, 25s	Flk(6)
116-5430	Calcium Phos Dibasic Tabs, .5 gm, 100s	Bo(24)
112-5535	Carbarsone Tabs, 0.25 gm, 20s	Bo(72)
243-4898	Carbon Tetrachloride, 1/4 lb	Bo(12)
112-9010	Cascara Sagrada Fldext Tabs, 0.25 gm, 100s	Bo(12)
160-0495	Chloramphenicol Caps, 0.25 gm, 100s	Bo(24)
299-8014	Chloroquine H Cl Inj, 5 cc, 10s	Bx(1)
113-9310	Chloroquine Phos. Tabs, 0.5 gm, 1000s	Bo(18)
299-8610	Chlorpheniramine Mal. Tabs, 4 Mg, 1000s	Bo(12)
159-6575	Chlortetracycline HCl Caps, 0.25 gm, 100s	Bo(12)
299-8747	Chlortetracycline HCl Oint, 3%, 1 oz.	Tu(36)
114-8935	Codeine Sulf Tabs, 32 mg, 100s	Bo(12)
115-0030	Collodion, Flexible, 1 oz	Bo(6)
116-1730	Detergent, Surgical Liquid, 1 gallon	Bo(6)
106-8715	Dextroamphetamine Sulf, Tabs, 5 Mg, 100s	Bo(3)
133-4975	2,6-diamino-3-phenylazopyridine HCl Tabs, 0.1 Gm, 50s	Bo(12)
299-9535	Dibucaine HCl Oint, 1%, 1 oz.	Tu(72)
576-8915	Dichlorotetrafluorethane, 8 oz.	Cn(6)
H00-4072	Dithiazanine Iodide Tabs, 100 mg, 50s	Bo(12)
598-5830	Ear Drops, Ethylaminobenzoate Soln, 15 cc	Bo(24)
299-8760	Epinephrine Inj, 1:1000, 2 cc, 12s	Bx(2)
153-9718	Ergonovine Maleate Inj, 0.2 mg, 1 cc, 12s	Bx(2)
662-9730	Erythromycin Tabs, 0.25 gm, 100s	Bo(12)
153-8379	Eugenol, 1 oz	Bo(12)
119-3330	Ferrous Sulfate Tabs, 0.324 Gm, 1000s	Bo(6)
588-5434	Fluorescein Sol Applicator, Sterile, 50s	Flk(1)
515-1534	Foot Powder, Fungicidal, 1 oz.	Cn(250)
299-8279	Gamma Benzene Hexachloride Oint, 1%, 60 Gm	Tu(6)
153-8774	Hexylresorcinol Pills, 0.2 Gm, 5s	Bx(48)
299-9514	Hydrocortisone Acetate Susp. Sterile, 25 mg/cc, 5 cc.	Bo(6)
576-4897	Hydrocortisone Acetate Oint. 1%, 1/6 oz	Tu(36)
153-8480	Hydrogen Peroxide Soln, 1 lb	Bo(24)
598-6117	Lidocaine H Cl Inj, 2%, 20 cc	Bo(6)

664-5582	Meclizine HCl Tabs, 25 Mg, 100s	Bo(12)
550-5464	Meprobanate Tabs, 0.4 gm, 500s	Bo(3)
660-1601	Methocarbamol Tabs, 0.5 gm, 500s	Bo(3)
184-5304	Methyl Salicylate, 1 lb	Bo(6)
129-5517	Morphine Inj. 16 mg, 1.5 cc, 5s	Bx
H04-0067	Multivitamin-Mineral Tabs, Stuarts, 1000s	Bo(30)
130-1805	Nikethamide Inj, 25%, 1 1/2 cc, 5s	Bx(3)
130-1960	Nitrofurazone Oint, 1:500, 1 lb	Jr(6)
299-8604	Oxytetracycline-Polymyxin-B Ophth. Oint. 1/8 oz., 10s	Bx(24)
299-4541	Penicillin Inj, 400,000 U. in Oil, Tabex Cartridge-needle, 10s.	Plt(150)
133-8025	Petrolatum, White, 1 lb	Cn(3)
113-9600	Phenobarbital Tabs, 32 Mg, 100s	Bo(12)
133-9610	Phenobarbital Sod Inj, 0.162 gm/cc, 2cc, 5s	Bx(3)
598-8561	Piperazine Citrate Syrup, 0.5 gm/5 cc, Pint	Bo(18)
137-3000	Potassium Permanganate Tabs, 5 gr, 100s	Bo(24)
656-1612	Potassium Phenoxymethyl Penicillin Tabs 400,000 Units, 100s	Bo(24)
H00-3093	Powder, Antidiarrheal, Intromycin	Bo(72)
530-6470	Prednisone Tabs, 5 Mg, 1000s	Bo(1)
559-6741	Prednisolone-Sulfacetamide-Neomycin Ophth. Oint, 1/8 oz, 12s	Bx(6)
754-2436	Polymyxin-Neomycin-Hydrocortisone Susp. Otic, 5 cc.	Bo(48)
160-7410	Procaine Penicillin-G, 1,500,000 Units	Vi(200)
264-9713	Salt Tablets, Impreg. 0.643 Gm, 1000s	Bo(24)
140-3100	Secobarbital Sodium Caps, 100 mg, 500s	Bo(1)
299-9672	Silver Nitrate Applicator, 6 inch, 100s	Bx(3)
140-5159	Silver Nitrate Ophth. Soln, 1%, 24s	Bx(1)
141-1900	Soap, Surgical, 4 oz	Br(72)
663-2636	Sodium Chloride-Sodium Bicarbonate Mixture 4.5 gm, 2s	Bx(12)
141-3000	Sodium Bicarbonate, Charcoal & Peppermint Tabs, 1000s	Bo(6)
299-8617	Sodium Salicylate Tabs, EC, 0.324 gm, 1000s	Bo(6)
299-8176	Sodium Sulfate, 1 lb	Bo(6)
292-9796	Streptomycin Sulf., 1 gm	Bo(1000)
334-2894	Sulfamethoxypyridazine Tabs, 0.5 Gm, 1000s	Bo(3)
146-4425	Sulfisoxazole Tabs, 0.5 gm, 1000s	Bo(24)
147-0300	Tar Comp Oint, Modified, 1 lb	Jr(2)
687-4482	Terpin Hydrate Elixir, 4 oz.	Bo(100)
147-1300	Testosterone Propionate Inj, 25 mg/cc, 1 cc, 5s	Bx(6)
286-7302	Tetracycline Tabs, 0.25 gm., 100s	Bo(60)
128-5705	Thimerosal Tincture, Pint	Bo(24)
133-0810	Thiopental Sodium Sterile, 1.0 gm, 25s	Bx(2)
299-8601	Trichloroethylene, 60 cc	Bo(6)
664-4814	Undecylenic Acid Oint Comp, 1 oz.	Tu(250)
543-4048	Water for Injection, 5 cc, 25s	Bx(50)
150-1000	Zinc Oxide Powder, 1 lb.	Bo(12)



PEDIATRIC ITEMS

6505-			
559-6747	Acetylsalicylate Aluminum Tabs, 75 Mg, 250s	Bo(12)	
285-2033	Acetylsulfisoxazole Suspension, Pediatric 11.54%, Pint	Bo(12)	
663-2701	Chloromycetin Palm. Suspension, 60 cc	Bo(24)	
586-3126	Octabitanin Drops, 30 cc	Bo(96)	
656-1080	Penicillin-Vee Potassium, 2 Gm	Bo(96)	
656-1344	Tetracycline Syrup, Pint	Bo(12)	

REFRIGERATOR ITEMS

6505-		
286-5319	Diphtheria, & Tetanus Toxoids & Pertussis Vaccines, 7½ cc.	Bo
299-8296	Tetanus & Diphtheria Toxoids, Adult, 5.0 cc	Bo
	Anti-Venon, Polyvalent, Cobra Type	Bo

I.V. ITEMS

6505-		
299-8179	Albumin, Normal, Human, Serum, 100cc	Pk(6)
116-1890	Dextran, Injection, 6%, 500 cc	Pk(6)
116-5000	DDextrose & Sodium Chloride, 1000 cc, 6s	Pk(1)
6515-		
342-6850	Intravenous Injection Set, Disposable	Ea(6)
6510-		
203-5000	Adhesive Plaster, Surgical, 3" x 5 Yds	R1(50)
597-7496	Bandage, Absorb, Adhesive, 3/4x3", 100s	Bx(25)
200-2185	Bandage, Cotton, Elastic, 2"x5Yd, 12s	Bx(3)
200-2200	Bandage, Cotton, Elastic, 3"x5Yd, 12s	Bx(3)
200-2400	Bandage, Cotton, Elastic, 4"x5Yd, 12s	Bx(3)
201-2175	Bandage, Cotton, Plaster of Paris, 3"x5 Yd, 12s	Bx(1)
200-3935	Bandage, Gauze, Roller, 1"x6Yd, 12s	Bx(6)
200-4000	Bandage, Gauze, Roller, 2"x6Yd, 12s	Bx(9)
201-1755	Bandage, Triangular, Muslin	Ea(25)
200-3050	Compress, Gauze, 2"x2"	Ea(12)
201-4000	Cotton, 1 lb.	Bx(12)
299-9552	Dressing, First Aid, Field, 4"x7"	Ea(12)
201-7430	Dressing, First Aid, Field, 7½x8"	Ea(12)
353-0500	Gauze, Absorb, Iodoform, ½"x5Yd.	Jr(1)
203-8448	Pad, Gauze, Surgical, 4"x4", 200s	Bx(12)
559-3221	Pad, Gauze, Surgical, 2"x2", 100s	Bx(12)
6515-		
303-6250	Applicator, Cotton Tip, 1/12"x6", 100s	Pk(25)
344-7100	Blade, Surgical Knife, Detach, No. 10, 6s	Pk(3)
344-7120	Blade, Surgical Knife, Detach, No. 11, 6s	Pk(3)
423-5500	Depressor, Tongue, Wood, 100s	Bx(6)
339-7900	Gloves, Surgeons, Size 8½	Pr(3)
349-2400	Needle, Hypodermic, 18G, 1½", 12s	Pk(6)
349-3400	Needle, Hypodermic, 20G, 1½", 12s	Pk(6)
349-6400	Needle, Hypodermic, 26G, ½", 12s	Pk(12)
372-1200	Splint, Wood, 18x3x3/16, 12s	Pk(1)
H04-0484	Splint, Wire, 10s	Pk(1)

5513-			
378-500	Suture, Absorb, Size 0, Single Armed, 12s	Pk(3)	
378-7100	Suture, Absorb, Size 00, Single Armed, 12s	Pk(3)	
616-9444	Suture, Nonabsorb, Silk, Size 00, Sngl Arm, 12s	Pk(3)	
299-3272	Suture, Nonabsorb, Silk, Sz 000, Sngl Arm, 12s	Pk(3)	
376-7500	Suture, Nonabsorb, Silk, Sz 4-0, Sngl Arm, 12s	Pk(3)	
	Syringe & Needle Unit, Sterile Plastic, Disposable, 2 cc, 26 G Needle, 1 Os	Bx	
515-2395	Syringe, Luer, 2 cc	Ea(24)	
380-4100	Syringe, Luer, 10 cc	Ea(24)	
299-8218	Thermometer, Clinical, Human, Oral, 6s	Bx(6)	
299-8243	Thermometer, Clinical, Human, Rectal, 6s	Bx(6)	
6520-			
503-5000	Burr, Dental, Excavating, No. 2, 6s	Pk	
503-7000	Burr, Dental, Excavating, No. 6, 6s	Pk	
504-3000	Burr, Dental, Excavating, No. 35, 6s	Pk	
504-4000	Burr, Dental, Excavating, No. 37, 6s	Pk	
505-2000	Burr, Dental, Excavating, No. 557, 6s	Pk	
505-3000	Burr, Dental, Excavating, No. 558, 6s	Pk	
6545-			
957-7650	Surgical Instrument, Set, Minor Surgery	Ea	
6840-			
290-5027	Insect Repellant, 2 oz.	Bt(200)	
242-4217	Louse Powder, DDT, 2 oz	Cn(14)	
6850-			
264-5904	Water Purification Tabs, Iodine, 50s	Bt(200)	
8115-			
	Envelopes, Paper, Drug Dispensing, 100s	Pk(10)	
8125-			
404-7700	Bottle, Dropper, 1 oz, 12s	Bx(2)	
406-0150	Bottle, Screw Cap, RX, 2 oz, 72s	Bx(1)	
8950-			
150-7194	Yeast, Baker Compound, Cake Form, 1 lb.	Ck	

EQUIPMENT ITEMS-INITIAL ISSUE ONLY

6515-			
660-0046	Airway, Plastic, Mouth-Mouth Respiration	Ea(1)	
337-3900	Forceps, Gauze Pad Holding, Straight, 9 1/2"	Ea(2)	
290-3294	Inhaler Set, Analgesia, Duke	Ea(1)	
354-0800	Otoscope & Ophthalmoscope Set	St(1)	
379-5830	Syringe, Metal, Ear, 2 oz	Ea(1)	
6530-			
770-6425	Bag, Hot Water-Ice, 2 Quart	Ea(2)	
770-9220	Basin, Emesis, CRM	Ea(2)	
782-7180	Jar, Surgical Dressing, Glass W/Metal Cover	Ea(2)	
	Litter, Nylon, Folding, Poleless,	Ea(1)	
	with carrying straps		
	Sterilizer, Fuel Heated Autoclave, Field	Ea(1)	
793-3600	Tray, Instrument, CRM, 9x5x2	Ea(2)	
6545-			
957-7650	Surgical Instrument Set, Minor Surgery	Ea(2)	

There have been several requests from S.F. Medics asking for information on drugs which appear on the Monthly Requisition Form.

This booklet has been prepared to provide information on only those drugs appearing on the Monthly Requisition Form which may be new to S.F. Medics.

As these preparations are now standard stock items, information may appear in the U.S. Army Formulary under the name appearing in capitals.

174

**SODIUM CHLORIDE-SODIUM BICARBONATE MIXTURE**

Use: as oral shock solution, when patient is conscious and not vomiting violently. Stated to be as good as I.V. solutions, particularly in burn cases.

**SULFAMETHOXYPYRIDAZINE TABLETS.**

TN: Kynex, M&Mcel

Use: Same as Sulfisoxazole (Gantrisin).  
Dose: two tablets FIRST DAY, then one tablet DAILY.

**PREDNISONE TABLETS.**

Use: ORAL steroid replacing cortisone and hydrocortisone injections.

Dose: one week, 7 to 1 tablet schedule or as directed by reference: is-

First day-7 tablets; second day-6 tablets;  
third day-5 tablets; fourth day-4 tablets;  
fifth day-3 tablets; sixth day-2 tablets;  
seventh day-1 tablet.

**TAR COMPOUND OINTMENT.**

TN: Pragmatar

Use: in skin conditions; eczemas, seborrheic conditions (acute dandruff).

**THIMEROSAL TINCTURE - Merthiolate**

THICPENIAL SODIUM - Penicillin T.V.

**TRICHLOROETHYLENE.**

Use: anesthesia, given by DUKE INHALER. In surgical procedures, obstetrics, etc. Does not produce anesthesia deep enough for major surgery. DUKE INHALER is designed so anesthesia can be self-administered by patient, does not require second medic experienced in giving anesthesia.

**ACETYSALICYLATE ALUMINUM - CHILDRENS ASPIRIN.**

ACETYSULFISOXIZOLE - GANTRISIN PEDIATRIC  
SUSPENSION.

19  
ANTHELMINTICS FOR INTESTINAL PARASITES.

HOOK WORM.

Hexylresorcinol Pills. TN: CRYSTOIDS.

Dose: follow label directions.

Sodium Sulfate is included on Monthly Requisition form as Saline Cathartic.

PINWORMS (Enterobius).

Piperazine Citrate Syrup. TN: ANTEPAR.

Dosage: Adults & Children over 60 lbs.,  
four teaspoonfuls

Children-up to 15 lbs one-half teaspoon

-15 to 30 lbs. one teaspoonful

-30 to 60 lbs. two teaspoonfuls

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taken as one dose daily for seven days.

ROUNDWORMS (Ascaris).

Piperazine Citrate Syrup. TN: ANTEPAR

Dosage: double the dosage for Pinworms, to  
be taken as one dose daily for two days.

WHIPWORM (Trichuris).

Dithiazanine Iodide Tablets. TN: DELVEA

Dosage: Adults & Children over 60 lbs.,  
two tablets three times daily.

Children: 20-30 lbs, one tablet twice daily.

30-45 lbs, one tablet three times  
daily.

45-60 lbs, one tablet four times  
daily.

to be taken for ten days.

THREADWORM (Strongyloides).

Dithiazanine Iodide Tablets. TN: DELVEA

Dosage: same as for Whipworm

TAPEWORMS (Taenia).

Hexylresorcinol Pills. TN: CRYSTOIDS.

Dosage: follow label directions.

**ALUMINUM HYDROXIDE GEL TABLETS.**

TN: Amphojel Tablets

Use: gastric antiaacid.

Dose: one to two tablets five to six times daily.

**ATROPINE SULFATE SYRETTES.**

Use: provides sterile field solution for use as drops to dilate and fix eye in emergency treatment of eye injuries.

Dose: one or two drops as needed.

**BELLADONNA ALKALOIDS W/PHENOBARBITAL TABLETS.**

TN: Donnatal Tablets.

Use: single dose solid medication to replace Belladonna Tincture, liquid requiring measuring and in breakable container.

Dose: one tablet three to four times daily.

**BENZOIN COMPOUND TINCTURE.**

Use: to apply to skin before applying adhesive tape to make tape stick better.

--put in water and boiled; when placed in a closed room or under a cloth hood with patient, helps make breathing easier in chest and head congestion.

**CAFFEINE & SODIUM BENZOATE INJECTION.**

Use: as Central Nervous Stimulant after poisoning by depressants such as alcohol, barbiturates, morphine.

Dose: one to two cc. I.M. or I.V. as needed.

**CALCIUM GLUCOHEPTONATE INJECTION.**

Replaces standard stock item calcium gluconate; same actions and uses.

CHLORPHENIRAMINE MALEATE TABLETS.

TN: Chlor-trimeton.

Use: Antihistamine; used as pyribenzamine. Two A.P.C. tablets and one Chlor-trimeton tablet are equivalent to two Coricidin cold tablets.

CODEINE SULFATE TABLETS.

Use: single dose solid medication to replace paregoric liquid requiring measuring and in breakable container. Can be taken with Terpin Hydrate Elixir for severe cough.

2,6-DIAMINO-3-PHENYLAZOPYRIDINE HCL TABLETS.

TN: Pyridium.

DIBUCAINE TOPICAL OINTMENT.

TN: Nupercainal Ointment.

Use: replaces TETRACAINE TOPICAL OINTMENT.

DICHLOROTETRAFLUOROETHANE, 8 OZ.

Use: non-breakable spray can; requires no refrigeration; replaces Ethyl Chloride Spray.

EAR DROPS, ETHYLAMINOENZOATE.

TN: Auralgan Ear Drops.

Use: for pain; reduce inflammation only; not antibiotic or anti-fungal.

FLUORESCEIN SODIUM APPLICATORS.

Use: Sterile applicators placed in eye as diagnostic aid. Fluorescein stains corneal abrasions, ulcers, foreign bodies, a green color so they are easier to see.

LIDOCAINE HCL INJECTION.

TN: Xylocaine

Use: replaces procaine for local anesthesia

MECLIZINE HCL TABLETS.

TN: Bonamine.

Use: replaces Dramamine; for nausea and motion sickness, morning sickness.



**MEPROBAMATE TABLETS.**

TN: Miltown, Equanil.

Use: tranquilizer, daytime sedative without depressant effects of barbiturates.

Dose: one to two tablets three to four times daily.

**METHOCARBOMAL TABLETS.**

TN: Robaxin

Use: muscle relaxant in muscle spasms, acute back pain, stiff neck, bursitis.

Dose: two tablets four times daily.

**MULTIVITAMIN-MINERAL TABLETS.**

TN: Stuarts Formula Tablets.

Use: to replace B-complex vitamins; for mineral content needed in this area for anemias, dietary mineral deficiencies.

**NIKETHAMIDE INJECTION.**

TN: Coramine

Use: Central Nervous System and respiratory stimulant in anesthesia overdosage, narcotic and barbiturate poisoning, shock.

Dose: two to 15 Mls. I.M. or I.V. as required.

**POWDER, ANTIDIARRHEAL.**

TN: Intromycin.

Use: antidiarrheal as Spensin; contains streptomycin, neomycin and an antidiarrheal agent. Powder form can be used for both adults and children.

Dose: Adults-two tablespoonfuls

Children-one tablespoonful

Infants-two teaspoonfuls

taken every four hours mixed with boiled water at least one ounce per teaspoonful of powder.

**FACONISOLONG-SULFACETAMIDE-NEOMYCIN OINTMENT.**

TN: Mafinyl Eye Ointment.

Use: acute & chronic eye infections, inflammation, particularly those non-responsive to Terramycin Eye Ointment.

194

**SODIUM CHLORIDE-SODIUM BICARBONATE MIXTURE**

Use: as oral shock solution, when patient is conscious and not vomiting violently. Stated to be as good as I.V. solutions, particularly in burn cases.

**SULFAMETHOXYPYRIDAZINE TABLETS.**

TN: Kynex, Nadicel

Use: Same as Sulfisoxazole (Gantrisin).

Dose: two tablets-FIRST DAY, then one tablet DAILY.

**PREDNISONE TABLETS.**

Use: ORAL steroid replacing cortisone and hydrocortisone injections.

Dose: one week, 7 to 1 tablet schedule or as directed by reference; i.e.

First day-7 tablets; second day-6 tablets; third day-5 tablets; fourth day-4 tablets; fifth day-3 tablets; sixth day-2 tablets; seventh day-1 tablet.

**TAR COMPOUND OINTMENT.**

TN: Pragnatar

Use: in skin conditions; eczemas, seborrheic conditions (acute dandruff).

**THIMEROSAL TINCTURE - Merthiolate**

**THIOPEPTAL SODIUM - Pentothal I.V.**

**TRICHLOROETHYLENE.**

Use: anesthesia, given by DUKE INHALER.

In surgical procedures, obstetrics, etc.

Does not produce anesthesia deep enough for major surgery. DUKE INHALER is

designed so anesthesia can be self-

administered by patient, does not require

second man experienced in giving anesthesia.

**ACETYSALICYLATE ALUMINUM - CHILDRENS ASPIRIN.**

**ACETYSULFISOXIZOLE - GANTRISIN PEDIATRIC  
SUSPENSION.**

**MALARIAL ERADICATION MEASURES.**

USOM-Vietnamese Malaria Eradication officials want the opportunity to expand their program, are willing to provide malaria control services in S.F. Team areas.

**Control Services include:**

1. routine spraying of every village with D.D.T. once every six months on a regularly scheduled basis.
2. the taking of a small quantity of blood by finger puncture from all area people to make microscope slide diagnostic blood smears.
3. treatment of all malaria cases diagnosed by blood smear method.

Initiation and continuation of the USOM-VN services will not only provide the local people a valuable service but will decrease incidence of malaria hence S.F. Medic work load; relieve S.F. Medics of duties connected with malaria control in their area.

VN Malaria Eradication has representatives in each Province; they can be located through the Province Chief of Medicine. To initiate and establish the services liaison should be established with Province Malaria Eradication representatives to work out schedules and details.

USOM Malaria Eradication has five American Advisors upcountry:

HUE	RAYMOND COLLINS
DANANG	DR. CHARLES O'CONNOR
QUI NHON	RICHARD KEIRSTEAD
NHA TRANG	BERNARD FEINSTEIN
PHAN THIET	BURR FRUTCHET

Malaria Eradication Headquarters, c/o MAAG at each of these cities.

Presently, no malaria eradication work is being done south of Saigon because the incidence of malaria in these areas is thought to be very low. In the near future a malaria survey will be made to determine the actual incidence and if malaria eradication services are warranted.

USOM-Vietnamese Malaria Eradication national officials understand that a frankly unfriendly Vietnamese-Montagnard race relationship exists. It has been agreed that malaria eradication teams:

1. will not enter a S.F. area without first contacting the S.F. Team and making prior arrangements.
2. must be closely advised by S.F. personnel to insure they conduct themselves properly in accordance with local customs and create no incidents.

Because serious misunderstandings may arise because Vietnamese Malaria Eradication workers do not know of and may not observe local hill tribe customs, national officials have accepted the idea that, if possible, any Province Malaria Eradication team which will operate in hill villages should at least visit and possibly live for a few days with the S.F. Team at their village camp. During this period they can observe, learn something about the hill tribe customs and be trained to conduct themselves properly among the hill people.

The S.F. Team will be responsible for:

1. obtaining permission from the area village people for the Malaria Eradication team to operate within their areas.
2. providing protection for the team while they operate in the area.

V.C. propaganda has widely disseminated information that D.D.T. is really a poison and that the Americans are poisoning the people. One method of effectively counteracting this charge is for one of the Americans to publicly allow D.D.T. to be sprayed on him, before spraying is started in each village.

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D. SURVEY OF NEEDED DEVELOPMENT INFORMATION

3. Political Area:

a. Counterinsurgency political development depends on the ability of a national government to resolve any major complaints groups of the population have against the existing government because of unjust representation, unfair treatment, or any other cause.

b. Agreements allowing or preventing U.S. participation at lower levels will affect the success of counterinsurgency programs. This includes the status of monies, materials and advisors, e.g., if political agreements accept U.S. help only on the capital city level it would be difficult to activate programs on local levels where actual problems exist.

c. Political arrangements will often affect the working nature of counterpart programs where U.S. personnel act as advisors to local officials, military commanders, etc. Counterpart programs must be something more than a mutual exchange of lip-service. In the end the locals will be responsible for the development of their own country.

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D. SURVEY OF NEEDED DEVELOPMENT INFORMATION

4. Security Area:

a. Security programs will always involve some activities on the part of conventional forces. Activities on their part may well include:

- Patrol and border guard.
- Hunter-killer operations against subversive elements.
- Conventional operations against large guerrilla units.
- Ambush and counterambush tactics.
- Reconnaissance and intelligence operations.
- Civic action programs.

b. Since the general population is the main line of support for guerrilla forces, most considerations for counterinsurgency programs will have a close relationship with population control and security systems. Such systems have the following characteristics:

- Irregular defense forces or homeguards.
- Village defense systems.
- Cooperative agreements between defense villages.
- Warning nets and communications systems.
- Intelligence nets.
- Aggressor forces and/or alert forces.
- Propaganda programs.
- Prisoner interrogation and reeducation.
- Emergency supply and support systems.

c. Types of training most frequently needed for population security programs include:

- Defense techniques for native villages
- Methods for removing women and children from lines of fire.
- Emergency evacuation of villagers.
- Cutpost and other warning techniques.
- Control systems for village populations.
- Observation and reporting.
- Ambush and counterambush.
- Weapons care and firing.
- Communications systems.
- Patrols.
- Counter guerrilla tactics.

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d. Enclosed is a guide for village defense which gives further detail of the system and goes on to include other incidental requirements. Some changes have been made in this system but it still serves as a good study of principles.

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GUIDE FOR VILLAGE DEFENSE

I. The purpose of this paper and attachments is to provide guidance for U.S. Special Forces Teams who may become involved in one or more of the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) programs. For ease of discussion these are all lumped under the general title of "Village Defense".

II. Each Village Defense development area will have assigned to it a joint team consisting of a U.S. Area Organizer, commonly known as a "case officer" and one or more representatives of the Vietnamese Government. This team will form the Area Management Team. The joint team is responsible for all decisions regarding the development of the area down to and including the type and level of training and equipment to be given to any particular group. US Special Forces are the training, organizational and action element of the area to implement and carry out the decisions and directions of the joint team. The joint team is guided and directed by a joint headquarters which establishes policies and adjudicates local differences of opinion.

III. In general Village Defense development consists of:

- a. Establishing a training village.
- b. Establishing a medical program.
- c. Training and arming a small group to secure the training village.
- d. Establishing or causing to be established the various civic action activities that will create a favorable psychological climate in the surrounding areas.
- e. Training, arming and organizing villages who volunteer to participate in the program.
- f. Training, arming and advising in the use of a local strike force which will be formed of local volunteers.
- g. Ensuring that all weapons issued are properly registered and that there is a continual check on the weapon and the armed villagers.
- h. Assisting in the establishment of:
  - (1) Village intelligence centers.
  - (2) Village population control centers.
  - (3) Interrogation centers.
  - (4) Rehabilitation centers.
  - (5) Village communication and alarm nets.
  - (6) Strike Force and village patrol systems.

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- 2 -

SUBJECT: Guide for Village Defense

IV. Village Defense developments will vary in size depending on a number of factors such as available population, political reliability of the population, support capability, security, etc. In general terms a village complex may consist of from thirty to one hundred and fifty villages with an area population of ten thousand to forty-five thousand, supporting up to thirty-five hundred armed villagers and a strike force of three or more companies.

V. Training is given on different levels depending on the job to be done by the trainees and the political reliability area of residence of the trainee group. The US Case Officer will provide the Special Forces Team with direction as to the desired level of training for any particular group. The Special Forces Teams will produce the POIs necessary to accomplish the desired result. Some of the Special Forces teams have run as high as five different POIs concurrently.

VI. Command and Control. Both United States and Vietnamese policy absolutely prohibits command and control of any Vietnamese elements by any US unit or individual. You will not only refrain from attempting to establish command or control but you will vigorously resist any effort by either Vietnamese or ethnic elements to force it on you. In some cases an attempt to pass command to you will be sheer provocation, in other cases it will be an attempt to avoid responsibility by inducing you to accept it. In most cases it is conscious or unconscious attempt to get Americans to take sides in local disagreements. There are many different ethnic groups in Vietnam as well as certain low level divisive elements and local jealousies among the Vietnamese themselves. A great deal of the United States effort in Vietnam is directed to bringing peace and security to the country by uniting the people behind the government against the common enemy i.e., the Viet Cong. Allowing yourself to become emotionally involved on one side or another in a local dispute assists the Viet Cong in their efforts to split the Vietnamese and the ethnic groups and is contrary to the intent and best interest of the United States. The only exception to this command relationship is during the actual training when US personnel are directly responsible. In this case the Vietnamese request and require that we exercise a training command function, both for the safety of the students and to maintain the desired standard of training.

VII. Finance and Material. Village Defense funds and material, including weapons, are not handled through normal channels or by the usual procedures. Authority for direct disbursement, within certain limits, has been given to Combined Studies. In turn this authority has been delegated to case officers and also to Special Forces Team Commanders. This procedure enables us to respond rapidly to local needs and to develop projects without the usual long, exhausting programming effort. However these funds and material are as rigidly controlled and accounted for as those processed through normal channels. US personnel responsible for funds and material must be able to certify as to the actual expenditures and issues and provide an accounting therefore. At the same time it is psychologically and politically unsound that US personnel should appear to be paying

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-3-

SUBJECT: Guide for Village Defense

troops or villagers or to be directly issuing supplies and equipment. To maintain our flexibility and avoid the appearance of direct aid we try to arrange that a Vietnamese paymaster be present and handle the actual payment of money to civilian troops. The US responsible officer is then in a position to certify the payroll and justify his expenditures. In the case of issuing equipment and supplies we attempt to have Vietnamese representation on the spot to hand out the items, the responsible US person checking the records as is normal on a joint issue.

VIII. The attachments hereto will give you specific guidance and instructions on many of the matters discussed above.

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PLANNING PROCEDURES FOR ESTABLISHING  
VILLAGE DEFENSE SYSTEMS

1. In order to establish village defense systems around our bases it is necessary that we get the approval of the Vietnamese Government for each separate area. The controlling agency with which we coordinate is the Presidential Survey Office which reports directly to the President of Vietnam. In order to get Presidential approval for any project we must present our plan in some detail to the Presidential Survey Office. The Presidential Survey Office in turn will obtain the permission of the President. In some cases the Presidential Survey Office will be charged with direct responsibility for overall management of the project. In other cases the PSO will be charged with general supervision and the management of the project will be delegated to some other government agency or local authority such as the Province or District Chief, local military commander etc. These decisions are based on various political and security factors which are not our specific concern. Depending on the local circumstances and the Liaison situation, Combined Studies will either assign a case officer to the project or designate the U.S. Training base chief as the U.S. local case officer.

2. Our proven method of securing the willing support of the population and establishing a volunteer civilian defense force has been to:

- a. Provide medical assistance to the local population.
- b. Train village medics who can extend the medical assistance to outlying villages.
- c. Recruit and train local volunteers to defend their own villages.
- d. Provide or devise communications so participating villages can call for help.
- e. Provide a local strike force which can be moved rapidly to any threatened point.
- f. Tie in villages with local connecting patrol systems.
- g. Induce other agencies to participate in raising the standard of living as soon as the area has satisfactory security.

3. To secure Presidential approval for the development of civilian security areas around our bases and to obtain the necessary support from other agencies each base will:

- a. Produce an overlay of the villages around the base it is desired to include in the defense system. Include known or estimated population of each village, ethnic makeup, accessibility by road, trail or air.
- b. Indicate central villages for each complex in which radio communications can be profitably established.

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-2-

**SUBJECT:** Planning procedures for establishing village defense systems

c. Indicate proposed communications systems from surrounding villages to central village.

d. Start a medical training program for village medics. This must conform to the USOM medical training program so that the village medics can receive USOM medical support. Medics will be accepted only from those villages who have volunteered to rally to the government and agreed to provide a contingent of volunteer village defenders.

e. When permission is granted start training and arming of village defense forces. Each of these forces must be tied in with the area plan. It is not desired to put arms in a village which can easily be overrun by the Viet Cong.

f. Report on specific needs of each village and area in the way of agriculture, economic or other type help needed to raise the standard of living and increase the loyalty of the people.

**4. Political Liaison**

a. There is an enormous amount of political liaison that must be conducted in order to operate with the minimum amount of interference. The team leader will have the responsibility of working not only with the local case officer but he must also work and cooperate very closely with the Vietnamese liaison officer. You must remember this officer has to report to his higher echelon in Saigon. The report that is submitted by him can, in some cases, make or break your program. Therefore it is imperative that you cooperate fully with him.

b. Occasionally your program may be stopped or temporarily delayed. You may not understand the reason for this but there will be one. It will be straightened out in Saigon

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TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTERS

Each hamlet or village joining one of our programs will be urged and assisted to set up a tactical intelligence center to which any of the local population can report information. The centers will be provided two maps of the local area.

1. One map will be known as the incident map. On this map each verified incident in the area will be marked by number in order of occurrence. A ledger will be kept with the map. Each incident by number shown on map will be recorded in detail. Once a week an overlay of the incident map and a copy of the ledger reports will be provided the next higher headquarters. This should go right up the line. Incidents detected while happening will, of course, be reported immediately by whatever means of communication are available. Each tactical center will be provided with a question type outline - see sample attached - in order to assist them in interrogations of prisoners or suspects and the questioning of informers and observers. It is intended that these questions be translated into the local language and followed on a "pointee-talkie" system until such time as the local interrogators develop basic interrogation skills. Intelligent persons from the hamlet will be selected and given a two- or three-day course on keeping incident maps. After two or three weeks they will be visited or brought out complete with overlays and ledgers and instructed on how to read out the incident map. It may be necessary to repeat this a number of times before the local people are able to analyze their own maps well enough to begin to direct informers, agents, patrols or combat actions into those areas which are pointed out by the incident map as being the most probable VC hideouts, routes, etc.

2. A rumor map will be kept on exactly the same basis as above. The reason for two maps is to stress the difference between a verified incident and an unverified rumor. By matching the overlays from the two, some rumors can be verified or given some weight and additional details can be added to some incidents. The whole country is exhausted from chasing rumors, many of them planted by the VC, and a number of innocent people have been blasted out of position because somebody someplace along the line mistook a rumor for a report or has never learned the difference. Combined Studies intelligence efforts will be directed to clearly establishing this difference from the ground level on up.

3. Among the tribesmen there is some sort of an intelligence net that seems to be effective. The tribesman probably will not cut you in on their net until they have full confidence in you. It has been found best not to try to work their net directly but to try to establish something parallel to it, and sooner or later they may cut you in on theirs. The type of nets for the village areas must be very simple and easy to manage. The establishment of an intelligence and warning net is most important for the security of the base area. The enemy has the capability of moving into your front door without warning.

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QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED OF ANYBODY INVOLVED IN OR REPORTING AN INCIDENT

1. Where did it happen?
2. When did it happen? Day and hour.
3. Did you see or hear it? (If answer is yes continue as below - if answer is no go to rumor questions.)
4. How many were there? How many did you actually see?
5. How were they armed?
6. How were they dressed?
7. What did they do?
  - a. Attack
  - b. Ambush
  - c. Make propaganda
  - d. Seize food
  - e. Seize people
  - f. Collect taxes
8. Where did they go? Direction and/or place.
9. Did you hear firing? If so, what did it sound like?
10. Did you see any dead or wounded? If so, how many?
11. Did you hear any talking or shouting? If so, what did they say? What dialect or language was used?
12. Did you see or hear any big weapons? Mortars, cannons. How about automatic weapons. (Note: Show the subject various kinds of weapons and see if he can point out similar types.)
13. What damage was done?
14. Have you talked to anybody else who was there? If so, what did they say? Who were they? Where do they live?
15. Can you think of anything we haven't asked you?
16. What is your name?

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-2-

(Con't) Questions to be asked of anybody involved in or reporting an incident.

17. Where do you live?
18. Where do you work?
19. How did you happen to be near this incident?

NOTE: Personal data asked last in order not to scare subject off by making it look like a police interrogation.

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RUMOR MAP

1. Where did it happen?
2. When did it happen? Day and hour.
3. Did you see<sup>0</sup> or hear it?
4. How did you hear of this?
5. What happened?
  - a. Attack
  - b. Ambush
  - c. Propaganda
  - d. Seizure of food
  - e. Kidnapping people
  - f. Tax collection
6. How many enemy were there?
7. How were they dressed?
8. How were they armed?
9. Were they Vietnamese or other people?
10. Where did they go? Direction and/or place.
11. How many dead and wounded?
12. What damage was done?
13. Who told you this?
14. What is his name?
15. Where does he live?
16. Did he see it or did somebody else tell him?
17. Has more than one person told you? If so, who were the others? Do you know them personally?
18. Where were you when you were told?
19. Do you believe what you were told about this incident? Please explain why you believe it.

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-2-

(Con't) Rumor Map

20. Can you go back and get any more details?
21. Can you think of anything we haven't asked you?
22. Would you take us to the people you talked to?
23. What is your name?
24. Where do you live?
25. Where do you work?

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INTERROGATION CENTERS  
PRISONER CONTROL

1. One of the big problems is the handling of prisoners in such a manner not to offend the people of the village but still satisfying your requirements. It will be necessary to set up an interrogation center where the prisoners can be debriefed. Initially, of course, this is done through an interpreter which makes it doubly difficult. When the prisoners are interrogated we, under no circumstances, use violence. If there is any violence needed it will be done on the part of the Vietnamese or the local who will be assisting you. It is most urgent that you work yourself out of the direct interrogation business as soon as possible. It is bad politically and psychologically, as well as being inefficient, for Americans to be involved in direct interrogation. You will not have the time or opportunity to run schools to turn out qualified interrogators. We have developed a simple on-the-job "pointie-talkie" interrogation instruction system which should be translated into the local language and used first as an instruction sheet and then as a guide for interrogation. Within a short time you will get passable interrogation results. You should observe carefully for those locals who show a natural talent for interrogation and help them to more advanced procedures.

2. Disposition of Prisoners.

When the prisoner no longer has any value as a source of intelligence he should be turned over to the local authorities for disposition. In some cases small rehabilitation centers are established for reorientation of collaborators. You may or may not be asked to assist with this. There have been cases, particularly among the Montagnards, of rapid trial and execution of "hard core" VC. Under no circumstances will American personnel participate in such activities nor even take cognizance of them. Either participation or interference could well destroy our entire effort. The Vietnamese local representative will assume the responsibility for such matters. Tribal judicial procedures are something that American personnel are not likely to understand or qualified to attempt to direct.

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### Village Population Control

1. The following system of village population control is primarily applicable to small villages, especially Montagnards, and is designed on the premise that a great many of the local security force will be illiterate. It can, of course, be adapted for use in large villages.

#### 2. Organization:

a. A sketch map will be made of each village. This map will show the location of each building in the village.

b. Each house or building will be numbered on the map and the same number will be affixed to the actual building.

c. A group picture will be taken of all the personnel legally living in any dwelling. Each person will hold a slate with a number on it. The numbers will run from one through the total numbers of legal dwellers. The people to be numbered will include all those from the age of reason (5 or 6) on up. If there are too many persons to include in one picture and additional groupings must be taken, numbers will run consecutively through the total number of persons in a dwelling.

d. For ease of identification the groupings should be by family units from grandpa down to babe in arms.

e. In front of each group a large sign should show the number of the dwelling.

f. If any person is reported to be absent at the time the picture is taken, a number will be assigned for that person and a slate will show the number and comment absent. (In the local language.)

g. When absentee returns his picture will be taken separately with the proper dwelling and individual number and clipped to the group picture from which he was absent.

h. A Population Control Center will be set up adjacent to or as part of the Tactical Intelligence Center.

i. Two copies of each picture will be filed at the Population Control Center. A file should be made by number for each dwelling and the Population Control Center should keep on the wall the sketch map of the village.

j. As data on the dwellers is obtained, names, ages, occupations, reliability, etc. it can be filed as part of the dwelling folder.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

212

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

a. A copy of the bill to the photos should be provided the District or Province Chief and a copy kept in the project control village. Negatives and a copy of the village map should be properly labelled and sent to the Presidential Survey Office for safekeeping. A copy of each map should be sent to Combined Studies for our records.

### 3. Functioning:

a. Each person leaving the village with intent to be away overnight will report to the Population Control Center and state his destination and expected length of absence.

b. Any non-resident entering the village will be taken to the Population Control Center where he will state his business, length of stay, with whom he is staying and his home village. He will be escorted to those with whom he claims acquaintance and be identified by them. He will report out when leaving.

c. In the event of alarms, incidents or irregular spot checks, village security personnel can be given the group picture of the dwellings they are to check. Even though illiterate, they can easily line up the people in relation to the pictures and tell who, if anybody, is missing or if an extra person is present.

d. In the event a person is missing and his family claims he is elsewhere in the village they will be given a limited time to produce him at the Population Control Center. If he cannot be produced and has not reported out at the Population Control Center he will be assumed to be Viet Cong until proved otherwise.

e. If he has reported out to the Population Control Center his proclaimed destination will be checked the next day to see if he did arrive there and spend the night.

f. In event an extra person is present he will immediately be taken to the Population Control Center to verify that he has properly reported in. If he has not reported in he will be held as a Viet Cong suspect until proved otherwise.

g. The above procedure is loosely called the "Who Ain't Here?" system and is to enable the security forces to make a quick check in the event of any kind of disturbance seen, heard or reported in the area to determine whether or not any of the villagers might have been involved. It also enables unscheduled surprise spot checks by relatively untrained and/or illiterate security personnel on dwellings in which suspected VC live. In effect it holds the entire family responsible for knowing the whereabouts of any absent individual. It should assist in slowing or stopping the activities of night-time VC fighters, couriers and intelligence agents. It is not intended to and does not prohibit freedom of movement.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

5. It is suggested that a small Population Control Section be established to accompany the Strike Forces to the various villages, make the sketches, number the houses, take the pictures and instruct the village Population Control people in the functioning and procedures of the Population Control Center. It is assumed that a number of visits will be necessary before the Population Control Center learns to function efficiently.

6. As customary, comments and suggestions for improvement of the above system are both welcome and solicited.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**  
PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATION

214

1. Villagers.

a. Villagers are trained in village units in whatever strength is to be armed in that village. They are trained with the weapons they will use and trained for the specific defense of their specific village. They are assisted in laying out their village defense system, alarm system and local patrolling systems. In short, they are trained on a very austere need-to-know basis.

b. We do not confuse village people by teaching them tactics. They will never use, supporting weapons they will never have or placement of units of greater size than the available manpower of the village. We stress marksmanship, patrolling, ambush, counter-ambush and immediate action. We are not fussy about what firing position a man takes. If he can hit the target standing on his head then that's the way he should shoot. You will receive specific guidance on our instruction techniques during your break-in period. We have learned them the hard way. If you keep an open mind you can learn them the easy way.

2. Strike Force

a. Each village development area will be secured by a Strike Force of a strength approximating three companies. These men are recruited from civilian volunteers and receive a higher type of training than the village defenders. There are no hard and fast rules for Strike Force T/O and E's. They are developed in accordance with the manpower available, the character of the people and the needs of the area. The basic element of the Strike Force is the squad or section which may vary from eight to twelve or fourteen men. This section must be trained and capable of operating as a self-contained combat patrol because normally the Strike Force is not utilized as a company but as a groupment of patrols. When necessary to take stronger action several patrols are thrown together as a platoon and on occasion several platoons as a company. When the Strike Force has proved its reliability, a large heavy weapons section is added to the company. In effect, rather than establishing a company which can send out patrols, we are establishing a large number of patrols which are capable of forming a provisional company for specific missions.

b. Strike Force Mission

(1) When a village sends in its manpower for training, a part of the Strike Force occupies and secures that village until the trained village defenders return. They then remain one or two additional weeks to supervise and assist in organizing the village defenses, alarm systems, patrol systems, etc. The VC usually try to knock off a village just after the armed villagers return and before they are set. The Strike Force helps them over this danger period.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

N

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

SUBJECT: PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATION

(2) Strike Force patrols check each village at least once every two weeks. The schedule and villages to be checked are determined in the base camp and are given to the patrol just before it leaves in order to avoid any security leaks and subsequent ambushes of the patrol. The patrol scouts the trails and the village to be checked before entering. In the village they check each armed man with his weapon (to make sure he is still there and has it), check weapons maintenance, run a test village alarm, conduct a short refresher training program and usually take some of the villagers to reinforce the patrol and act as guides to the next village on the list. These regular checks keep the villagers on their toes and make sure we know weapons and/or men have not disappeared into VC land.

(3) The Strike Force also moves in larger units to rescue any village under attack; to pursue VC or to intercept VC movement.

(4) The Strike Force becomes a professional paramilitary unit and as such is paid in accordance with a pay scale determined by local Vietnamese authorities. We provide the funds direct but a Vietnamese paymaster must make the actual payments.

(5) We do not exercise direct command over the Strike Force. As it is the security force for a joint project, the use of it is agreed to jointly. It is normal that most of the local tactical details will be delegated to the Special Forces team while policy matters and actual command will be handled by the Vietnamese representative. This will vary in detail from area to area. You will be instructed as to the arrangements in your specific area.

3. All the above is to be taken as general instructions and/or policy. You will be given detailed instructions for your area.



CONFIDENTIAL

A SECRET

1. Our general policy where we are responsible for issuing weapons is as follows:

a. Each recipient will have his picture taken with the following identification on the photograph.

(1) Name

(2) Village

b. The type of weapon issued and the serial number will be on the weapons registration card which is carried by each man and also on all of the copies that go to the district, to the province, for PSO and for our own records.

c. A short PRQ should be made out for each man and this should be attached to the picture; this should certainly contain data on his family and close relatives. This is important so that if the man defects his family and friends can be watched for contacts.

d. Each man issued a weapon must also have a weapons permit with his picture on it from the province or district so he will be protected against arrest by other government agencies.

e. You will be given specific instructions relative to weapons registration procedures in your area.

f. Attached hereto are weapons registration forms normally used. These are:

(1) The individual weapons permit.

(2) The hamlet form. Note that all armed men and weapons for the hamlet are listed on the hamlet form and the hamlet head assumes full responsibility for the reliability of the armed men and security of the weapons.

CONFIDENTIAL

Republic of Vietnam  
VIET-NAM CỘNG-HOA

No. 217  
Số

Authorization  
**GIẤY PHÉP**  
to Retain Combat Weapon  
để giữ vũ khí chiến đấu

Photo  
ANH

Chief of Province  
Trưởng tỉnh

authorizes Mr. Hamlet  
cho phép Ông thôn

Village District  
Xã Quận

ID Card No. Issued on  
thẻ kiểm-trà số cấp ngày

at to retain weapon (type)  
tại được phép lưu giữ súng

no. to protect the population (see back)  
số để bảo-vệ nhân dân, (xin xem mặt sau)

Certified (as witness) Province day month year 196  
Tỉnh, ngày tháng năm 196

Chứng nhận :  
PSO Representative Đại diện PSO

The Man Concerned :  
Đương sự

Special Orders for the Man Who Retains Weapons  
TIÊU LỆNH ĐIỀU CHO NGƯỜI LƯU GIỮ SÚNG :

1. Cannot carry weapon 5 kilometers from hamlet.
  - 1<sup>o</sup> — Không được mang súng ra khỏi thôn quá 5 cây số.
  2. Cannot carry weapon out of hamlet by himself.
  - 2<sup>o</sup> — Không được mang súng đi một mình ra khỏi thôn.
  3. Cannot use weapon for personal interest.
  - 3<sup>o</sup> — Không được sử dụng vũ khí vì lợi ích cá nhân.
  4. Cannot cede this permit to another person or let him keep it.
  - 4<sup>o</sup> — Không được nhượng hay cho người khác giữ giấy phép này.
  5. ID card must be joined to this permit.
  - 5<sup>o</sup> — Phải có thẻ kiểm tra kèm với giấy phép này.
- All cases contrary to the above orders must be the objects of a special order from Chief of District and the Weapon Issuing Agency.
- Mọi trường hợp trái với các Tiêu-Lệnh trên, phải có lệnh đặc biệt của Quận-trưởng và Cơ-quan cấp-phát vũ-khí.
6. Must hide, bury or destroy weapon when cannot resist the enemy. Determined not to let weapon fall into enemy's hand.
  - 6<sup>o</sup> — Phải chôn giấu hay phá hủy vũ-khí khi không thể chống cự với địch. Cường quyết không để vũ-khí rơi vào tay địch.

Request:

YÊU - CẦU :

1. All competent agencies to give man concerned all facilities.
- 1<sup>o</sup> — Các Cơ-Quan thẩm quyền cho đương-sự mọi dễ dãi.
2. Arrest man concerned and bring him to district in case he violates above regulations.
- 2<sup>o</sup> — Bắt và giải đương-sự về tại Quận trong trường-hợp đương-sự vi-phạm các điều-lệ trên.

# PHIẾU CẤP PHÁT VŨ - KHÍ

WEAPON ISSUE SLIP

2/8

Hamlet  
Thôn  
Village  
Xã  
District  
Quận

Số thứ tự	Name HỌ VÀ TÊN	Id card number KIỂM TRA SỐ VÀ Issue date NGÀY CẤP	Type of weapon LOẠI detained và súng lưu giữ	Signature KÝ NHẬN (for receipt)	Remarks BỊ CHỦ
HAMLET ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD:					
We guarantee for the above listed armed men.					
If they lose their weapons or betray, our hamlet is responsible for reparations and we will punish the men concerned.					

**HỘI-ĐỒNG THÔN:**

Chúng tôi xin bảo lãnh các phần tử được vũ trang trên.

Nếu các đương-sự để mất vũ-khí hoặc bội phần, thôn chúng tôi phải chịu trách-nhiệm bồi hoả và trừng-trị các đương-sự.

Hamlet Chief (Signature)  
THÔN-TRƯỞNG KÝ,

To:  
NƠI NHẬN:

Day  
ngày

Month  
tháng

Year 196  
năm 196

Certified as Witness:  
CHỨNG NHẬN:

Chief of District  
QUẬN-TRƯỞNG, QUẬN

Certified:  
NHẬN THỰC:  
Chief of Province  
TỈNH-TRƯỞNG TỈNH

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2/9

## FINANCE

### 1. Requisition of funds.

a. Authority to requisition funds. Usually only one officer will be authorized to draw monies for any given project or Civilian Irregular Defense Group Camp (CIDG). This officer, in most cases, will be the senior resident case officer (Combined Studies employee) responsible for the operation of the camp. If there is no resident case officer the senior U.S. Army Officer or NCO will submit a written request for funds to the Project Officer in Saigon. This request will include all the particulars, i.e., why, what for, etc. See attachment 1 for sample fund request.

b. Time factor involved in the requisition of funds. Operational funds should be requested in ample time to meet obligations. The designated officer should use enough foresight to request, submit justification, et. to avoid any flaps. Never run out of money!

### 2. Disbursement of Funds.

In some cases the disbursement of funds, maintenance of accounts and receipts will grow to such a proportion that it will become impossible, without devoting your full time, to keep a running ledger of funds expended. It may become necessary to delegate a local employee as finance clerk. If this is done it will become necessary for the clerk to have all expenditures documented with a receipt. In the past it has proved necessary to let the local finance clerk handle all payment of salaries.

### 3. Accounting of Funds.

a. Operational expenses. The expenditures, if possible, should be documented with receipts. This is the only way to find out how the funds are being expended and is mainly to protect the responsible officer. Accounting of funds should be made at least once a month. See attachment 2 for sample accounting.

b. Payroll. All personnel drawing salaries, i.e., strike force, cooks and labor force MUST sign a payroll. Payroll will be completed in two copies. One copy to remain in the camp and one copy to be FORWARDED with the accounting. See attachment 3.

c. Receipts. As receipts come in all shapes, forms and sizes and are easily lost each receipt should be taped or stapled to a 8X10 $\frac{1}{2}$  piece of bond paper and numbered. See attachment 2.

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P

*1**Confidential*

16 June 1962

TO :

ATTN :

FROM :

SUBJECT : Requisition of Funds

Request that 190,000VN\$ be obligated to the Buon Enao CIDG camp. Funds will be utilized as shown below. Accounting will be submitted on or about 30 July 1962.

30,000\$

For monthly operational funds, i.e., payment of labor, local supplies and miscellaneous operational requirements.

140,300\$

Payment of strike company for month of July 1962.

93 Pmts. x 1,000\$	=	93,000
20 Cpls. x 1,200\$	=	24,000
13 Sgts. x 1,400\$	=	18,200
3 Pls. x 1,700\$	=	5,100
		<u>140,300</u>

20,000\$

To establish two 10,000\$ dispensaries at Buon Pu Hue (AQ 975035) and Buon Kniet (AP 925970)

190,000\$

Ted Kennedy, Captain  
Team Leader, SF Team #111

Attachment #1

*Confidential*

TO :  
 FROM :  
 SUBJECT : Fund Report

The following is an itemized list of receipts and expenditures, as of 2 August 1962, from the funds allocated this detachment in the conduct of its irregular training mission. Receipts are numbered accordingly and attached.

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>COST</u>
	8 Jun 62	Receipts of Funds - 150,000\$	
1.	11 Jun 62	Notebooks and pencils	564
2.	17 Jun 62	Lumber	654
3.	19 Jun 62	Masonite blackboard	140
4.	20 Jun 62	Cloth arm bands	200
5.	20 Jun 62	Film developing	219
6.	21 Jun 62	Lock and keys	80
7.	21 Jun 62	Electrical wiring	300
8.	22 Jun 62	Lumber	212
9.	22 Jun 62	Messing and service	3,000
10.	23 Jun 62	Construction materials	280
11.	23 Jun 62	Construction materials	1,536
12.	25 Jun 62	Hasp and lock	98
13.	25 Jun 62	Wood and materials	322
14.	27 Jun 62	Hinges	66
15.	29 Jun 62	Photo developing	215
16.	30 Jun 62	Hardware	151
17.	2 Jul 62	Bricks	600
18.	3 Jul 62	Miscellaneous merchandise	100
19.	7 Jul 62	Pencils	410
20.	11 Jul 62	School supplies	870
21.	12 Jul 62	Flags and banners	700
22.	14 Jul 62	School supplies	490
23.	17 Jul 62	School supplies	400
24.	20 Jul 62	Building materials	681
25.	25 Jul 62	Padlocks	70
26.	26 Jul 62	Construction of Dispensary	20,000
27.	27 Jul 62	Rubber bands, scissors	68
28.	27 Jul 62	Hardware	75
29.	29 Jul 62	Photo developing	85
30.	30 Jul 62	Lumber	430
31.	30 Jul 62	Salaries	140,300
		FUNDS EXPENDED:	173,016
		BALANCE :	16,984

Attachment #2

*Confidential*

Irregular size receipt attached to 8x10 1/2 inch paper

NHIEN THANH

Bon Hieu cung cap tai lieu cat nha  
So 14-16, Phan chau Trinh  
Ban Me Thuot

HOA DON SO 1015

ONG John Smith

606 Tran Hung Dao

Item 1:	3 pieces of lumber:	100\$
Item 2:	1 piece of lumber:	112\$
		<u>212\$</u>

Signature

Receipt #8

Attachment #2

*Confidential*



*Confidential*

26 July 1962

I, Thanh Giac, chief of the District, Phanly Cham,  
Darlac Province, do hereby acknowledge receipt of  
20,000VN\$ from \_\_\_\_\_, and agree to  
utilize said funds in the construction of 2 separate  
dispensaries in my district at an approximate cost  
of 10,000VN\$ each.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

Receipt #26

Attachment #2

*Confidential*

224

PERIOD COVERING \_\_\_\_\_ TO \_\_\_\_\_

[illegible]

TOTAL

Attachment #3

Page of pages

*Confidential*

COMMUNICATIONS

All Special Forces teams are tied in to a Special Forces net which is centered in a joint Vietnamese, U.S. base station. You will be provided with communications instructors.

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Q

*Confidential*

226

## REPORTING

1. The following type of reports are expected.

a. Weekly "Status of Training" report. This is a narrative report covering the weeks activities, plus a statistical report regarding numbers of trainees, weapons, etc plus a weapons check list form. These forms are self explanatory. Copies are attached hereto for your information and guidance. A simple requisition form can also be included with the weekly report or may be forwarded separately. Copy of this form also attached.

b. Spot reports. Any unusual or outstanding incidents such as attacks on villages, serious accidents, defections to the VC, VC defections to the project, etc., will be flashed immediately by radio and followed up by a detailed report.

c. After action reports. The entire official community desires detailed after action reports of any attacks on or by villagers. These should be provided after a debriefing of personnel involved and accompanied by sketches and pictures. You will be provided cameras and film for this purpose.

d. Intelligence Reports. As the project develops and the villagers become more cooperative and turn more anti-VC there will be a significant increase of tactical intelligence concerning VC actions, movements, concentrations, tax collections, propaganda maneuvers etc. These items will be reported to the nearest military or civilian official with whom you are in liaison. Items of significant or immediate interest will be radioed in. Lesser items will be covered in the intelligence section of the weekly report.

2. You will be requested from time to time to make special reports on various subjects or incidents that may develop.

*Confidential*

R

13 May 1962  
Report #1

SUBJECT: Weekly Report Buon Enao

TO :

1. STATUS OF TRAINING: See Inclosure 1

a. Training has been completed for all personnel presently in Buon Enao. The entire Strike Force has been reorganized and will be given a complete refresher training cycle which will last one week.

b. Future training will commence in Village Defense the week of 21 May if arms are received.

c. Training of the Rhade Scout Platoons will commence the week of 21 May also.

d. We have now been given the approval to utilize the ARVN ranges which will greatly benefit us in our weapons training.

2. OPERATIONS:

a. At 061000 May a report was received from B. Du Enguo (ZV25013h) that a large force of VC was reported to be moving to attack mentioned village. We immediately requested helicopter support and dispatched 5 teams by truck and foot. The helicopters dropped two teams N of the village and the overland force approached from the South. The helicopter force was in position at approximately 1130 hours and set up ambushes and remained until 070730 May. The overland force secured the village at 061360 hours. There was no VC contact and the village had not received any VC activity.

b. Based on a rumor from several refugees who had come to B. Enao from B. Knoup (BQ274150) Strike Force teams were sent to this area to search for a VC rice cache and return with as much as they could carry so we could further assist the refugees food problem. The force discovered the rice 101600 May in a heavily wooded, bamboo area three kilometers NE of B. Knoup. They were unable to effectively transport the rice so the cache of approximately 1 ton of rice was burned. On the return trip H'Bre, a VC rice collector was captured and brought to B. Enao.

c. On 5 May Y-Lem and Y-Uih from B Cour Knia (ZV229138) were captured by our Strike Force at B. Du Enguo (ZV25013h). Both proved to be well trained scouting and intelligence agents for the VC. They were interrogated and reported the following:

SUBJECT: Weekly Report Buon Enao (cont'd)

13 May 1962

d. Viet Cong Bn 33 held a special election meeting on 1 May at Bn Hqs located at either of the two locations (XV980170-XV990200) and that approximately 1000 in peasant type clothing were in attendance of which; 90% were mountagnards and 10% Vietnamese with approximately half armed with a mixture of carbines, MAT 36's, MAT 49's. Three Bren guns were seen as well as 10 81mm mortars. Y-Bih was elected Area President. Two Rhade long houses serve as the Bn Hqs in heavy wooded and jungle area. It was also reported that after the meeting about half of these people moved to a second location either (ZV134280 - AV155275) which is often a used VC camp. Y-Lem and Y-Uih proceeded from this base to scout B. Cu Enguo (ZV250134) for a VC attack. They also revealed that the entire village of B-Uing (AQ821375) was moved into the jungle by the VC somewhere West of the village. They also revealed the names of four VC village organizers and rice collectors whom we captured. The information is as follows:

H'Wen (B Cour Knia (ZV229138) Organizer of affairs of the village women. This included rice collection as well as dancing and other entertainment for the VC.

Y-Ki (B Cour Knia) Political Organizer and rice collector.

H'Guah B Du Enguo (ZV250134) had the same job as H'Wen.

Y-Yot (B Du Enguo) had the same job as Y-Ki.

e. On 8 May our Strike Force stationed at B. Ho District captured one French grenade in a short fire fight with the VC in the general area of AQ965320. This action occurred at 2200 hours. The district chief later informed us that 2 VC were KIA and one wounded. This team also reported a strong increase in VC activities in the area as well as many of the smaller trails in the area being trapped and booby trapped North of the district Hqs.

f. On 11 May village defenders at B. Trap Mewal (AQ808252) captured the following VC agents. Y-Ju, Y-Knot, Y-Bhut, Y-Tue, Y-Knir (Rice collectors and H'Blun the director of VC women.

g. On 12 May village defenders at B. Trap Mewal captured the following VC agents at B. Bling (AQ866270). Y-Guat, Y-Blieng, Y-Ho (Tax collectors) and H'Bleo Organizer of Women. On 12 May the village defenders at B. Trap Mewal also captured the following agents at B Jok (AQ870250). Y-Tac, Y-Sut, Y-Gu all tax collectors.

h. It must be noted that as we send villagers back to these denied areas the number of agents captured will increase. We now have over 30 and it is getting to be a problem. We are hoping that Phu will relieve us of them and handle them as he sees fit.

### 3. INTELLIGENCE:

a. On 12 May Y-Ngui from B. Gier (BQ035385) and Y-Dum from B Peoh (BQ114375) came to B. Enao and stated that they had just escaped from the VC.

SUBJECT: Weekly Report Buon Enao (Cont'd)

13 May 1962

Y-Ngui stated that he was captured near his village on 15 April and at the time of his capture he saw 500 VC both Rhade and Vietnamese; over half were armed and the dress was mixed. After a few days he was turned over to a 15 man group. They had three Vietnamese cadre armed with pistols and 12 Rhade armed with 10 MAT 36's and 2 MAT 49's. He managed to escape from this group on 8 May.

Y-Dum was captured near his village on 20 April and was instructed to be a village agent. He graduated on 3 May and sent back to his village. The 12 man instructor group was headed by Y-Song.

b. On 12 May unconfirmed reports from several sources indicated that over 1000 VC or VC sympathizers were watching movies in the jungle in the vicinity of BQ040410. The showings were to have taken place the week of 6 May.

c. At 120400 May the District Post at Lac Thien was over-run by a VC attack. Accurate details are not presently known.

d. At 122230 May the B. Ea Kmur Land Development Center (AQ830300) approximately 2km from B. Enao, was overrun. B. Enao maintained alert status and manned all positions until 130730 May. The VC did not approach this area.

e. On 10 May Y-Sin of B. M'be (BQ154128) surrendered himself at B. Enao. He stated that 50 armed VC had captured him while he was working in his field in March 62. He underwent 2 months of training in the general area of B Knoup (BQ274150). He stated that the group he was with consisted of 100 men of which 50 were armed. Forty were Vietnamese and the remainder Rhade. There area of operations was always 10-15 km radius of B Knoup. He reported this force wore mixed clothing, no uniforms, had 4 Bren guns, 1 Mortar, and the normal mixture of carbines and french weapons. The cadre wore pistols. Y-Sin said he escaped when his group was engaged in a fire fight with an ARVN unit. He stated he was not armed.

NOTE: The interrogation is being held by a Rhade team and Phu. By the time we receive all the translations the info is late in reaching you. However Phu wires all important information to Saigon as it is received. We have asked him to include your office in the dissemination of the messages.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION:

a. On 8 May Y-Khirt a trained Village Defender at B. Tong Sing (B Sut on the map) (BQ256168) became enraged at a rice wine party and fired his .03 at some of the other villagers. No one was injured and the villagers brought him to B. Enao for disciplinary action.

b. The refugee total has increased to about 1000. One VC in the group was turned over to us. Phu is now handling the development of our film and we should begin getting the processing into you shortly.

SUBJECT: Weekly Report Buon Enao (Cont'd)

13 May 1962

5. MEDICAL: See inclosure 1
6. COMMUNICATIONS:  
No significant changes.
7. LOGISTICS: See inclosure 2 and Requisition.
8. TRANSPORTATION:  
No radical changes.
9. GENERAL:

General Ozmanski, and a host of full colonels (I believe they are connected with MAC-V, visited us today and we gave them the normal briefing and tour. They seemed well pleased and impressed and it was a pleasure to show this group around because of the interest they displayed.

Captain Phu is doing wonders as far as I am concerned. He is putting things into effect that I wanted done long ago. We no longer support a mission that is the responsibility of ARVN. As a result we are pulling our teams from B. Ho District. We are organizing along a military line in structure and control. He knows people who can do us good and we no longer have to hassle among intermediaries to get things done. We have built him and his staff an office out here.

I believe in a week we will have the organization of the Strike Force complete and all the back log of processing complete and will be at the best this operation has ever been at in all respects. We have begun coordination with FOI (Major Wolja) and we are eager to help them. They are doing everything in their power to assist us.

In accordance with your directive in assistance to the refugees, a crop growing program will be started in a few days. In exchange for the work effort the refugees will receive a minimum subsistence allowance until they can be trained in village defense.

Dave is handling the proposed demonstration with Phu. They have not worked out the details yet.



DISEASE

THIS BRINGS THE TOTAL TO DATE AS FOLLOWS:

WEAPONS ISSUED



## REQUISITION FOR SUPPLIES

APPROVED BY:

SUBMITTED BY:

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

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## AFTER ACTION REPORT

Buon Tang Ju

On or about 100300 July 1962 Buon Tang Ju (AP810927) came under attack from an estimated company of VC. The attack occurred during a heavy rain and complete darkness. We, at Buon Enao, had radio contact during the entire battle which lasted for three hours. We had two sections of our Strike Force alerted but did not dispatch them at that time due to the rain, darkness and our experience in the time factor and possibility of being ambushed. One section was dispatched at dusk and arrived at approximately 0600 hours. At this time, we also received word by radio that the VC were withdrawing into the jungle. They also gave us a report of casualties. I arrived at the scene at approximately 0730 and learned and observed the following:

At approximately 0300 on 10 July, the VC began battling the fence and making noises from all around the village perimeter (fence). (This is a turnabout from their usual tactics when they plan to attack a village but it is the normal method used when they plan on harrassing a village.) While the VC were distracting the villagers from certain points a portion of them began breaching a portion of the fence (point 1) and began entering the village through this hole. When the first VC entered the village and reached point 2 he was fired upon by a village defender (point 3) who was in his foxhole. The latter fired a single shot from his carbine and hit and killed the VC. It was at this point that firing began from all around the village. This village defender, V-40, was killed at that time and his carbine captured. The VC continued their attack from the hole in the fence as the village defenders opened fire in their assigned sectors. The women and children got into their family shelters and when I arrived some were still there. Many of the VC did enter the village in the vicinity of point one but never got much farther than the banana grove. The VC fled into the jungle at approximately 0600 and as usual were carrying their dead.

When I arrived on the scene I found that a section of the Strike Force was in the process of patrolling and searching the jungle surrounding the village. They came upon two dead VC (indicated in sketch) and were in the process of tying ropes to them and pulling them for fear that they might be booby trapped. They were not and they were both Vietnamese. The nature of their wounds reveals that they were definitely carried into the jungle by the VC. The amount of blood along the outer fences of the village as well as along the banana grove and along the route of withdrawal indicated that many, many VC were severely wounded. I was also impressed with the effectiveness of the punji stakes (bamboo spikes) as I witnessed many VC had stepped on these severely wounding themselves. In the vicinity of point 1 alone I counted four stakes that were covered with blood.

2 VC rifles (Mat 36) were captured as well as much equipment including an entire dossier of the company commander of the VC. This dossier included the entire company roster, personal history forms on every man, organization of the company down to squads and much other valuable information. This was an entire Vietnamese Company which we believe was brought in from zone D above Bien Hoa. The original roster also indicated that 9 men had been killed in actions prior to this one. Commanders name is Van Nam.

8

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235

-2-

There are 36 villagers trained and armed at Buon Tang Ju. However, it so happened that we had one Strike Force section that had completed a weeks operation in our southern area at the village for pick-up and return to Buon Enao on the morning of the 10th. We also had one Strike Force section on a propeganda mission for a two-week period that was at the village performing its duties that night and staying there until morning when they were to move on to a new village. This gave us 68 men and 6 automatic rifles more than would normally be at this village.

The VC had the village well scouted as they, in my opinion, hit it at the most advantageous spot. The banana grove hinders observation of point 1 from all but point 3 from within the village. The villagers have been trying to get the owner to cut down the grove but he has refused. Maybe now he will remove it as the dead man was his nephew.

The list of VC equipment captured is as follows:

2 MAS 36 rifles; one grenade; 2 flashlights; 1 aid kit; 100 rds MAS 36; 3 Bren magazines; 3 canteens; 2 knives; 1 hammock; 2 uniforms; and much other clothing. The many documents are in the hands of Phu who is having them logged and translated and will forward them to his CO.

The village casualty list is as follows:

One village defender killed (Y-Ao)  
One carbine lost (6448477)


After I investigated the scene the normal after action procedures were attended to. The dead man's wife was given 2000\$ to cover burial expenses; a resupply of ammo was made; critique of action was attended to.

Attachments: Sketch  
Photos


Note: Capt Phu also investigated the scene of action and is submitting his report through Vietnamese channels.

Note: We received word a few moments ago that B Tang Ju was hit again last night, 102100 July 62, but repelled the small scale attack. As a precautionary measure I had reinforced them with one Strike Force section immediately after the large encounter, so we guessed right.


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


*Breach in Fence*




VC Concentration Point 2






*Firing Position Dead Village points*



*Critiquing Troops*



*Resupplying Ammo and Equipment*



*Captured VC weapons*



*Dead VC*



2/14/4



Dead VC




*Caring for the Wounded*



*Widow Receiving Funeral Expenses*





*Family Shelter 0800*

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FOLLOW-UP ON BUON TANG JU AND BUON HRA EA HNING REPORTS:

VC have been observed in scattered small groups in the vicinity of Buon Tang Ju ever since the attack. We feel they are completely disorganized due to the loss of their leader and the many casualties they have suffered.

Buon Ea Tit (AP850938) observed four VC two km. from their village on 101400 July and attacked them. They wounded several and captured much ammo including 5 rifle grenades (a sample is being hand carried to Saigon) which are French. However the detonator seems to be Chinese manufactured.

Buon Tang Ju has been probed every night since the attack. We have two strike force sections patrolling and ambushing in that area.

We have a class A source who was told by what he considers a class C source that the VC lost 50 VC between the two attacks on 10 July (dead) and many more were wounded. After again inspecting the scenes of action this in my opinion is highly probable. At Tang Ju alone our people fired over 2,500 rounds of ammo including 6 basic loads of Automatic Rifle (6 AR's) each expended their basic load. The numerous amounts of blood and blood trails also bear this out.

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The following listed questions should be asked of persons who are met when units are on patrol missions. The first list is to be used for persons who are not armed but who may be friendly, unfriendly or neutral.

The second list is to be asked of persons who are carrying arms. In both cases the object is to keep the subject on the defensive by making him explain himself and his presence in the area.

These questions are also valid for use in the interrogation center.

LIST I.- Unarmed Person

1. What is your name?
2. Where do you live, exactly?
3. Is your family there? What are their names?
4. Can your family and neighbors identify you?
5. Have you ever had any trouble from or contact with the VC? If so, what?
6. What are you doing here?
7. Why?
8. Where are you going?
9. Why?
10. What are you carrying?
11. Why?
12. What are you going to do with it?
13. Why?
14. Are there any VC in this area? Do you know anything about the VC?
15. Do you know where they are?
16. Can you lead us to them?
17. How many are there?
18. How are they armed?
19. Have they caused any trouble in this area?
20. What kind of trouble? Where? When?
21. Have they caused any trouble in your village?
22. What kind of trouble? When?
23. If there are no VC why are you afraid to help us?

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-2-

24. Are there VC in your village?
25. Do you know them?
26. Why don't you know them?
27. If you don't know them how do you know they are there? Explain in detail.
28. How far away is your village?
29. How many people live there?
30. Are there guards around the village?
31. Are they armed?
32. Are there arms in the village?
33. Who has them?
34. What kind are they?
35. Does the village have a defense system?
36. What is it?
37. Does it have an alarm system?
38. How does it work?
39. Where are the people who give the alarms?
40. Are there stakes and booby traps on the trail?
41. Do you know where they are?
42. We believe you. Therefore, we will let you lead us to your home.
43. We are afraid we will get lost so we will tie these two soldiers to you so they don't get lost.
44. You lead the way.

-3-

## LIST II - Armed Persons

These persons are, of course, to be brought in. This is merely a preliminary interrogation.

1. What is your name?
2. Where do you live, exactly?
3. Is your family there? What are their names?
4. Can your family and neighbors identify you?
5. Where did you get this weapon?  
(If suspect says he found it ask 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13.)  
(If suspect says it was issued to him ask 14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22.)
6. Where did you find it?
7. How long ago?
8. Why didn't you report it?
9. Were there other weapons there?
10. What happened to them?
11. Can you take us to where you found it? (Why not?)
12. Can you use this weapon?--
13. Where and how did you learn?
14. Who issued you this weapon?
15. Do you have a permit to have it? If so, show it.
16. Where were you trained?
17. Who trained you?
18. Where is your unit now?
19. What unit is it?
20. Who is the commander?
21. Why aren't you with it?
22. Can you lead us to it
23. What are you doing here?
24. Why
25. Where are you going?

26. Why?
27. Are there any VC in this area?
28. Do you know where they are?
29. Can you lead us to them?
30. How many are there?
31. How are they armed?
32. Are you a VC?
33. Where is your village?
34. Is it a VC village?
35. Are there VC in the village?
36. Do you know them?
37. Why haven't you shot them (or why don't you know them)?
38. If you don't know them how do you know they are there?
39. How far away is your village?
40. How many people live there?
41. Are there guards around the village?
42. Are they armed?
43. Are there arms in the village?
44. Who has them?
45. What kind are they?
46. Does the village have a defense system?
47. What is it?
48. Does it have an alarm system?
49. How does it work?
50. Where are the people who give the alarm?
51. Are there stakes and booby traps on the trail?
52. Do you know where they are?
53. You will lead us to your village.

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INTERROGATION GUIDE

1. Unskilled interrogators operating without specific guidelines tend to wander far astray from the specific subject matter it is desired to develop.

2. They do not know enough about the subject and area to be able to lead the suspect into a trap.

3. They do not realize specifically just what information they are trying to develop and therefore do not follow a question line that will develop that information.

4. They start giving ideological lectures and get into political arguments with the suspect. They forget that an interrogator's job is to get useful information - not give political indoctrination. In many cases the interrogator should be prepared to appear to be sympathetic to the subject's political viewpoint in order to collect useful information.

5. They tend to ask leading questions and thereby get the answer they want to hear or think they should hear. This leads to the collection of an immense mass of misinformation.

6. Following are listed a few simple interrogation principles and techniques which are applicable to village interrogation centers, which can and should be part of the village tactical intelligence center, as well as to "on the spot" interrogations of prisoners or suspects picked up by patrols.

a. Individuals and small groups.

(1) If there are sufficient guards, keep prisoners separate; if they are taken in a group separate them immediately, before there is any chance of VC inside the group gaining control of thoughts or emotions. Prisoners must not be allowed to talk to each other.

(2) Begin interrogation of individuals immediately, before the individual has a chance to gain control of himself or his emotions.

(3) Interrogation should be so conducted that no other prisoner can hear either questions or answers. This can be done in two ways.

(a) In a house or room where the prisoner is alone with interrogator and guard.

(b) In the open at a distance where the interrogator can occasionally, during the interrogation, point toward other prisoners to induce fear by making them think the prisoner being interrogated is pointing them out.

(4) If any informers known to the interrogator are in the group of prisoners they should be treated and interrogated exactly as are all prisoners in order not to expose them.

(5) The interrogator should never take immediate action on any informer's report but should wait until he has interrogated three or four more prisoners.

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(6) In all cases guards and interrogators must be alert for any attempt by any prisoner to signal to or communicate with any other prisoner. A prisoner making such an effort is most likely to be a VC.

(7) Torture is seldom effective in gaining accurate information as both guilty and innocent will confess to almost anything they think the interrogator wants to know in order to stop the torture.

b. Large Groups.

(1) There will be occasions where the number of prisoners will be so large that it will be impossible to separate them individually. If any are wearing any insignia or rank they should be separated immediately by rank and closely watched. Prisoners should not be crowded closely together as it is easy for the undiscovered leaders to communicate with and control the other prisoners. It is best to seat them a meter or so apart, all facing the same direction with their hands clasped behind their heads. Soldiers guarding the group from in front can appear to be somewhat inattentive, but alert sharp eyed men should be in the rear watching for any indication that any prisoner is attempting to communicate with another. When they spot one they should immediately go in and pull the communicator and the one communicated with out of the crowd for special interrogation. If they are not close relatives it is very likely one or both are VC agents. If the rear watchers are highly trained and alert they may wait until they have detected a chain of communications and then bring them all out for special interrogation.

(2) In most cases, time permitting, it is best to start interrogating the lower ranks first as recruits and soldiers are much less likely to be politically motivated and more likely to be self motivated. The leader group should see, from a distance, this interrogation of the lower ranks in order that the weaker ones of the leader group have a chance to let their fear for themselves become stronger than their political ideology. If one, two or more interrogators are available interrogation should start with both the higher and lower ranks at the same time. Each is more inclined to talk for fear of what the other is disclosing.

c. After initial interrogation

(1) Whenever possible troops should prepare temporary prisoner compounds in available houses which will hold between 10 and 20 prisoners. These should be arranged so that trained men can see into them and hear without the prisoners being aware. Many times undiscovered leaders will seize this opportunity to attempt to gain control over the prisoners and can be spotted by the watchers.

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-3-

(2) In a well-planned raid it will be possible, many times, to send a few men into the area an hour or so ahead of the raid who can pose as civilians in transit i.e. tradesmen, travelers, etc. These men should also be arrested, in spite of their protests, and thrown in with the rest of the prisoners. If they play their part properly they will have a good chance to detect and point out (during interrogation and afterward) VC leaders.

d. Women

(1) Women are more likely to be motivated by the family protective instinct than they are by political beliefs. Many women will disclose anything in order to protect the males of the family. If interrogations have not been completely successful, it is sometimes useful to announce to the women that it being impossible to detect the guilty man it will be necessary to take all. Permit women one at a time to bid farewell to their men. Many of them will become hysterical and accuse other men of being guilty. If this occurs bring up the wife of the accused man and let her answer the first woman. Many times in the heat of the hysterical emotion of a woman fight, very interesting information is obtained by a careful listener. Women tend to point out every detail of the activities of the person they are accusing.

(2) Watch closely for the woman who carefully controls her emotions and says a relatively calm goodbye. Often such women are aware of their husband's guilt and are trying to conceal it and sometimes they too are trained agents. These cases merit further investigation as there is always the possibility that a woman is merely glad to get rid of her husband for one reason or another.

(3) Young boys 12 to 16 like to boast about how good they are. Sometimes a little praise as to how well they fought or how clever they were may get them to boasting and talking faster than any other method.

(4) Small children, old enough to talk but too young to reason well are often an excellent source of information about their elders. These should be the subject of special interrogations by friendly, fatherly type soldiers who are armed with candies, etc., and can joke and laugh and talk about how important and good, etc. father or mother is. Quite often children hear things at home that they should not and made to feel at ease with the fatherly soldier they might well boast that "daddy says Johnny Klung's father is a VC agent."

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**III. Outline of Special Considerations:**

**Enclosure:**

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19 February 1963

SPECIAL REQUIREMENT FOR COUNTERING COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

I. FOREWORD:

Experience in SEA has proven that successful area counterinsurgency programs critically depend on the development of numerous hill tribes found in this area.

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II. NEEDS AND PROPOSALS:

A. Expansion of efforts with SEA hill tribes to secure the area from Communist subversion.

B. Recruitment and training of personnel to provide the needed number of persons capable of organizing and directing primitive ethnic groups.

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III. DISCUSSION:

A. Recent success with indigenous groups has highlighted specialized development in four major areas.

1. Economic - simple village agricultural and industrial advancement.
2. Social - basic medical aid programs and introductory education.
3. Political and Propaganda - orientation of tribal relationship to their nation and the free world vs. communism.
4. Security and/or military - home guard, aggressor and intell units for tribal area defense systems.

B. Considerable contributions for these programs should be expected to come from AID, USIA, Military, and CIA.

C. All experience to date has confirmed the vital necessity of having capable U. S. personnel working in the field directly with the minority groups.

D. There is a critical shortage, from all agencies, of persons qualified in any of the four major areas who are willing or capable of working with minority groups.

E. To date, no concerned U. S. agency has any comprehensive training program specifically designed to equip its personnel to function effectively in a minority group program.

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F. We are presently ill-prepared to embark on the various highly desirable new projects involving primitive minority groups which have or will appear in the near future.

G. What is needed is a coordinated interagency training program which will equip an individual with the necessary skills and basic experience to enable him to effectively engage in operations involving minority groups.

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IV. SKILLS REQUIRED:

A. Language: Common area languages such as French or Lao-Thai would be of first consideration. This could be supplemented by a 200 to 400 word vocabulary of the tribal group a trainee is either working with or expected to work with.

B. Cultural Adjustment: All of the tribal groups of SEA have some general overlapping of environment, customs, superstitions, and diet. The SEA Training School should be designed to facilitate both physical and mental adjustment in these areas.

C. Tribal Economics: The structure of tribal economies is in general similar. For this reason, persons responsible for working with these minorities should understand present workings, potentials for improvements, observed difficulties, and possible dangers.

D. Jungle Training: Persons working with ethnic minorities in SEA should be given some basic knowledge and skills for existence, survival, and every day life in the jungle.

E. Medical ability: Trainees should receive some basic medical techniques for their own use as well as being capable of diagnosing and giving simple treatment for diseases common to the tribal groups.

F. Civic Action: Some basic knowledge in development of educational programs, youth organizations, health and sanitation, etc. as adjusted to tribal village life, can be extremely valuable in organizing minority groups.

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**SKILLS REQUIRED: (Cont'd)**

**G. Supplemental Abilities Needed:**

1. Basic air reception techniques.
2. Knowledge of building "helio" strips and/or "chopper pads."
3. Paramilitary background with emphasis on use of weapons.
4. Basic psywar and intelligence techniques.
5. Anthropology and/or Rural Sociology.

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V. CONCEPT OF TRAINING:

A. To approach actual operating conditions in tribal minority areas.

B. Instructor cadre should consist of at least four U. S. instructors with backgrounds in the four major areas, i. e., Economic, Political, Social, and Military. These should be supplied by the various interested and participating U. S. agencies.

C. Assistant instructors should be drawn from highly qualified ethnic members of CIDG, PAFU, RPP, etc.

D. Resident minority instructors should bring their families and should construct their houses to the style of their tribal group. Appropriate accoutrements, tools, etc. representative of each ethnic group should also be moved to the training site.

E. The end result should be a small complex representative of all the ethnic groups in SEA which we are either working with or consider important.

F. Possibly the site could also be used to train ethnic cadre or even administrators, etc. responsible for working with ethnic minorities within each of the countries of SEA. Training for these groups would of course vary with the needs of their individual cases.

G. In every respect the training site should use local items in preference to imported ones. This mainly includes food and housing.

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CONCEPT OF TRAINING: (cont'd)

H. A preliminary screening and evaluation period of about 10 days should take place in the U. S. prior to trainees being sent to the field. This program should consist of:

1. Orientation to include basic objectives, familiarization of general problems, and expected living conditions.
2. Field problem designed to test the flexibility and mental outlook of the prospective trainees. (This might include a number of "harassment situations" designed to frustrate and irritate the students.)

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VI. TRAINING:

A. Classroom instruction on selected area language; principles of economic, political, social, and security developments for tribal groups; and any additional classroom work as needed to develop the abilities recommended in IV.

B. Field problems designed to actually develop the various minorities surrounding the area of the selected training site.

C. Possible visits to existing effective projects with minorities in the area of SEA.

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VII. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS:

- A. All U. S. students should be volunteers.
- B. Candidates should be aware of the exact nature of the type of work and the demands that will be made of them.
- C. Effective ability in working closely with indigenous people should be the primary factor in retaining or dropping a trainee.
- D. Ideally, students should have a farm or outdoorsman background.
- E. Age limit should be about 35, with exceptions to the rule.
- F. Adjustments will have to be made in career management programs of such agencies as AID, CIA, and Military to provide for long-term utilization of the abilities gained by the persons working with ethnic minorities.
- G. Personnel assignments should be for periods of 2 to 3 years and families should be assisted in moving to the nearest feasible location.

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VIII ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS:

- A. Approval must be obtained from the government selected to host the ethnic minority training school. (The Thai Government is recommended, since the N. E. of Thailand seems to be the most logical area for the school).
- B. A funding and supply channel must be established, preferably through a single U. S. agency such as AID.
- C. The training site must be located and built. In addition, U. S. and ethnic cadre should be settled on location prior to any arrival of trainees.
- D. Cost of setting up the site must be determined - but it is not expected to exceed \$10,000.00.
- E. A system for supplying the camp must be developed. Overall this would amount to not more than five hours of C-46/47 time per month and 15-20 hours per month of STOL/helicopter time; depending on road access and use of trucks to supply equipment.
- F. The largest area of difficulty would be selection and assembly of U. S. trainees. Some facility would have to be provided by the participating agencies for per diem, incentive allowances, and essential equipment.
- G. Local or ethnic instructors would be paid on the basis of local rates with some additional compensation for the abnormal conditions. (Average would be \$50-\$75.00 per month).

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ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS: (cont'd)

H. Costs of establishing and running the school should be borne equally by the agencies participating in it.

I. Expenses for the first year are estimated as follows:

1. First year for 20-25 students - less than \$200,000.
2. Continuing years costs average about \$150,000.

NOTE: Student salaries are not included as a part of expense; however, both U. S. and ethnic instructor expenses are included.

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IX. ORGANIZATION OF ETHNIC/AREA TEAM SYSTEM:

A. Establish three-man U. S. ethnic/area teams composed of one representative each from AID, CIA, and Special Forces.

NOTE: Substitution of agencies or personnel would be feasible so long as team members were skilled in the required backgrounds.

1. Each of these agencies would supply personnel to the recommended training school. Upon graduation three-man teams would be formed and assigned to develop one or more ethnic minority groups.

2. Individuals would be supported by their individual agencies. However, they should be only indirectly responsible to those agencies. Direct responsibility would be to the Ethnic/Area country team. /explanation follows./

B. Development of Ethnic/Area Country Team system.

1. The U. S. Ambassador should select or appoint representatives from the various agencies, i.e., AID, CIA, and Military. This group would be known as the Ethnic/Area Country Team.

2. Ethnic/Area Country Teams would have the responsibility for directing and controlling the various Field E/A teams working in the host country.

3. E/A Country Teams would initiate and direct all support from the representative agencies to be provided for E/A development programs. (In short, the E/A Country Team is the coordinating body for the entire E/A effort. E/A field teams would answer directly to the E/A Country Team and indirectly to their individual agencies.

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ORGANIZATION OF ETHNIC/AREA TEAM SYSTEM: (cont'd)

C. Host Government's Ethnic/Area Counterparts:

1. E/A field teams should be trained and allowed to work closely with and similar to the U. S. E/A field teams.
2. An E/A Country Team should be appointed by the Host Government. If an emergency situation exists with minority groups, this E/A group should have some authority to direct national funds to the E/A developments. The Host E/A Country Team would be a counterpart of the U. S. E/A Country Team.

D. Specific support agreements should be concluded between host governments and the U. S. to permit direct provision of monies and materials to the project level in the event of emergencies.

E. Allowances should be made for changes of fixed political agreements which "hamper" functional working relations between the U. S. and the host government.

F. Control Group. E/A: should be a Washington ethnic/area working group which would act as the supervisory organ for the E/A program. It might well include representatives of all the agencies concerned but should be responsible to a single authority, at least during the experimental stage.

1. Duties of the Control Group, E/A would be to coordinate, program, and direct the support to be provided by the various agencies.
2. Overall analysis with consideration for potential development should be an initial responsibility of the Control Group, E/A.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

X. CONCLUSION:

Detailed planning has not been attempted in this paper but such planning could logically follow the acceptance of the concepts and principles outlined in this paper. The next step should be some type of working committee, possibly appointed by the Special Group (CI) whose function would be to develop details and planning to effect initial action. It is probable that CIA could proceed with some initial implementation as indicated under NSAM 162 which states in part; "the CIA will expand its present training and support efforts to achieve needed improvements in indigenous intelligence organizations and that other U. S. agencies contribute to this CIA coordinated program.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

XI. APPROACH TO EFFECT:

A. Approval for Experimental Program

B. Recruitment of Trainees:

1. Selected individuals from participating agencies.
2. Hiring of IVS, Peace Corps, and/or military personnel upon completion of contracts or tours of duty.
3. Raw recruitment at university levels.

NOTE: In the event raw recruits are drawn into the Ethnic/Area program, short courses should be conducted by the individual agencies. A program might be developed whereby each candidate, once processed, could undergo limited essential training from each agency before being sent to the E/A Field Training Center.

FURTHER NOTE: In the event college graduates are recruited, studies should be made of the highly personalized selective approach made by IVS. (This system has proven successful in obtaining the type of person needed for work in underdeveloped areas.)

4. Exception Recruitment: A great number of persons exist who have qualifications that would enable them to work effectively with ethnic groups. To date this source has not been recognized as a potential area for filling gaps in personnel requirements for overseas assignments. Since work with ethnic groups mainly involves experience and understanding of certain basic working principles, it is believed that persons with outstanding backgrounds in the following areas might be selected:

- (a) High school education
- (b) General agricultural background
- (c) Knowledge of simple industries.
- (d) Prior military experience

S-E-C-R-E-T

-2-

(e) Backwoodsman or outdoorsman.

NOTE: Such persons should be of high quality and no more than 1 or 2 of these types per E/A team would be feasible. (One of the "keys" here is the motivation of the individual.)

C. Establishment of the SEA Ethnic/Area Field Training Center - as indicated.

D. Enactment of the E/A System - as proposed.

E. Adjustment of training program to include "on the job" training - new E/A teams training and working under experienced E/A teams and field instructor supervisors.

NOTE: Such a system might well eliminate the continued need of the E/A Field Training Center.

F. Alteration of E/A system to fit needs in other areas.

Example would be use of an E/A team to conduct a survey of minority groups in a suspected trouble spot.

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End